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POWER AND POLITICS IN THE CHINESE
COURT SYSTEM: THE ENFORCEMENT
OF CIVIL JUDGMENTS
DONALD C. CLARKE*
According to reports from all regions of North China, there is a great
accumulation of unexecuted cases at the level of the court of first instance. . . . In
some of these cases, it has been two or three years since judgment; in some, the party
frequently runs to the court to apply for execution but the problem is not resolved; in
some, the party asks, “Is there any law in the court?” and “Does the judgment count
for anything?” — this has been the cause of great dissatisfaction among the masses.
—North China Division of the Supreme People’s Court, 19531

At present, the most prominent problem in economic adjudication is the difficulty
of executing judgments.

*
Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. This article is a revised and
much expanded version of an article that appeared in the March, 1995 issue of the China Quarterly.
I would like to thank the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China, the Committee on
Legal Education Exchange with China, and the University of Washington School of Law for the funds
and leave time that made possible the research on which this article is based. I would also like to thank
William Alford, James Feinerman, Ellen Hertz, Nicholas Howson, Louis Wolcher, and Ping Yu for
their comments and suggestions at various stages of this project.
Court officials, academics, lawyers, and others interviewed in China who were promised
anonymity are identified in the notes only by profession. In addition to interviews and articles in legal
journals, this article draws heavily on news reports published in the legal and popular press. These are
not always reliable, and it would be a mistake to draw conclusions of any weight from a single report.
I have tried to compensate for this unreliability by sheer volume, on the assumption that an inference
is relatively reliable if it is supported by many news stories from different parts of the country.
1.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Huabei Fenyuan [North China Division of the Supreme
People’s Court], Guanyu Geji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Panjue De Zhishi [Directive Concerning the
Implementation of Judgments by People’s Courts at All Levels] (Aug. 1, 1953), reprinted in MINSHI
SUSONGFA CANKAO ZILIAO [REFERENCE MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], vol. II, part
2 [hereinafter 2 MSCZ], at 720, 720 (Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Faxue Yanjiusuo Minfa Yanjiushi
Min-Su Zu, Beijing Zheng-Fa Xueyuan Minshi Susong Jiaoyanshi [Civil Procedure Group of the Civil
Law Research Section of the Institute of Law of the Chinese Acadeny of Social Sciences and the Civil
Procedure Law Teaching and Research Section of the Beijing Institute of Politics and Law] eds.,
1981) [hereinafter 1953 SPC-NC Directive].
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—Zheng Tianxiang, President of the Supreme People’s Court, 19882
When judgments are not executed, the law is worth nothing.
—“The masses”3

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a staple of Chinese legal literature that the judgments of Chinese
courts in civil and economic cases are plagued by a low execution rate and
that this is a serious problem. This perception should be taken seriously.
When the President of the Supreme People’s Court devotes significant
space to it in his report to the National People’s Congress, as did Zheng
Tianxiang in 19884 and Ren Jianxin in subsequent reports, clearly
something interesting is going on. Yet it would be a mistake to accept all
reports uncritically. A critical examination of the claims and the evidence
can yield a richer picture of reality than has been presented by the literature
so far.
The issue of whether court judgments can be enforced is important for
a number of reasons, among which is its bearing on the relationship
between the legal system and the economic system. Laws, courts, and court
judgments are part of the institutional framework within which economic
reform is being carried out in China. Obviously, the rules of the game have
to change. But the move from a hierarchically administered economy to a
primarily market economy means more than just changing the content of
the rules. It implies a whole new way of rule-making and rule-enforcing.
This article explores one particular way of making the rules mean
something: the enforcement of a court decision that the implementation of
a particular rule requires the performance of a particular act — typically,
the delivery of money or goods. How does a court make A give something
to B? If court decisions cannot be enforced, then the rules that they purport
to implement will have little significance,5 and this has crucial implications
for the direction of economic reforms.

2.
Zheng Tianxiang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme People’s Court
Work Report] (Apr. 1, 1988), reprinted in ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO [SUPREME PEOPLE’S
COURT GAZETTE] [SPCG], No. 2, June 20, 1988, at 3, 8.
3.
Quoted in Liu Yong, Tantan Shen-Zhi Fenli De Biyao Xing [A Discussion of the Need
to Separate Adjudication from Execution], FAZHI JIANSHE [CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM],
No. 3, at 46, 46 (1984).
4.
See Zheng, supra note 2, at 8.
5.
As will be shown later, however, there are some interesting ways in which even an
unenforced and unenforceable court judgment can have significant real-world consequences.
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It is important to stress what this article is not about. First, it is
concerned only with civil judgments of the type outlined above. Because
I am trying to look at cases in which there is no perceived direct threat to
governmental authority, I do not discuss the enforcement of judgments in
criminal matters or the enforcement of administrative decisions.
Second, I do not discuss the process by which the judgment to be
enforced is produced. This is a key part of any full account of the
enforcement of rights in China. A powerful opponent may be able to scare
a weaker party out of bringing suit. Once suit is brought, many obstacles
stand in the way of a correct judgment: judicial ignorance of the law and
corruption, to name two, as well as the many factors detailed in this article
that stand in the way of execution, such as favoritism of local enterprises.6
This article deals only with what happens after the judgment is issued.
Third, this article is not about the enforcement of judgments, Chinese
or foreign, involving foreigners. Since the beginning of large-scale foreign
investment in China, the government has attempted to maintain a largely
separate legal system for foreign businesses. In many cases there are special
rules or practices applicable to foreigners and some of these are noted in
passing. With the progress of economic reform, however, segregation is
becoming less and less viable and the special status of foreigners is
disappearing. What is true for domestic parties will increasingly be just as
true for foreign parties, both for better and for worse.
Part II of this article explains the focus on court decisions. It argues
that although not all the rules pertaining to economic activity, broadly
defined, are enforced through courts, an important sub-class of those rules
is given meaning through court decisions and their enforcement.
Part III introduces the legal institutional background to issues of
execution, looking at legislation and the structure of the court system.
Part IV examines the evidence of the existence of a problem in
enforcing civil judgments against recalcitrant defendants.
Part V contains the detailed analysis of the problem, discussing
precisely where problems seem to exist and why. In studying causes, it also
suggests ways in which some problems could be overcome.
Part VI presents the conclusion and links difficulties in enforcement
to the lack of fit between economic reform and legal institutional reform.

6.
For more on the factors that go into the production of a court decision, see Phyllis L.
Chang, Deciding Disputes: Factors That Guide Chinese Courts in the Adjudication of Rural
Responsibility Contract Disputes, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (1989) and Donald C. Clarke,
What’s Law Got To Do With It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 1, 57-64 (1991).
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WHY LOOK AT COURT DECISIONS?

A focus on courts does not depend on the assumption that courts in
China possess anything like the power and prestige they command in
common-law countries and, to perhaps a lesser extent, in developed civillaw countries. It is instead the particular relationship among economic
reforms, rules, and institutions that suggests a focus on court decisions and
their enforcement.
The transition from a plan-centered to a market-centered economy
requires an appropriate set of corresponding legal institutions, the most
important feature of which is general applicability. The essence of the
planned economy is production according to directives from above. A
production directive to a firm is meaningless if it does not take into account
the particular characteristics of the firm (for example, its production
capacity). Firms producing in a competitive market, on the other hand,
operate under a set of constraints common to all firms in their sector:
prices, demand, environmental and labor regulations, etc.7 If law in China
is to be used in support of market institutions, it must apply indifferently to
large numbers of economic actors. Otherwise the system will revert to the
kind of specific directives and ad hoc bargaining whose inadequacies led
to the drive for reform in the first place.8
A system of uniformly applicable rules needs an institution ready and
able to undertake the task of enforcing them. For a number of reasons, the
courts in China are the most likely candidate for this task.
First, individual courts, not just the system as a whole, have the
putative authority to issue orders cutting across bureaucratic and territorial
boundaries provided that jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. A judge
sitting in a Hunan county and appointed by the county People’s Congress
could, under proper circumstances, legitimately order a state-owned, cityrun handicrafts factory in Harbin to pay a sum of money to a collectivelyowned, township-run sandalwood supplier in Guangxi.
This type of formal authority is remarkable in China. No other
institution, including the Communist Party, has it. The traditional way to
solve disputes in post-1949 China has been to find the common superior

7.
This paragraph should not be read as a claim that firms in Western economies all
actually function in this way. It is intended merely to highlight the differences between the ideal type
of the planned economy and the ideal type of the market economy.
8.
I make this argument more fully in Donald C. Clarke, The Law, the State and Economic
Reform, in THE CHINESE STATE IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORM 190 (Gordon White ed., 1991).
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with jurisdiction over both parties.9 But this method invariably involves the
problems of particularism and bargaining that economic reform was
intended to move away from.
Second, norms enforced by courts can be less subject to dilution than
norms enforced by other bureaucracies. Any authority system faces the
problem of ensuring that policy formulated at the top is carried out properly
below. The key advantage of court-enforced policy over bureaucratically
implemented policy is that, if the system works properly, it minimizes the
number of layers between policy making and policy implementation. A
court can resolve a dispute between parties by direct reference to the
original text of policy issued by the relevant policy maker, which could for
example be the central government. In this case, there is only one
intermediate layer between the central policy makers and the regulated
parties. Thus, court enforcement of rules has the potential to provide a
much greater degree of uniformity and consistency than enforcement by
other bureaucracies — provided the courts can actually command
obedience and have a system for ensuring consistent enforcement.10
A consistently enforced system of rights-granting rules of property
and contract is often thought necessary for economic development.11 Can
well defined property and contract rights — particularly property rights —
reasonably be said to exist? Are rights of property and contract, however
well defined, in fact reliably enforced? If not, does China’s undeniably
impressive growth provide a significant challenge to this theory? An
examination of the enforceability of court decisions about rights can
contribute to the discussion of the relationship between property and

9.
This principle applies not only to dispute resolution but sometimes also to the most
basic kinds of communications or cooperative relationships. If two units in different systems (xitong)
would gain from some mutually beneficial arrangement, they cannot just do it. They must go through
proper channels. I discuss this principle at greater length in Donald C. Clarke, The Creation of a Legal
Structure for Market Institutions in China, in REFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISM: THE GROWTH OF
MARKET INSTITUTIONS 39, 45 (John McMillan & Barry Naughton eds., 1996).
10.
It should be stressed that this is so far largely a question of potential, not reality. Law
in China still works in much the same way as a bureaucratic command — in fact, it might be more
accurately characterized as simply a species of bureaucratic command. A central law is passed down
to the provincial level, where it is interpreted and sent down to the local level. The local gloss added
at the intermediate levels is in fact expected, as the central regulation may be deliberately vague on
certain points. Ultimately, local courts must follow the municipal authorities’ interpretation of the
provincial authorities’ interpretation of the central document. In short, law in China tends to be like
an army command: you follow only the orders of your immediate superior. Whether he gave the right
orders or not is a matter between him and his superior, not for you to wonder about.
11.
See generally, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE
WESTERN WORLD (1973); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
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contract rights and economic development by providing a richer
understanding of just what it means in practice to have a right in China.

III. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: COURT STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATION
A.

The
. Court System

To understand the issue of execution in its full complexity, it is
necessary to understand something about the structure of the courts.12 China
has a total of about 3,500 courts of general jurisdiction and various
specialized courts13 staffed by about 106,000 judges and 52,000 assistant
judges.14 There are four levels of courts of general jurisdiction, the lower
two of which are the usual courts of original jurisdiction, although all can
serve as such depending on the perceived importance of the case and the
status of the parties.15

12.
For more detail on the court system, see the accounts, on which the following
paragraphs are based (although supplemented and updated) in Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution
in China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 245, 235-268 (1991) and Clarke, supra note 6, at 19-22, 57-69.
13.
The structure of the court system is set out in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin
Fayuan Zuzhi Fa [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Organization of People’s Courts],
as amended, 1983 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAGUI HUIBIAN [COLLECTED LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] [FGHB] 4 [hereinafter Court Organization
Law]. There are about 132 specialized courts, whose jurisdiction is by subject matter and is not limited
by administrative boundaries. See Chang Hong, Top Judge Feels Law Has Made Big Gains, CHINA
DAILY, Oct. 3, 1989, at 4.
14.
See Renmin Fayuan Zai Gaige Kaifang Zhong Quanmian Fazhan—Fang Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan Yuanzhang Ren Jianxin [The People’s Courts Are Developing in All Areas in the
Course of Reform—An Interview With the President of the Supreme People’s Court, Ren Jianxin],
ZHONGGUO FALÜ [CHINESE LAW], June 15, 1995, at 2, 7. Assistant judges are appointed by the courts
themselves, not the local People’s Congress or its Standing Commitee, see infra note 22 and
accompanying text, and may be authorized to perform the same functions as judges. See Court
Organization Law, supra note 13, art. 37.
15.
For example, Intermediate Level People’s Courts are the courts of original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases where a foreigner is the accused or the victim. See Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China], 1979
FGHB 87, art. 15 [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Law]. In a system where court officials are simply
bureaucrats, it is inappropriate for them to pass judgment on those of higher rank. Thus, regulations
exist that assign original jurisdiction to courts of various levels depending on the administrative and
social rank of the parties involved. See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court],
Guanyu Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Opinion on Several Issues in Civil
Adjudication Work] (Aug. 28, 1963), in JIEFANG YILAI QUANGUO MINSHI, JINGJI SHENPAN GONGZUO
HUIYI ZHENGCE WENJIAN XUANBIAN [SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM NATIONAL MEETINGS ON CIVIL
AND ECONOMIC ADJUDICATION SINCE LIBERATION] [hereinafter SELECTED DOCUMENTS] 1, 10-11
(Yunnan Zheng-Fa Zhuanke Xuexiao Minfa Jiaoyan Shi, Yunnan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan
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At the top of the structure is the Supreme People’s Court (zuigao
renmin fayuan) (SPC).16 Below it, at the provincial level, are the thirty
Higher Level People’s Courts (gaoji renmin fayuan) (HLPC): one for each
province, autonomous region (e.g., Tibet or Xinjiang), and centrallyadministered city (e.g., Beijing or Shanghai). Below the HLPCs are the 389
Intermediate Level People’s Courts (zhongji renmin fayuan) (ILPC).17
These are established just below the provincial level in prefectures (diqu),
provincially-administered cities, and within centrally-administered cities.
At the bottom are the 3,000-odd18 Basic Level People’s Courts (jiceng
renmin fayuan) (BLPC), which exist at the county level. Because it may be
difficult for parties from outlying areas to attend court, a BLPC may
establish branch courts known as People’s Tribunals (renmin fating) (PT)
outside the town in which it is headquartered.19 The decision of a PT is the
decision of the BLPC and is properly appealed to the court above the
BLPC, not the BLPC.20 There are over 18,000 PTs across the country.21
The formal structure of the Chinese government and its relationship
to the courts is shown in simplified form in Figure 1. Each court has a
president, a vice president, and several judges. Generally, court presidents

Yanjiushi [Civil Law Teaching and Research Section of the Yunnan Specialized Institute of Politics
and Law and the Research Section of the Yunnan Province Higher Level People’s Court] eds., June
1985) [hereinafter 1963 SPC Opinion]; Renmin Fayuan Shenpan Minshi Anjian Chengxu Zhidu De
Guiding (Shi Xing) [Rules on the System of Procedure for the Adjudication of Civil Cases by People’s
Courts (for Trial Implementation)] (Feb. 2, 1979), in ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE [HANDBOOK ON
EXECUTION WORK] 73, 74-75 (Sun Changli ed., 1988) [hereinafter 1979 SPC Rules]. The Communist
Party Central Committee may assign any case to the Supreme People’s Court. See id.
16.
For a detailed and well-informed account of the Supreme People’s Court and its role
in the legal system, see Susan Finder, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China,
7 J. CHINESE L. 145 (1994).
17.
See Renmin Fayuan Zai Gaige Kaifang Zhong Quanmian Fazhan, supra note 14, at 2.
18.
See id.
19.
The establishment and functioning of PTs are governed by two regulations. The first,
entitled “Experimental Procedures for the Work of People’s Tribunals (Draft)” (Renmin Fating
Gongzuo Shixing Banfa (Cao’an)), was circulated by the Supreme People’s Court to lower courts in
1963. The second, entitled “Several Rules Concerning People’s Tribunals” (Guanyu Renmin Fating
De Ruogan Guiding), was formulated in July, 1988 by the Supreme People’s Court and apparently
circulated to lower courts. Neither document has to my knowledge been published. See Han Shuzhi,
Renmin Fating Shezhi Ji Gongzuo De Jige Wenti [Several Problems in the Establishment and Work
of People’s Tribunals], FAXUE [JURISPRUDENCE] (Shanghai), No. 10, at 18, 18 (1990).
20.
Court Organization Law, supra note 13, art. 20.
21.
See Renmin Fayuan Zai Gaige Kaifang Zhong Quanmian Fazhan, supra note 14, at 2.
The same source, the President of the Supreme People’s Court, put the number at 18,500 in 1991. See
Ren Jianxin, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme People’s Court Work Report], FAZHI
RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Apr. 12, 1991, at 2, 2, translated in BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, PART 3: ASIA-PACIFIC [SWB/FE], Apr. 25, 1991,
at C1/1. In 1994, however, another authoritative source put the number at 15,400. See ZHONGGUO
FALÜ NIANJIAN 1994 [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 1994], at 103 (1994).
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are chosen by the People’s Congress at the same level, as shown, but vice
presidents and other judges are chosen by the corresponding People’s
Congress Standing Committee.22 This local control of personnel and
funding23 has crucial implications for the functioning of the court system
that are discussed in more detail below.24 Unlike federal judges in the
United States, Chinese judges have no security of tenure and below the
SPC are not appointed by the central government. Hence, BLPC judges are
beholden to the county-level government, HLPC judges are beholden to the
provincial-level government, and SPC judges are beholden to the central
government.25

22.
This states only the formal rule. In fact, People’s Congresses act as rubber stamps for
the local Communist Party organizational department. See, e.g., Zhonggong Zhongyang [Chinese
Communist Party [hereinafter CCP] Central Committee], Guanyu Quan Dang Bixu Jianjue Weihu
Shehui Zhuyi Fazhi De Tongzhi [Notice on the Need for the Whole Party to Firmly Uphold the
Socialist Legal System] (July 10, 1986), reprinted in 3 SIFA SHOUCE [JUDICIAL HANDBOOK] 92, 94-95
(“Resolutions and decisions passed by People’s Congresses and their Standing Committees at various
levels must have prior approval in principle by the Party committee at the same level.”).
23.
Various internal Party documents state clearly that although court personnel are under
a system of “dual leadership” (shuangchong lingdao), the leadership of the local Party organization
is primary. See Zhonggong Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Dangzu [Communist Party Group of the Supreme
People’s Court], Guanyu Geji Renmin Fayuan Dangzu Xiezhu Dangwei Guanli Fayuan Ganbu De
Banfa [Measures on Cooperation with Party Committees by Party Groups at Courts of All Levels in
the Administration of Court Cadres] (transmitted Jan. 10, 1984 to Party branches in courts at the
provincial level), reprinted in 3 SIFA SHOUCE [JUDICIAL HANDBOOK] 609 [hereinafter Corporation
Measures] (citing Doc. 33 of CCP Organization Department (1983) and Doc. 15 of CCP Organization
Department (1983)). For more on funding, see infra text accompanying notes 177-184.
24.
See infra text accompanying notes 177-210.
25.
Few ILPCs have a People’s Congress at the same level. Prefectures, for example, are
units of administration immediately below the provincial government established for the convenience
of that government and have no People’s Congress of their own. In that case, ILPC judges are
officially appointed by the provincial People’s Congress.
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Figure 1: Formal relationship of government, courts, and People's Congresses. Arrows indicate
power to appoint personnel.
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Officials in China’s court system are generally poorly educated,
especially at the BLPC level, where a large number of judges are
demobilized army officers.26 There is as yet no career judicial bureaucracy.
Until the passage in 1995 of the Law on Judicial Officers,27 there were no
objective qualifications in terms of legal training that all judges had to
have,28 although in practice something more than simply secondary school
was usually required.29 The Law on Judicial Officers now prescribes certain
educational qualifications, but judges in office at the time of its passage
who do not meet the qualifications are not required to resign. They are
given a certain amount of time (yet to be stipulated by the Supreme
People’s Court) for training.30
China’s courts hear and decide cases in three basic organizational
forms. First, a single judge can try minor civil and criminal cases in the first
instance. Second, other cases are tried by a collegiate bench of at least three
persons.31 The bench is composed solely of judges or of judges and
26.
These officers are simply assigned to a court whether they are wanted there or not. In
1988, the then-president of the Supreme People’s Court asked the National People’s Congress to give
the courts more power to refuse assignments of unqualified personnel and begged local Party
committees, People’s Congresses, and governments not to send such people. See Zheng, supra note
2, at 4.
27.
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegua Faguan Fa [Law on Judicial Officers of the People’s
Republic of China] (effective July 1, 1995), FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Mar. 3, 1995, at
2 [hereinafter Law on Judicial Officers].
28.
Judges and clerks must, however, be qualified for the personal status of state cadre
(guojia ganbu). Thus, a peasant or worker could not be suddenly elevated to a judgeship. He or she
would first have to find some way to move into the state cadre class. See Academic Interview S.
The Law on Judicial Officers was several years in incubation. In 1988, Supreme People’s
Court president Ren Jianxin first announced that the law was being drafted and that it would establish
a unified national standard of qualifications for judges. See Su Hongzi & Yu Xinnian, Fayuan Gaige
He Jinshe Shi Wancheng Shenpan Renwu De Zhongyao Baozheng [The Building and Reform of
Courts Are Important Guarantees of the Fulfillment of Adjudication Tasks], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL
SYSTEM DAILY], July 19, 1988, at 1. Although this claim was consistently repeated in subsequent
years, the law was not enacted until 1995.
29.
See Academic Interview S.
30.
See Law on Judicial Officers, supra note 27, art. 9. The educational qualifications are
as follows:
Graduation from an institute of higher education with a specialization in law, or
graduation from an institute of higher education with a specialization not in law but
with specialized legal knowledge, and two years’ work experience; or a bachelor’s
degree in law and one year’s work experience. Those who have achieved a master’s or
doctoral degree in law need not be subject to the above requirements of work
experience. Adjudication personnel in office prior to the implementation of this law
who do not meet the conditions stipulated [above] should undergo training in order to
meet the conditions stipulated by this law within a prescribed period. Concrete
measures shall be formulated by the Supreme People’s Court.
31.
This requirement can create problems. According to one report, a number of People’s
Tribunals, when faced with cases that cannot be heard by a single judge, can attempt only mediation
because they lack the third judge necessary to form a collegiate bench. See Kunrao Renmin Fayuan
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“people’s assessors” (renmin peishenyuan) selected from the populace.32
Third, each court has an Adjudication Committee, which is the highest
decision-making body within the court. It is composed of the court
president, the vice president, the head and deputy head of the various
specialized chambers, and ordinary judges. The Adjudication Committee
has the power to decide individual cases if it wishes and to direct the judge
or bench that heard the case to enter a particular verdict.33
In addition to deciding cases by adjudication, courts can and indeed
are encouraged to lead the parties to a mediated agreement. Until its 1991
revision, the Law on Civil Procedure instructed courts to “stress
mediation”; when attempts at mediation failed, they were to proceed to
adjudication.34
An important feature of court mediation is that the mediation
agreement has the same effect as a court judgment upon its delivery to the

De “Si Nan” [The “Four Difficulties” Vexing People's Courts], FAZHI DAOBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
HERALD], Feb. 26, 1988, at 3.
32.
It appears that the role of people’s assessors is largely a formality and that they are not
expected to disagree with the views of the presiding judge. See, for example, Liu Shouhai,
Peishenyuan Liangdi Shu [Letters from (People’s) Assessors in Two Places], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL
SYSTEM DAILY], Aug. 25, 1988, at 1, where the writer recalls his service as a people’s assessor. After
the trial but before any discussion, he was informed that the court president had already decided how
the case was to be disposed of and was presented with a copy of the judgment to sign. His career as
a people’s assessor ended when, in another case, he ventured to question the conclusions of the
presiding judge.
33.
The Adjudication Committee is discussed in greater detail in Clarke, supra note 6, at
60-61.
34.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) [People's Republic of
China Law on Civil Procedure (for Trial Implementation)], 1982 FGHB 133, art. 6 [hereinafter 1982
Law on Civil Procedure]. Article 6 is now article 9 in the revised Law on Civil Procedure. Where it
formerly said that people’s courts should “stress mediation,” it now says they should “conduct
mediation in accordance with the principles of voluntariness and lawfulness.” Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China], ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO QUANGUO RENMIN DABIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GONGBAO
[PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE GAZETTE]
[NPCSCG], No. 3, July 10, 1991, at 3, art. 8 [hereinafter Law on Civil Procedure], translated in
SWB/FE, May 8, 1991, at C1/1, and in CHINA L. & PRACTICE, No. 5, at 15 (1991). The translation
here is my own.
In the view of the Economic Chamber of the Beijing Intermediate Level People’s Court,
to “stress” mediation meant that the court should attempt mediation in every case before it. See Liang
Qinhan, Chuli Jingji Jiufen Anjian Ying Zhuozhong Tiaojie [In Handling Cases of Economic Disputes
One Should Stress Mediation], FAXUE YANJIU [LEGAL STUDIES], No. 4, at 13, 13 (1981). Although
this article predates even the old Law on Civil Procedure, to “stress mediation” appears to have been
a well-settled policy directive for courts. Indeed, such was the need for courts to report large numbers
of mediated settlements that even outcomes where one side got everything it asked for and the other
side nothing were reported as successful mediations. See, e.g., Changjia Laizhang, Fayuan Mingduan;
Fang’ai Zhixing, Zhuren Shou Fa [Factory Welshes on Debts, Court Judges Clearly; For Obstructing
Execution, the Person in Charge Is Punished], ANHUI FAZHI BAO [ANHUI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS],
Apr. 6, 1988, at 1, 2.
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parties.35 In fact, it arguably has a stronger effect, since, being in theory
voluntary, it may not be appealed.36 In addition, court mediation is the only
kind of mediation attempt that can (in divorce cases) be required before a
court will give judgment.37
Internally, courts are organized into several departments, all under the
general authority of the Adjudication Committee and the court president.
Several of these are adjudicatory chambers (ting) — the criminal chamber,
the civil chamber, the administrative chamber, and so on. In addition to
these chambers, there might also be a general office (bangongshi) and a
personnel section (renshi bumen).38
The execution of judgments is generally consigned to a separate
department within the court, the execution chamber (zhixing ting).
Although the great majority of basic level and intermediate level courts39
do now have such a chamber, it is not technically required. The relevant
law requires only that particular personnel be placed in charge of execution
work.40 The execution chamber is administratively equal to the other
adjudicatory chambers, and its officers are formally on the same
bureaucratic ladder as adjudication officers.41 Very few, however, have
worked as such or have received specialized legal education,42 and the

35.
See RENMIN TIAOJIE SHIYONG DAQUAN [PRACTICAL COMPENDIUM OF PEOPLE'S
MEDIATION] 17 (Liu Zhitao ed., 1990).
36.
See id.; Michael Palmer, The Revival of Mediation in the People's Republic of China:
(2) Judicial Mediation, in YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS 1988, at 161 (W.E. Butler ed.,
1989).
37.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa [Marriage Law of the People’s Republic
of China], 1980 FGHB 3, art. 25 [hereinafter Marriage Law].
38.
See Academic Interview S; Court Interview K.
39.
Execution chambers are most necessary at these levels, because they have original
jurisdiction over almost all cases and are thus in charge of execution of the judgment whether or not
it is appealed.
40.
See Court Organization Law, supra note 13, art. 41; Law on Civil Procedure, supra note
34, art. 209.
41.
See Academic Interview S. It is not clear what the effect of the new Law on Judicial
Officers will be on execution officers. Because their work does not require the same level of legal
training as that of a regular judge, the educational requirements of the Law clash with the principle
that execution officers are essentially the same as judges in the other chambers. The Law on Judicial
Officers essentially fudges the question by providing cryptically in article 48 that “execution officers
of people’s courts shall be administered with reference to (canzhao) the relevant provisions of this
law.” The legal significance of this formulation is that it makes it apparent that the drafters
deliberately chose not to use one of several other formulations unambiguously meaning “in
accordance with” (yizhao; genju; anzhao).
42.
See Beijing Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Beijing Intermediate Level
People’s Court Execution Chamber], Wei Zhixing Gongzuo De Liangxing Xunhuan Gaijin Women
De Gongzuo [Improve Our Work to Achieve a Virtuous Cycle in Execution Work], at 5, in DI-ER-CI
QUANGUO SHENGHUI CHENGSHI ZHONGJI RENMIN FAYUAN ZHIXING GONGZUO YANTAOHUI HUIYI
CAILIAO [MATERIALS FROM THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF INTERMEDIATE LEVEL PEOPLE’S
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prestige of the execution chamber is lower than that of the adjudicatory
chambers.43 According to a number of sources, young and capable cadres
go to the adjudicatory chambers, while the execution chamber is the refuge
of the tired, the mediocre, and the uneducated.44 Nevertheless, one source
reports that about one third of the funds spent on handling cases go toward
execution.45
Reported statistics allow no more than a very rough picture of the
operations of execution chambers in particular. While a 1987 article put the
total number of execution personnel nationwide at 1301,46 by 1990 there
were 648 in Jiangsu province47 and 635 in Heilongjiang province alone.48

COURTS FROM PROVINCIAL CAPITALS ON EXECUTION WORK] [hereinafter CONFERENCE MATERIALS]
(1992) [hereinafter Beijing ILPC].
43.
Id., at 2; Xi’an Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Xi’an Intermediate Level
People’s Court Execution Chamber], Qiantan Zhixing Gongzuo De Diwei He Zuoyong [A Brief
Discussion of the Position and and Role of Execution Work], at 4-5, in CONFERENCE MATERIALS,
supra note 42 [hereinafter Xi’an ILPC]. According to one court source, the chief of the execution
chamber is, unlike the chiefs of the other chambers, often not on the court’s Adjudication Committee
(shenpan weiyuanhui), the organ of collective leadership in the court. To add insult to injury,
execution chambers are apparently the last to get access to a car. Their officers have to ride about on
bicycles. Id., at 6.
44.
See, e.g., Xi’an ILPC, supra note 43, at 4-5; CHANG YI, QIANGZHI ZHIXING LILUN YU
SHIWU [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMPULSORY EXECUTION] 5 (1990). In Fuzhou in Fujian
province, about half of the execution chamber personnel in the city’s one ILPC and 13 BLPCs had
any post-secondary education. See Fuzhou Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Fuzhou Intermediate Level
People’s Court], Qianghua Zhixing Gongzuo, Wanshan Shenpan Zhineng, Geng Haode Wei Gaige
Kaifang He Jingji Jianshe Fuwu [Strengthen Execution Work, Perfect the Adjudication Function,
Serve Even Better the Cause of Reform and Opening Up and Economic Construction], at 1, in
CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42 [hereinafter 1992 Fuzhou ILPC].
45.
See Court Interview U. These expenses do not include funds for salaries.
46.
See Gong Yiwei & Chen Yonghu, Qiantan Jingji Hetong Zhongcai Jiguan De Zhixing
Quan [A Brief Discussion of the Execution Powers of Economic Contract Arbitration Organs],
SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Oct. 12, 1987, at 6, 6. To put this figure
in context, recall that at this time there were well over three thousand BLPCs and ILPCs, the courts
that mainly carry out execution.
47.
See Jiangsu Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan [Jiangsu Province Higher Level People's
Court], Renzhen Zuohao Zhixing Gongzuo, Wei Shehui Wending He Jingji Fazhan Fuwu
[Conscientiously Do Execution Work Well to Serve the Cause of Social Stability and Economic
Development], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No. 6, at 5, 6 (1990) [hereinafter Jiangsu
HLPC]; Jiangsu Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan [Jiangsu Province Higher Level People's Court],
Renzhen Zuohao Zhixing Gongzuo, Wei Shehui Wending He Jingji Fazhan Fuwu [Conscientiously
Do Execution Work Well to Serve the Cause of Social Stability and Economic Development], in JINGJI
SHENPAN JINGYAN ZHUANTI HE ANLI XUANBIAN [SELECTED PROBLEMS AND CASES IN THE
EXPERIENCE OF ECONOMIC ADJUDICATION] [hereinafter SELECTED PROBLEMS] 234, 236 (Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan Jingji Shenpan Ting [Supreme People's Court Economic Adjudication Chamber] ed.,
1991) [hereinafter Jiangsu HLPC 2].
48.
See Tang Langting (President, Heilongjiang Province Higher Level People’s Court),
Jianchi Liang-Shou Zhua, Jiejue “Zhixing Nan” [Keep Grasping the Problem With Both Hands, Solve
“Difficulty in Execution”], RENMIN SIFA, No. 6, at 3, 4 (1990).
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These personnel handle well over a million cases a year,49 of which
approximately 85 percent are civil or economic cases.50 Figures from
Heilongjiang province give some indication of their workload. In 1988 and
1989, approximately two hundred courts with an execution staff of 635
executed almost 67,000 judgments.51 On average, then, each court, with
three specialized execution personnel, executed almost 170 judgments per
year, or about one every two days.52 In Guangzhou, the total execution
caseload (not only successfully executed cases) was reported to be about
4,000 annually distributed among nine courts.53
Assisting the execution chamber in addition to performing other
functions are the court police (fajing).54 These are recruited from the
population at large and assigned through the personnel department of the
local government.55 Court police do not carry the same authority as regular

49.
In 1995, the figure was approximately 1.3 million. See Ren Jianxin, Renmin Fayuan
Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme People’s Court Work Report] (Mar. 12, 1989), reprinted in RENMIN
FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS], Mar. 21, 1996, at 1. A figure of about one million was
reported for 1992, see Ren Jianxin, Jinyibu Quanmian Jiaqiang Shenpan Gongzuo, Genghaodi Wei
Jiakuai Gaige Kaifang He Xiandaihua Jianshe Fuwu [Strengthen Adjudication Work in an Even More
All-Around Way in Order to Serve Better the Causes of Accelerating Reform and Opening Up and
Modernization] (report to the 16th National Conference on Judicial Work, Dec. 21, 1992), SPCG, No.
1, Mar. 20, 1993, at 6, 12 [hereinafter Ren, Strengthen Adjudication], and 760,000 cases were reported
for 1989, see Ke Changxin, Guanyu Zhiding Qiangzhi Zhixing Fa De Huhuan [The Cry for
Formulating a Law on Compulsory Execution], in “ZHIXING NAN” DUICE TAN [A DISCUSSION OF
MEASURES TO DEAL WITH "DIFFICULTY IN EXECUTION"] 143, 145 (Zhengzhou Shi Zhongji Renmin
Fayuan [Zhengzhou Intermediate Level People's Court] ed., 1992).
50.
I have deduced this percentage from the figures provided in ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN
1994 [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 1994], at 1030 (Table 12) (1994).
51.
See Tang, supra note 48, at 3-4.
52.
According to one study of enforcement in several counties of New Jersey, each officer
responsible for judgment collection handled (whether successfully or not) an average of 802 cases
(writs and wage executions) per year. See Committee on Post-Judgment Collection Procedures in the
Special Civil Part, Report to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, NEW JERSEY L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at 2
[hereinafter New Jersey Report]. According to the Heilongjiang statistics, each officer there
successfully executed an average of 53 judgments per year. Even if we pessimistically assume a
successful execution rate of only 20 percent of all cases assigned, the total workload, 265 cases, still
comes out to well under the New Jersey figure.
53.
See Guangzhou Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Guangzhou Intermediate
Level People's Court Execution Chamber], Chongfen Fahui Zhixing Gongzuo De Zhineng Zuoyong,
Genghaode Wei Shehui Anding He Jingji Fazhan Fuwu [Bring the Functional Role of Execution Work
Into Full Play to Serve Better the Causes of Social Stability and Economic Development], at 1, in
CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42 [hereinafter Guangzhou ILPC]. The figure for the number
of courts is derived from ZHONGGUO YOUZHENG BIANMA: ZHENG-FA XITONG ZHUANJI [THE POSTAL
CODES OF CHINA: THE POLITICAL-LEGAL SYSTEM SPECIAL EDITION] 180 (Zhongguo Youzheng
Bianma Zheng-Fa Xitong Zhuanji Bianxie Zu [Editorial Group for the Political-Legal Special Edition
of the Postal Codes of China] ed., 1992).
54.
Court police are generally directly under the control of the court’s general office
(bangongting), which comes under the president. See Academic Interview S; Court Interview F.
55.
See Court Interview F.
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police; they are part of a different bureaucratic system and do not instill the
same fear.56 According to one source, they do not carry the electric stun
batons and guns that are the hallmarks of police authority,57 but another
source lists stun batons among the equipment possessed by the court.58
B.

Legislation and Procedure
1.

Legislation

Writers on execution complain constantly that there is insufficient
legislation in this area, that what exists is too vague and general, and that
courts therefore have no laws to follow.59 The first major law on the subject
is considered to be the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure;60 this law was
substantially revised and reissued in 1991,61 apparently in part because of
problems with execution.62
Despite general dissatisfaction with the state of legislation, however,
execution has not been completely neglected. There is, in fact, a
surprisingly rich tradition of legislation on execution. First, by the early
1950s a number of municipal courts and regional judicial authorities
formulated their own regulations governing execution procedures.63 The

56.
See Lawyer Interview R; Academic Interview B.
57.
See Academic Interview L.
58.
See 1992 Fuzhou ILPC, supra note 44, at 1.
59.
See, e.g., Pan Dingqu & Luo Shifa (officials of the Changsha Intermediate Level
People's Court), Qian Tan Zhixing Huanjing [A Brief Discussion of the Execution Environment], at
6, in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42; Ding Haihu & Chen Xiuyan, Shi Lun Qiangzhi Zhixing
Lifa [An Exploratory Discussion of Legislation in the Field of Compulsory Execution], FAXUE ZAZHI
[LEGAL STUDIES MAGAZINE], No. 5, at 38, 38-39 (1989). Ding Haihu, Qiangzhi Zhixing Lifa Chuyi
[A Proposal for Legislation in the Field of Compulsory Execution], FALÜ KEXUE [LEGAL SCIENCE],
No. 6, at 71, 71-74 (1989); Xu Junying & He Congjian, “Zhixing Nan” Fayuan Neibu Tanyin [A Look
at the Causes Within the Court of “Difficulty in Execution”], FAXUE [LEGAL STUDIES], No. 10, at 16,
17 (1990); Kunming Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Kunming Intermediate Level People's Court],
“Zhixing Huizhan” Shi Huanjie “Zhixing Nan” Maodun De Youxiao Cuoshi [An “Execution Attack”
Is an Effective Measure for Mitigating the Contradiction of “Difficulty in Execution”], at 4, in
CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42 [hereinafter Kunming ILPC]; CHANG, supra note 44, at 4.
60.
1982 Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34.
61.
Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34.
62.
See Court Interview D.
63.
See, e.g., Harbin Shi Renmin Fayuan [Harbin City People's Court], Minshi Qiangzhi
Zhixing (Tiaoli) [Civil Execution (Regulations)] (1949), in MINSHI SUSONGFA CANKAO ZILIAO
[REFERENCE MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], vol. I, part 1 [hereinafter 1 MSCZ], at
435. (Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Faxue Yanjiusuo Minfa Yanjiushi Min-Su Zu, Beijing Zheng-Fa
Xueyuan Minshi Susong Jiaoyanshi [Civil Procedure Group of the Civil Law Research Section of the
Institute of Law of the Chinese Acadeny of Social Sciences and the Civil Procedure Law Teaching
and Research Section of the Beijing Institute of Politics and Law] eds., 1981) [hereinafter 1949 Harbin
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peak of this trend is represented by a long and extremely detailed set of
regulations formulated in 1955 by the court of Xuanwu District in
Beijing.64
Second, a significant amount of legislation and regulations touching
on execution was promulgated at the national level before the 1982 Law on
Civil Procedure. The first of a series of proto-civil procedure laws was
issued as early as 1950.65 This document established the general principle
that coercive measures could be used to execute judgments:
In civil cases, upon the application of the winning party, the
court of first instance should effect compulsory execution of a
confirmed judgment. When the court deems it necessary, it may

Regulations]; Wulumuqi Shi Renmin Fayuan Minshi Anjian Zhixing Shi Xing Banfa [Urumchi City
People's Court Trial Measures for the Execution of Civil Cases] (approved by Northwest Branch Court
of the Supreme People’s Court to take effect on Apr. 3, 1951), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 712
[hereinafter 1951 Urumchi Measures]; Shenyang Shi Renmin Fayuan Minshi Qiangzhi Zhixing
Zanxing Banfa [Shenyang City People's Court Provisional Measures on Compulsory Execution in
Civil Cases] (promulgated and effective for implementation on a trial basis on Mar. 26, 1951, revised
version approved by Northeast People’s Government), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 709 [hereinafter
1951 Shenyang Measures]; Dongbei Renmin Zhengfu Sifa Bu [Northeast People's Government
Ministry of Justice], Guanyu Jiaqiang Minshi Qiangzhi Zhixing De Zhishi [Directive on Strengthening
Compulsory Execution in Civil Matters] (June 5, 1951), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 714 [hereinafter
1951 Dongbei Directive]; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Huabei Fenyuan [North China Division of the
Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Geji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Panjue De Zhishi [Directive
Concerning the Execution of Judgments by People’s Courts at All Levels] (Aug. 1, 1953), in 2 MSCZ,
supra note 1, at 720.
64.
See Beijing Shi Xuanwu Qu Renmin Fayuan [People’s Court of Xuanwu District,
Beijing], Minshi Zhixing Gongzuo Banfa [Civil Execution Measures] (June 20, 1955), in 2 MSCZ,
supra note 1, at 723 [hereinafter 1955 Beijing Measures]. The Xuanwu court was at that time being
held up as a model for other courts to follow.
65.
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Susong Chengxu Shi Xing Tongze [People's
Republic of China General Principles for Trial Implementation on Litigation Procedures] (Dec. 31,
1950), quoted in CHANG, supra note 44, at 13 [hereinafter General Principles of Procedure]. I have
not been able to find a copy of these regulations. Other substantial regulations dealing with matters
of civil procedure were issued right up to the time of the first formal Law on Civil Procedure in 1982.
In chronological order, they are as follows: Guanyu Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai Deng Da Chengshi
Gao-, Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Xing-, Minshi Anjian Shenli Chengxu De Chubu Zongjie [An Initial
Summing-Up of Procedures for Adjudicating Criminal and Civil Cases in the Higher and Intermediate
Level People's Courts of Large Cities Including Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai], in ZUIGAO RENMIN
FAYUAN [SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT], GUANYU BEIJING, TIANJIN, SHANGHAI DENG SHISAN-GE DA
CHENGSHI GAO-, ZHONGJI RENMIN FAYUAN XING-, MINSHI ANJIAN SHENLI CHENGXU DE CHUBU
ZONGJIE [AN INITIAL SUMMING-UP OF PROCEDURES FOR ADJUDICATING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES
IN THE HIGHER AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL PEOPLE'S COURTS OF THIRTEEN LARGE CITIES INCLUDING
BEIJING, TIANJIN AND SHANGHAI], at 19 (July 1955) [hereinafter 1955 Procedure Summary]; 1963
SPC Opinion, supra note 15; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Guanche
Zhixing Minshi Zhengce Ji-Ge Wenti De Yijian [Opinion on Several Problems in the Thorough
Implementation of Civil Policies] (Aug. 29, 1963), in SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 14;
1979 SPC Rules, supra note 15.
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also effect compulsory execution on its own [without such an
application]. If the confirmed judgment orders the loser to pay
money or to hand over articles of property for which substitution
can be made, then when the court deems it necessary in the
course of execution, it may, according to the concrete
circumstances, seal up and auction the loser’s property. When a
ruling calls for provisional advance disposition of property or for
provisional advance execution, the court making the ruling may,
when it deems it necessary, carry out execution without waiting
for an application.66
In subsequent years, the Supreme People’s Court and the Ministry of
Justice issued a number of notices and decrees dealing with specific
problems of execution.67 Indeed, a 1956 speech by the then-president of the
Jiangsu Higher Level People’s Court containing several detailed
suggestions on execution shows that many of the techniques of the 1982
and 1991 Law on Civil Procedure were already in common use in the

66.
General Principles of Procedure, supra note 65, art. 72. A “confirmed” (queren)
judgment is the same as a “legally effective” or final judgment from which there is no further appeal
67.
Sifa Bu [Ministry of Justice], Wei Geji Renmin Sifa Jiguan Jin Hou Dui Weituo
Diaocha Weituo Zhixing Huo Yiban Anjian Ying Jinsu Chuli De Tongbao [Circular Stating That
Henceforth People's Judicial Organs Should Handle as Expeditiously as Possible Entrusted
Investigation, Entrusted Exection and Transferred Cases] (Mar. 21, 1951), in 2 MSCZ, at 413 (1981)
[hereinafter 1951 MOJ Notice]; Sifa Bu [Ministry of Justice], Gei Guangdong Sheng Chaoyang Xian
Renmin Fayuan De Pifu Jieda [Reply and Answer to the People's Court of Chaoyang County,
Guangdong Province] (1955), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 722; Caizheng Bu, Sifa Bu, Zhongguo
Quanguo Gong-Xiao Hezuoshe Zongshe [Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice and National AllChina General Office of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives], Guanyu Geji Renmin Fayuan Chuli
Moshou, Zhuijiao, Paimai Wupin De Lianhe Tongzhi [Joint Notice on the Handling by People's
Courts of Confiscation, Forced Payments and Auctions] (Sept. 10, 1956) (text not available); Sifa Bu
[Ministry of Justice], Guanyu Weituo Zhixing Wenti De Tongzhi [Notice on Problems in Entrusted
Execution] (June 18, 1957), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 418 [hereinafter 1957 MOJ Notice]; Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Lihun Anjian Zhong Dui Caichan Chuli Ruhe
Qiangzhi Zhixing Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Question of How to Execute by Compulsion a
Disposition of Property in a Divorce Case] (Dec. 9, 1963), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 743
[hereinafter 1963 SPC Reply]; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Qiangzhi
Zhixing Minshi Caichan Anjian De Panjue Bu Xu Ling Xia Caiding De Pifu [Reply Stating That
When Executing by Compulsion Judgments in Civil Cases Involving Property, It Is Not Necessary
to Issue a Separate Ruling] (May 19, 1964), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 744 [hereinafter 1964 SPC
Reply]; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang [Supreme People’s Court, People’s Bank
of China], Zhuanfa Shanghai Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Minshi
Panjue Xiang Yinhang Diaoqu Dangshiren Cunkuan Wenti De Tongzhi [Transmittal of the Shanghai
People’s Court Notice on the Problem of People's Courts' Levying on a Party’s Bank Account When
Implementing Civil Judgments] (June 16, 1980), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 745.
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1950s.68 The 1980 Marriage Law made specific reference to compulsory
execution “according to law” of unpaid judgments for maintenance and
child support even though no formal law on civil procedure existed at the
time.69
Execution is currently governed by the 1991 Law on Civil Procedure
and its associated regulations, such as a lengthy Supreme People’s Court
opinion (yijian) of 1992 that supplements many of the law’s provisions.70
The status of the numerous administrative interpretations issued by the
Supreme People’s Court prior to the promulgation of the law is not entirely
clear. Officially, they remain in effect provided they do not conflict with
the provisions of the new law,71 but it is not always easy to discern the
existence of a conflict. If the new law declines to regulate a matter
regulated under the old law, for example, is the rule of the old law in
conflict?
Other gaps and ambiguities remain as well. For example, when a nonparty objects to execution — generally on the grounds that property being
seized is his and not the debtor’s — execution officers are instructed by the
Law on Civil Procedure to investigate the matter “according to the
procedures prescribed by law.”72 This phrase was added in the 1991
revision — but there still exist no legally prescribed procedures for the
investigation of such objections.73
68.
See Liu Shaotang, Youguan Zhixing Gongzuo Ji-Ge Zhuyao Wenti De Yi-Xie Yijian
[Some Ideas About Some Important Problems in Execution Work], SIFA GONGZUO TONGXUN
[BULLETIN OF JUDICIAL WORK], No. 12, at 13 (1956).
69.
See Marriage Law, supra note 37, art. 35.
70.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Opinion on Several Issues in the
Application of the People's Republic of China Law on Civil Procedure], SPCG, No.3, Sept. 20, 1992,
at 70 [hereinafter 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion].
71.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Xuexi, Xuanchuan,
Guanche Minshi Susong Fa De Tongzhi [Notice on Studying, Publicizing, and Implementing the Law
on Civil Procedure] (May 24, 1991), in ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN 1992 [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA
1992], at 531 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 SPC Notice] (“With respect to judicial interpretations issued
by the Supreme People’s Court over the years in the field of civil procedure, all that conflict with the
Law on Civil Procedure shall no longer be implemented.”); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Dui Guanche
Zhixing Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) De Yi-Xie Yijian, Jieda, Pifu, Dafu Deng Shi Fou Hai You Xiao?
[Are Various Opinions, Answers, Replies, Responses, Etc. Issued by the Supreme People's Court
Respecting the Implementation of the Law on Civil Procedure (for Trial Implementation) Still in
Effect?], RENMIN SIFA, No. 1, at 46 (1992) (elaborating on 1991 SPC Notice).
72.
Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 208.
73.
See Ke Changxin, Guanyu Zhiding Qiangzhi Zhixing Fa De Jianyi [A Proposal on the
Formulation of a Law on Compulsory Execution], ZHENG-FA LUNTAN [POLITICAL-LEGAL FORUM],
No. 2, at 95 (1992), who makes this complaint. It should be noted that the law of the Republic of
China on Taiwan, which allows for objections from execution debtors as well as non-parties, does not
provide much in the way of procedure either, although there are a few rules. See Qiangzhi Zhixing
Fa [Law on Compulsory Execution], arts. 12-16, in ZUIXIN SHIYONG LIU FA QUAN SHU [NEWEST
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Procedure

This section will introduce and classify the formal mechanisms of
execution in order to set the stage for the analysis of the rest of the paper.
Execution in civil and economic cases is generally governed by the
1991 Law on Civil Procedure. Courts have the authority to execute a
number of different documents. First are court judgments or rulings in civil
cases in which appeals have been exhausted (“legally effective”
judgments). These are to be executed by the court of first instance.74 These
judgments or rulings include court-sponsored mediation agreements75 as
well as any ruling calling for the preservation of property during litigation
or the preliminary transfer of property pending final resolution.76 Courts
may also in theory — although it is not known to have occurred — give
direct effect to foreign judgments and arbitration awards by means of a
ruling, and this ruling may be executed by compulsion.77
PRACTICAL COMPLETE BOOK OF THE SIX LAWS] 334 (Shi Maolin & Liu Qingjing eds., 1992).
74.
See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 207. The same applies to any part of
a criminal judgment or ruling calling for the transfer of property. See id.
75.
See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 215; MINSHI SUSONG FA DE XIUGAI
YU SHIYONG [THE REVISION AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW ON CIVIL PROCEDURE] 226 (Ma Yuan
& Tang Dehua eds., 1991). It would seem that mediation agreements reached outside of court are not
directly executable. Given the stipulation of article 215 (“The provisions of this book shall apply to
the execution of bills of mediation issued by a People’s Court”), this seems to be the only way of
explaining the deletion of “mediation agreements” from the list of documents that can be executed by
courts in the 1991 revision of the Law on Civil Procedure. Compare 1982 Law on Civil Procedure,
supra note 34, art. 161 with Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 207. For examples of
execution of court-sponsored mediation agreements, see Fushun Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Dui Bu
Zhixing Tiaojie Shu Zhe Caiqu Qiangzhi Cuoshi [Fushun Intermediate Level People's Court Adopts
Compulsory Measures Against Those Who Do Not Implement Bills of Mediation], ZHONGGUO FAZHI
BAO [CHINA LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Nov. 27, 1981, at 2; Sihui Fayuan Fengtiao, Kangju Qiangzhi
Zhixing, Xu Guilan Bei Yi Fa Juliu [Xu Guilan Rips Up Court Sealing Strips, Resists Compulsory
Execution, Is Detained According to Law], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS],
Dec. 29, 1986, at 1; Qi Yaochao, Yu Maoqing, Chen Kezhi Fanghai Minshi Tiaojie Zhixing Bei
Fakuan, Juliu An [The Case of Qi Yaochao, Yu Maoqing, and Chen Kezhi, Who Obstructed the
Execution of Civil Mediation and Were Fined and Detained], in SPCG, No. 3, Sept. 20, 1991, at 44.
On mediation in general and court-sponsored mediation in particular, see Donald C. Clarke, Dispute
Resolution in China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 245, 256-257, 268-286, 294-296 (1996) (noting the sometimes
coercive nature of mediation).
76.
See Nei-Xie Falü Wenshu Keyi Zuowei Fayuan Qiangzhi Zhixing De Genju? [Which
Laws Can Form the Basis for Compulsory Execution by a Court?], JIANGXI FAZHI BAO [JIANGXI
LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], July 22, 1988, at 3 [hereinafter Which Laws?].
77.
See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, arts. 268-269; Which Laws ?, supra note
76. To execute a foreign judgment, a Chinese court must find that a relevant treaty or reciprocity
exists between the foreign jurisdiction and China. A bilateral judicial assistance agreement is not,
strictly speaking, necessary. In practice, enforcement by a Chinese court of a foreign judgment is
virtually unknown. See Wang Changying, Zhengque Yunyong Shenpan Jingji Anjian De Qiangzhi
Cuoshi [Correctly Use Compulsory Measures in Adjudicating Economic Cases], SHENZHEN FAZHI
BAO [SHENZHEN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], July 23, 1990, at 7. In 1994, the Dalian Intermediate Level
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Second, “other legal documents” that are by law supposed to be
executed by courts shall be executed by the court in the place of the
execution debtor’s residence or in the place of the property being executed
against.78 These “other legal documents” include orders of administrative
agencies that apply for compulsory execution,79 final decisions of a state
arbitration organ,80 and an instrument evidencing debt that has been given

People's Court, essentially folding the reciprocity requirement into the treaty requirement, found a
treaty lacking and thus rejected the application of a Japanese national to enforce the judgment of a
Japanese court. See Riben Gongmin Wuwei Huang Shenqing Zhongguo Fayuan Chengren He
Zhixing Riben Fayuan Panjue An [The Case of the Application of Japanese Citizen Gomi Akira to
a Chinese Court for the Recognition and Execution of a Japanese Court Judgment], SPCG, No. 1, Mar.
20, 1996, at 29. This case is especially interesting because the judgment did not, strictly speaking,
affect the wealth of Chinese nationals: a Japanese creditor was attempting to realize on the assets in
China of a Japanese debtor.
78.
See Wang, supra note 77. The language of the 1991 Law on Civil Procedure is an
improvement on that of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure, which spoke vaguely only of “the court
having jurisdiction” without giving guidance on how to determine which court had jurisdiction. The
1991 law simply codifies the solution already reached in a 1984 Supreme People’s Court document
addressing precisely this issue. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu
Renmin Fayuan Yi Shengxiao De Falü Wenshu Shi Fou Shiyong Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) DiYibaishijiu Tiao Guiding De Shenqing Zhixing Qixian Deng Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Question
of Whether the Provisions of Article 169 of the Law on Civil Procedure (For Trial Implementation)
on the Time Limit for Applications for Execution Apply to Legal Documents of a People’s Court That
Have Taken Effect, and Other Questions] (Aug. 15, 1988), in ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note
15, at 180. On the other hand, it fails to address the problem that in any given place in China, four
courts — one at each level of the hierarchy — all have geographical jurisdiction. Probably the Basic
Level or the Intermediate Level People’s Court are intended, as they are the most likely to have
execution chambers.
79.
See MINSHI SUSONG FA DE XIUGAI YU SHIYONG, supra note 75, at 224. Such orders
might come, for example, from the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the Customs
Administration, or a local land administration bureau. In one typical case, the defendant was ordered
by the county land administration bureau to tear down an illegal structure; he refused but did not
appeal to a court. The bureau then went to the court seeking compulsory execution of the order. The
court then issued an order for compulsory execution, and tore the structure down itself when the
defendant still refused. See Shenpan Chengxu He Zhixing Chengxu; Shenqing Zhixing He Yisong
Zhixing [The Adjudication Process and the Execution Process; Application for Execution and
Transferred Execution], JILIN FAZHI BAO [JILIN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Sept. 20, 1988, at 1
[hereinafter Adjudication Process]. Similar cases are reported in Minhe Xian Fayuan Zhixing Yi-Qi
Zhaijidi Jiufen [Minhe County Court Executes a Judgment in a Dispute over Residential Land], FAZHI
DAOBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM HERALD], Aug. 26, 1988, at 3; Weizhang Jianfang Bei Fayuan Qiangxing
Chaichu [House Built in Violation of Regulations Is Forcibly Torn Down by Court], ANHUI FAZHI
BAO [ANHUI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Sept. 7, 1988, at 1; Yi Nong Hu Chaozhan Tudi Jian Fang Bei
Qiangzhi Chaichu [House Built by Farmer Occupying Excessive Land Is Forcibly Torn Down],
YUNNAN FAZHI BAO [YUNNAN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Nov. 11, 1988, at 2. According to one source,
the State Council is in the process of formulating a set of regulations specifically addressing the issue
of compulsory execution of administrative orders. See CHANG, supra note 44, at 14.
80.
See 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, supra note 70, art. 256. Note, however, that the
law allows defendants a number of grounds for in effect appealing the arbitration decision to the
executing court — for example, errors of law or fact. See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art.
217.
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compulsory effect by a state notarial organ.81 The status of bills of

81.
See 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, supra note 70, art. 256. The general idea behind
this provision is that if a notary office certifies the existence of a debt about which there is no
question, a court may compel repayment of the debt without a trial. The proposition that courts may
directly enforce documents evidencing indebtedness dates back as a legal matter at least to 1956. See
Sifa Bu [Ministry of Justice], Guanyu Zhengming You Qiangzhi Zhixing De Xiaoli De Fanwei Deng
Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Scope of Certification of Compulsory Executability and Other Problems]
(Sept. 20, 1956), in MINSHI SUSONGFA CANKAO ZILIAO [REFERENCE MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE], vol. II, part 3 [hereinafter 2A MSCZ], at 65 (Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Faxue
Yanjiusuo Minfa Yanjiushi Min-Su Zu, Beijing Zheng-Fa Xueyuan Minshi Susong Jiaoyanshi [Civil
Procedure Group of the Civil Law Research Section of the Institute of Law of the Chinese Acadeny
of Social Sciences and the Civil Procedure Law Teaching and Research Section of the Beijing
Institute of Politics and Law] eds., 1982) [hereinafter 1956 MOJ Reply] (“With respect to documents
evidencing debt about which there is genuinely no doubt, . . . if subsequently they should be carried
out and are not carried out, the notarial organ may give a certification of compulsory executability.”).
It is not necessary that the original debt be evidenced by notarized documents. See id.
The provision may come from pre-1949 Republic of China (ROC) law. See Gongzheng Fa
[Law on Notaries], art. 11, in XIANXING FALING DAQUAN (ZHONG) [COMPENDIUM OF CURRENT
STATUTES (II)] 182 (Zhang Jingxiu ed., 1947), as amended in ZUIXIN SHIYONG LIU FA QUAN SHU,
supra note 73, at 359. The PRC version is, however, a little different. The ROC law appears to give
the defendant a chance to bring suit to overturn the notary’s certification. The PRC version says that
the notariat should provide certification only where there is “no doubt,” but has no procedure for
challenge. Article 218 of the 1991 Law on Civil Procedure states that courts should not execute such
documents where it finds “genuine error,” but provides no procedure for determining whether such
error exists. Moreover, neither the Law on Civil Procedure nor the PRC Law on Notaries stipulates
any procedure to be used by the notary office in determining whether any doubt exists about the
indebtedness. See Guowu Yuan [State Council], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongzheng Zanxing
Tiaoli [People’s Republic of China Provisional Regulations on Notarization] (Apr. 13, 1982), in
ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 282.
There appears to be considerable confusion among the commentators on the point of procedure.
One article asserts that notaries may provide certification only where no dispute exists, but goes on
to specify a number of things that they should investigate — for example, whether the signer (in the
case of a corporate debtor) had the authority to act, whether there was a genuine manifestation of
intent, and other legally complex matters. See Huang Yongming & Tong Jianxin, Dui Zhaiquan
Wenshu Banli Qiangzhi Zhixing Gongzheng Zhi Chutan [An Initial Investigation Into the Giving by
Notaries of Compulsory Executability to Debt Documents], HEBEI FAXUE [HEBEI LEGAL STUDIES],
No. 3, at 38 (1990). If there is no dispute over the debt, none of these matters should require
investigation. If there is a dispute, then surely this is precisely where the rules of the Law on Civil
Procedure should apply, and these quintessentially legal questions should be resolved in court.
According to the Supreme People’s Court, notariats cannot certify the obligations contained
in ordinary contracts as directly executable. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Sifa Bu [Supreme People's
Court and Ministry of Justice], Guanyu Yi Gongzheng De Zhaiquan Wenshu Yi Fa Qiangzhi Zhixing
Wenti De Dafu [Response on the Question of Compulsory Execution According to Law of Debt
Documents That Have Been Notarized] (April 9, 1985), in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALÜ
GUIFANXING JIESHI JICHENG [COLLECTED NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] [hereinafter NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS] 994 (1990). There must
be something more — for example, a document showing that the person against whom execution is
sought has agreed in advance to such execution if the debt is not paid. See ZHIXING DE LILUN YU
SHIJIAN [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EXECUTION] 7-9 (Liang Shuwen ed., 1993). In the words of
one Western commentator,
The probable intended meaning of [old] CPL Article 168 is that the creditor is required
to produce a notarized document that establishes that the debtor is in default before a
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mediation issued by state arbitration organs was recently clarified after
several years of confusion. In 1986, the Supreme People’s Court issued a
Notice saying that such bills could be executed by compulsion.82 The
statutory basis for this Notice, however, weak in the first place, later
essentially disappeared as the provisions it cited in support were revised.83
Nevertheless, it probably remained valid because subsequent legislation did

court will endorse execution proceedings. Such a document could not likely be
produced if there were a dispute between debtor and creditor as to the existence of a
default.
Christopher G. Oechsli, The Developing Law of Mortgages and Secured Transactions in the People’s
Republic of China, 5 CHINA L. REP.1, 5 n.30.
In some cases, courts seem not to have paid sufficient attention to notarial certifications of
executability. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Sifa Bu [Supreme People's Court and Ministry of Justice],
Guanyu Zhixing Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) Zhong Sheji Gongzheng Tiaokuan De Ji-Ge Wenti De
Tongzhi [Notice on Several Questions Related to the Provisions on Notarization in the Course of
Implementing the Law on Civil Procedure (for Trial Implementation)] (Nov. 8, 1984) (on file with
author) (instructing courts to give effect to such documents in accordance with the rules of the Law
on Civil Procedure). In other cases, they seem to have gone too far, certifying as executable precisely
those documents — ordinary contracts — they had been told to stay away from by the Supreme
People’s Court in 1985. See Yinchuan Shi Gongzheng Chu, Yinchuan Shi Cheng Qu Renmin Fayuan
Qiangzhi Zhixing Yi-Xiang Hetong [Yinchuan City Notary Office and Yinchuan City District Court
Compulsorily Execute a Contract], NINGXIA FAZHI BAO [NINGXIA LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Apr. 2,
1986, at 1; Ju Bu Changfu Caizheng Zhouzhuanjin Yangniu Zhuanyehu Gao Mou Bei Qiangzhi
Zhixing [Cattle-Raising Specialized Household Gao Refuses to Pay Back Circulating Capital Loan,
Suffers Compulsory Execution], TIANJIN FAZHI BAO [TIANJIN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], May 26, 1988,
at 1; Boyang Xian Gongzheng Chu Yunyong Qiangzhi Zhixing Shouduan Cujin Hetong Lüxing
[Boyang County Notary Office Uses Compulsory Execution Methods to Promote the Carrying Out
of Contracts], JIANGXI FAZHI BAO [JIANGXI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Dec. 14, 1990, at 1. In all these
cases, plaintiffs took a contract they claimed had been breached to the notary office, obtained a
certification of executability, and secured court execution of the certification.
82.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Dui
Shenqing Qiangzhi Zhixing Zhongcai Jigou De Tiaojie Shu Ying Ruhe Chuli De Tongzhi [Notice on
How People's Courts Should Dispose of Applications for the Compulsory Execution of Bills of
Mediation Issued by Arbitration Organs] (Aug. 20, 1986), in NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS, supra
note 81, at 995. See also Xingzheng Tiaojie Shi Fou Keyi Qiangzhi Zhixing? [Is Administrative
Mediation Subject to Compulsory Execution?], TIANJIN FAZHI BAO [TIANJIN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS],
May 26, 1988, at 1 (citing other regulations in support of enforceability of arbitration mediations).
83.
The Notice cited article 52, para. 3 of the 1981 Economic Contract Law (implying that
any mediation agreement, let alone one sponsored by an arbitration organ, could be executed by
compulsion) and article 166 and article 161, paragraph 2 of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure. The last
item was never convincing -- it just speaks to the executability of “other legal documents” without
specifying further — and the references in the first two to the executability of mediation agreements
of any kind were dropped in subsequent revisions. Compare Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingji
Hetong Fa [People's Republic of China Law on Economic Contracts] (Dec. 13, 1981), 1981 FGHB
1, arts. 48, 49, translated in 2 CHINA’S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION 1 (1986), with Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Hetong Fa [People's Republic of China Law on Economic Contracts] (Sept.
2, 1993), art. 42, in SWB/FE, Oct. 6, 1993, at FE/W0302/WS1 (art. 52 of the old Economic Contract
Law has been dropped entirely); and compare 1982 Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 166
with Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 216.
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not affirmatively rule out compulsory execution of such bills,84 and a 1990
SPC document seemed to take for granted that they were executable by
compulsion.85 Although the 1991 Law on Civil Procedure makes no
reference to the execution by courts of arbitration mediations, it does
provide for the execution of arbitration decisions, and the recent Arbitration
Law (effective on September 1, 1995) provides that arbitration mediations
(tiaojie shu) have the same legal effect as arbitration decisions (caijue
shu).86 That arbitration mediations may be subject to compulsory execution
is also confirmed in passing by a recent Supreme People’s Court Notice.87
Although nationwide statistics are hard to come by, what evidence
there is suggests that the majority of cases sent to the execution chamber
involve organizations such as enterprises, while only a minority of cases
involve individuals.88 The most common types of cases appear to be
contract and debt cases between enterprises and individual debt cases.89
The execution process begins when a case is sent to the execution
chamber, which can happen in a number of ways. When a court delivers an
executable document or announces judgment, it is supposed to inform the

84.
The relevant Supreme People’s Court interpretation holds that prior interpretations,
regulations, etc. remain in effect to the extent they do not conflict with subsequent legislation. As
previously noted, see supra text accompanying note 71, whether a conflict exists is not as simple a
question as the Supreme People’s Court seems to think.
85.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Shenqing Zhixing
Gong-Shang Zhongcai Jigou Falü Wenshu Zhong De Bei Zhixing Ren Yi Bei Chexiao Ruhe Chuli
Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Question of What to Do when the Executee in an Application for the
Execution of a Legal Document From an Industrial-Commercial Arbitration Organ Has Already Been
Cancelled] (Nov. 14, 1990), in QUANGUO REN-DA FA-GONG-WEI, GUOWU YUAN FAZHI JU ZUIGAO
RENMIN FAYUAN, & ZUIGAO RENMIN JIANCHAYUAN [NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS COMMISSION, STATE COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE BUREAU, SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT, &
SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURACY], GUOJIA FAGUI SHUJUKU [DATABASE OF STATE LAWS AND
REGULATIONS][hereinafter DATABASE] (CD-ROM database) [hereinafter 1990 SPC Reply].
86.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa [Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic
of China], NPCSCG, No. 6., Oct. 10, 1994, at 3, art. 51. An English translation can be found in
SWB/FE, Oct. 6, 1994, at FE/2119/S1.
87.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Renzhen Guanche
Zhongcai Fa, Yi Fa Zhixing Zhongcai Caijue De Tongzhi [Notice on Conscientiously Implementing
the Arbitration Law and Executing Arbitration Decision According to Law] (Oct. 4, 1995), in
DATABASE, supra note 85.
88.
See Court Interview F (70% of cases involve organizations, 30% involve individuals).
89.
See Court Interview F; Guangzhou ILPC, supra note 53, at 1. Individual debt cases also
appear to have the most potential for conflict. In one eleven-month period, a BLPC in Shanghai
detained sixteen persons in fifteen cases, eleven of which involved debt. See Shanghai Shi Zhongji
Renmin Fayuan [Shanghai Intermediate Level People's Court], Dui Ju Bu Zhixing Fayuan Shengxiao
Panjue Caiding De Xingwei Ren Shiyong Sifa Juliu Cuoshi De Tantao [An Exploration of the Use of
Detention Against Persons Who Refuse to Carry Out Court Judgments and Rulings That Have Taken
Legal Effect], in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42, at 2. Detention is a sanction used only in
the most egregious circumstances.
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parties of the rules regarding execution.90 First, the judgment creditor can
make an application (shenqing) for execution.91 Second, the adjudicatory
chamber that heard the case can transfer (yisong) it sua sponte to the
execution chamber.92 Among cases deemed suitable for transferred
execution are judgments awarding support or medical expenses;93
presumably this is because the funds are typically urgently needed and the
plaintiff may be weak and intimidated.94 Third, one court can request the
execution chamber of another court to execute a judgment through the
process of entrusted execution (weituo zhixing) when the execution debtor
or his property is within the second court’s area of geographical
jurisdiction.95
The time limit for the application is one year where at least one party
is a “citizen” (gongmin) and six months where both parties are legal
persons or other organizations.96 This rule has been in effect since the 1982

90.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Yi
Shengxiao De Falü Wenshu Shi Fou Shiyong Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) Di-Yibaishijiu Tiao
Guiding De Shenqing Zhixing Qixian Deng Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Question of Whether the
Provisions of Article 169 of the Law on Civil Litigation (For Trial Implementation) on the Time Limit
for Applications for Execution Apply to Legal Documents of a People’s Court That Have Taken
Effect, and Other Questions] (Aug. 15, 1988), in ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 189
[hereinafter 1988 SPC Reply 2].
91.
See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 216. For a detailed account of the
process of applying for execution, see Song Jian, Tantan Shenqing Zhixing Shu De Shizuo [A
Discussion of the Formulation of an Application for Implementation], HEBEI FAXUE [HEBEI LEGAL
STUDIES], No.1, at 47-48 (1988). The applicant must provide, in addition to the judgment the
execution of which is sought, details on what exactly she wants done and why she wants it done as
well as information on the finances and property of the defendant. See Adjudication Process, supra
note 79.
92.
See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 216. While China’s is by no means yet
a litigant-driven legal system, a small sign of a move in that direction can be seen in the 1991 revision
of the Law on Civil Procedure. Whereas article 166 in the old law listed transferred execution before
execution upon application, the successor article 216 of the new law puts execution upon application
first, implying that it is the normal, preferred method.
93.
See 1988 SPC Reply 2, supra note 90, at 189.
94.
In one reported case, officials of a BLPC in Guangzhou read a newspaper report about
two sons who refused to obey a court judgment ordering them to pay support to their aged father. The
execution chamber went out to investigate, filled out the necessary forms on behalf of the father, and
obtained the money. See Guangzhou ILPC, supra note 53, at 2.
95.
See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 210. On entrusted execution generally,
see Hefei Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Execution Chamber of the Hefei Intermediate
Level People's Court], Qiantan Weituo Zhixing [A Short Discussion of Entrusted Execution], in
CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42; Zhang Yuqi, Ruhe Zhixing Yidi Jingji Hetong Jiufen Anjian
[How to Execute in a Different Region in Economic Contract Dispute Cases], JIANGXI FAZHI BAO
[JIANGXI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], May 5, 1987, at 3. The problems associated with entrusted execution
are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 196-205.
96.
See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 219. It seems likely that the one-year
limitation would apply to natural persons of foreign citizenship as well. See, e.g., ZHONGGUO RENMIN
GONGHEGUO BAIKE QUANSHU: FAXUE [GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA: JURISPRUDENCE] 829
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Law on Civil Procedure. When the judgment was made before the 1982
law, the rule appears to be that it is treated as if made on the date that law
came into effect.97
Specific procedures for execution are often formulated by HLPCs, at
the provincial level.98 According to the account of one ILPC execution
chamber, proceedings generally begin within five days of receiving the
application. The chamber investigates the financial situation of the
execution debtor and then, according to its reading of the situation, either
directly takes measures to begin execution or summons the execution
debtor to the court to attempt to persuade him to comply with the
judgment.99 According to another account, attempts to persuade the
execution debtor to comply voluntarily would not go on for more than half

(1984) (“In China and some other countries, the term gongmin refers to natural persons.”). But see id.
at 164 (“Gongmin refers to a person . . . with the citizenship of a particular country.”); MIN FA TONG
ZE SHIYI [EXPLICATION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF CIVIL LAW] 11 (1987); FAXUE CIDIAN
(ZENGDING BAN) [DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE (ENLARGED EDITION)] 142, 344 (1984)
(distinguishing between citizens (gongmin) and natural persons (ziran ren)). To add to the confusion,
the 1986 General Provisions of Civil Law head Chapter Two with the ambiguous title “Citizens
(Natural Persons).”
97.
In 1987, the Supreme People’s Court ruled that the judgment in one case would not be
executed, given that it was made in the early 1950s, no application for compulsory execution had been
made until 1984 (over two years after the coming into effect of the Law on Civil Procedure), and there
was no excuse for the lateness of the application. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s
Court], Guanyu Dui Shengxiao Duonian De Panjue Yuqi Shenqing Zhixing De Yi Fa Bu Yu Zhichi
De Pifu [Reply Stating That According to Law Overdue Applications for the Execution of Judgments
That Took Legal Effect Many Years Ago Will Not Be Supported] (Dec. 14, 1987), in ZHIXING
GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 183. In 1989, the Court ruled in another case that execution
should be granted where more than one year had passed between the judgment and the application,
given that both events occurred before the passage of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure and that the
court in question was in part responsible for the fact that the judgment had not been executed for so
many years following the application. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu
Dui Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) Shixing Qian Yijing Shenqing Zhixing Er Zhijin Wei Zhixing De
Anjian Shi Fou Ying Yu Zhixing De Han [Letter on Whether Execution Should Be Had in Cases
Where an Application for Execution Was Made Before Law on Civil Procedure (for Trial
Implementation) Came into Effect , But Execution Has Still Not Been Effected] (Aug. 15, 1989), in
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALÜ LIFA SIFA JIESHI ANLI DAQUAN [COMPLETE BOOK OF
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL EXPLANATIONS AND CASES ON THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA] [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATIONS] 1238 (Xin Ru & Lu Chen eds., 1991). An example
of a 1956 judgment executed in 1990 is reported in Ershi-Nian Qian De Panjueshu Keyi Zhixing Ma?
[May a Judgment From Twenty Years Ago Be Executed?], YUNNAN FAZHI BAO [YUNNAN LEGAL
SYSTEM NEWS], Feb. 23, 1990, at 3. For a full explanation of the statute of limitations issue, see id.
98.
See, e.g., Jiangsu HLPC 2, supra note 47, at 238.
99.
See Guiyang Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Execution Chamber of the
Guiyang Intermediate Level People's Court], Zhengque Shiyong Falü Quebao Anjian de Zhixing [Use
Law Correctly to Guarantee the Execution of Cases], at 4, in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note
42 [hereinafter 1992 Guiyang ILPC].
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a month.100 The Beijing ILPC has formulated its own deadlines of three
months to execute civil cases and six months to execute economic cases.101
Execution does not proceed forward inexorably once begun. In certain
circumstances, such as when the execution debtor has no money, it can be
suspended, to be revived when circumstances change.102 In other
circumstances, such as when the execution debtor has no prospects of ever
having any money, execution can simply be terminated.103
IV. SCOPE OF THE EXECUTION PROBLEM
The issue of zhixing nan (difficulty in executing judgments) has
received prominent coverage in the Chinese legal press for the last several
years. From scattered complaints in the 1950s,104 it has grown to become
a regular feature of Supreme People’s Court reports to the National
People’s Congress since 1988.105 A recent report from a lower court pointed
with alarm to the decline in the prestige of courts, attributing the
100. See Court Interview F.
101. See Beijing ILPC, supra note 42, at 5. Extensions are available when necessary. It is
not clear what the consequences of failure both to meet a deadline and to get an extension are —
perhaps a black mark in the record of the execution officer.
102. See ZHONGGOU MINSHI SUSONG FA JIAOCHENG [A COURSE IN THE LAW ON CIVIL
PROCEDURE] 357 (Jiang Wei ed., 1990). Suspension occurs when the judgment creditor so requests,
when a third party presents a well-founded objection, when a party dies or ceases to exist and it is
necessary to wait for a successor to assume rights or bear obligations, and in “other circumstances”
in the court’s discretion. See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 234. Execution is also
suspended after a court with proper jurisdiction decides to order a rehearing of the case. See Law on
Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 183. Note that execution is not to be suspended in the time
between the application for rehearing and the decision to order rehearing. On rehearing, see generally
infra text accompanying notes 160-171.
103. Article 235 of the Law on Civil Procedure lists the circumstances calling for an order
terminating execution: where the judgment creditor revokes his request for execution, where the legal
document forming the basis for execution is no longer valid, where the judgment debtor dies without
property to satisfy the judgment, where the judgment creditor in a support case dies, where the
judgment debtor is unable to pay because in “a difficult situation” without income and unable to work,
and in other circumstances at the court’s discretion. Interestingly, bankruptcy (either legal or actual)
is not mentioned as grounds for termination.
104. See, e.g., 1951 Dongbei Directive, supra note 63, at 714 (complaining that some court
cadres don’t even know what “compulsory execution” means); 1953 SPC-NC Directive, supra note
1, at 720 (noting failure to enforce judgments as a cause of “great dissatisfaction among the masses”);
Tai Yingjie, Tantan Women Fayuan De Zhixing Gongzuo [A Discussion of Our Court's Execution
Work], RENMIN SIFA GONGZUO [PEOPLE'S JUDICIAL WORK], No.3, at 20 (1957) (reporting complaints
that courts could only talk, not act).
105. A mere thirteen characters (“Some judgments and rulings have not been executed”)
were allotted to the problem in Zheng Tianxiang’s 1987 work report — a far cry from the three long
paragraphs he devoted to it the following year, when he called it “the most outstanding problem in
economic adjudication.” Zheng Tianxiang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme
People's Court Work Report] (April 6, 1987), SPCG, No. 2, June 20, 1987, at 12; Zheng, supra note
2, at 8.
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unwillingness of enterprises and individuals with valid claims to litigate
them to a simple reason: “The courts’ judgments cannot be enforced. Not
only can the debt not be recovered, but the expenses of litigation are lost as
well.”106
How bad are things really? It turns out that good statistics are simply
not available on this matter. An extensive review of the literature failed to
turn up a single serious study using well-defined categories. In particular,
the available literature often fails to distinguish between the referral rate —
the number (or, depending on the context, the percentage) of judgments
referred to the execution chambers for execution — and the overall success
rate — the number (or, depending on the context, the percentage) of
judgments actually enforced. Moreover, when discussing the success rate
as a percentage, the literature often fails to make clear whether it is a
percentage of judgments of a given type, or only of those referred to the
execution chamber for execution.
In his often-cited 1988 report to the National People’s Congress,
Supreme People’s Court president Zheng Tianxiang said that 20 percent of
judgments in economic cases went unenforced in 1985 and 1986, while
about 30 percent went unenforced in 1987.107 Other authors say that of
judgments having executable content in civil, economic, criminal, and
administrative cases, about 30 percent are not enforced,108 while still
another author puts the number at over 50 percent.109 (It is impossible to tell
from the context whether the residual category is “fully enforced” or “fully
or partially enforced.”)
Unfortunately, it is not possible to confirm or dispute these claims
using available statistics from other sources. The most commonly available

106. Nanning Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Nanning Intermediate Level People's Court],
Guanyu Kaizhan Anjian Zhixing Huizhan De Yixie Zuofa He Tihui [Some Understandings Derived
From Carrying Out an Execution Attack in Cases], at 10-11, in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note
42 [hereinafter 1992 Nanning ILPC]. Thus, although the supposed disinclination of the Chinese to
litigate is frequently attributed to mysterious cultural forces, it may turn out that the Chinese, like
practical people anywhere, do not engage in activities where the expected cost is greater than the
expected return. For a now-classic exposition of this argument with relation to Japan, see John O.
Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978).
107. See Zheng, supra note 2, at 8. The sample of which this percentage represents a part
would reasonably be the total number of cases resulting in a judgment having executable content in
favor of the plaintiff. As Zheng did not say so, however, we do not know for sure. I believe that the
sample is not limited to those cases that were referred for execution.
108. See Gu Lianhuang & Zhu Zhongming, Qianghua Zhixing Gongzuo, Weihu Falü Zunyan
[Strengthen Execution Work, Uphold the Dignity of the Law], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE],
No. 4, at 3, 3 (1989). The authors provide no source for this number.
109. See Qian Yongchang, Lun Shen-Zhi Fenli, Zhixing Fenliu [On The Separation of
Adjudication from Execution and the Separate Process for Execution], FAZHI JIANSHE
[CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM], No. 1, at 16, 16 (1990).
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statistics provide the number or percentage of judgments successfully
enforced by the execution chamber. It is extremely difficult, however, to
find a number indicating the total number of cases where execution could
have been required — i.e., where the defendant was required to hand over
money or property or to perform some act. Thus, if defendants voluntarily
performed their obligations in 95 percent of all cases where obligations
were imposed, then a 10 percent execution rate on the remaining 5 percent,
while certainly telling us something about the weakness of the execution
chamber, would not indicate an alarming state of affairs in the legal system
in general.
It is possible to construct a range of possible values using available
statistics. First, we can find the maximum number of judgments and other
decisions that could possibly need execution in a given year, even though
the real number is almost certainly lower. In 1989, a year for which there
are fairly good numbers, courts completed first-instance proceedings in 1.8
million civil cases (mostly marriage and divorce, debts, and tort claims) and
over 670,000 economic cases (among them bank loans, sales contracts, and
rural contracting disputes).110
Next, we can obtain an approximation of the referral rate by finding
the number of civil and economic cases referred to the execution chamber
in that year.111 In 1989, courts nationwide docketed 480,000 civil cases and

110. See Ren Jianxin, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Supreme People's Court
Work Report] (Mar. 29, 1990), SPCG, No. 2, June 20, 1990, at 5, 8-9. Space constraints unfortunately
forbid a full discussion of the methodological issues involved in using these numbers. They are
obviously not perfect but I believe they will do. I should, however, highlight a few problems that can
occur when using first-instance judgments as the denominator and judgments sent to the execution
chamber as the numerator.
Not all judgments will be in favor of plaintiffs, and not all judgments in favor of plaintiffs (for
example, adjustments of legal status) require execution. Because parties to litigation are allowed one
appeal before they are obliged to perform under the terms of the judgment, a better upper-limit figure
would be one for second-instance cases completed. I could not find this number. A first-instance case
completed in 1989 might not be ready for execution until a subsequent year. On the other hand, firstinstance cases completed in prior years would be coming on line for execution in 1989. Given a trend
of increasing litigation, the number of cases lost to future years in this way probably slightly exceeds
the number of cases picked up from prior years. This assumption is supported by a chart showing that
in 1990, courts had an intake of 116,000 civil and 35,000 economic cases in second instance, while
disposing of 114,000 civil and 33,000 economic cases: a real but minor difference. See ZHONGGUO
FALÜ NIANJIAN 1991 [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 1991], at 936 (1991).
111. It is only an approximation because there will be some cases in which the year of final
judgment and the year of referral for execution are different. The extra referrals from the beginning
of the year will not exactly match the lost referrals from cases judged but not referred at the end of the
year if the rate of referral or the absolute number of cases heard changes from year to year.
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250,000 economic cases for execution.112 If we assume that all first instance
proceedings in 1989 resulted in judgments in favor of plaintiffs having
executable content, then the referral rate is about 27 percent for civil cases
and 37 percent for economic cases. Since that assumption is clearly
unrealistic, the real referral rate must be higher. The minimum number of
judgments in favor of plaintiffs having executable content is, of course, the
number referred, which yields a referral rate of 100 percent.
We can also arrive at some estimates for 1992. In that year, courts
accepted about 1.8 million civil cases113 and about 600,000 economic
cases.114 The total number of cases sent to execution chambers was “almost
one million.”115 Since over 95 percent of execution cases are civil or
economic,116 this yields a minimum referral rate of about 40 percent and a
maximum of, again, 100 percent. This is a higher number than that for
1989, but is of the same general order of magnitude, and squares with
reports that the situation is getting worse.
Finally, we can derive an overall success rate by comparing the sum
of the number of cases successfully enforced and the number of cases not
referred against the total number of cases with executable content.
Nationally, the reported success rate on referred cases was about 80 percent
in 1993.117 Assuming the 1992 and 1993 numbers are similar, it would
mean that defendants paid in a maximum of 92 percent of all cases with an
executable judgment in favor of plaintiffs (again, subject to some very
unrealistic assumptions), and in a minimum of 32 percent of such cases.
There are also some interesting regional numbers. In 1989, execution
chambers in Jiangsu claimed to have successfully executed about 70
percent of the cases sent their way.118 In 1989 and 1990, slightly over half
the cases brought to execution chambers in Wuhan could be executed
according to the terms of the judgment.119 A similar rate — about half —

112. See Yu Lingyu, Guanyu Dangqian Zhixing Wenti De Ji-Dian Sikao [Some Thoughts
About the Current Problems in Execution], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No.1, at 26, 26
(1991).
113. See Ren, Strengthen Adjudication, supra note 49, at 11.
114. See id., at 6.
115. Id., at 12.
116. See Yu, supra note 112, at 26.
117. See ZHONGGUA FALÜ NIANJIAN 1994, supra note 21, at 102.
118. See Jiangsu Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan, supra note 47, at 5. In that year, 19% of civil
cases and 38% of civil cases required execution proceedings. See id. at 6.
119. See Ke, supra note 73, at 96. Another 43% had to be implemented through some kind
of “alternate” execution process, meaning probably that the plaintiff did not get what it wanted. A
loose interpretation of what counts as “successful execution” probably accounts for the 90%
successful execution rate reported for the same period in the same city in Wuhan Liangji Fayuan Like
“Zhixing Nan” [Courts at Two Levels in Wuhan Firmly Overcome "Difficulty in Execution"], FAZHI
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is reported for Shenzhen.120 Other cities report remarkably high rates of
execution. Xi’an reported an 82 percent success rate in execution from
1987 to 1991 inclusive.121 From 1989 to early 1992, Fuzhou reported a
success rate of 96 percent.122 And the Intermediate Level People’s Court
(ILPC) of Urumqi reported a 100 percent success rate in economic cases in
1985, with a 99 percent success rate in economic and civil cases
combined.123
It would seem that the only lesson to be drawn from the available
statistics is that they are not very useful. Even if we were able to arrive at
some kind of number to represent a referral rate or an overall success rate,
it would be risky to draw any conclusions from such a number.
First, the numbers given for “unexecuted judgments” typically include
cases where the defendant is simply insolvent. Business is risky; bad debts
happen. Failure to execute a judgment where the debtor is insolvent bears
no relation to court power or state capacity. In many places, however,
debtor insolvency accounts for a sizable proportion of unexecuted
judgments: the Jiangxi Higher Level People’s Court reported that out of
473 debt cases it surveyed, the decision in 277 had not been enforced; the
failure to enforce in 166 of those cases was due simply to debtor
insolvency, as opposed to the other 111 cases where it was due to debtor
intransigence.124 On the other hand, what is reported as insolvency may
reflect court weakness if, for example, the debtor’s administrative superior
is by law responsible for the debt but succesfully resists paying it, or if the
debtor, while short of cash in the bank, has a valuable factory building or
other property that the court is for some reason unable or unwilling to
exercise its legal right to seize.125

RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Feb. 22, 1993, at 1.
120. See Weile Falü De Zunyan [For the Dignity of the Law], SHENZHEN FAZHI BAO
[SHENZHEN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Sept. 26, 1990, at 1.
121. See Xi'an ILPC, supra note 43, at 3.
122. See 1992 Fuzhou ILPC, supra note 44, at 2.
123. See Gongping Wu Si, Yan Yu Zhi Fa [Fair and Impartial, Strict in Upholding the Law],
XINJIANG FAZHI BAO [XINJIANG LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Dec. 26, 1987, at 2.
124. See Jiangxi Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Jingji Shenpan Ting [Economic Adjudication
Chamber of the Jiangxi Province Higher Level People's Court], Ruhe Jiejue Zhaiwu Anjian Zhixing
Nan De Wenti? [How to Solve the Problem of Difficulty in Executing Debt Cases], JIANGXI FAZHI BAO
[JIANGXI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Oct. 2, 1987, at 3 [hereinafter Jiangxi HLPC]. Unfortunately, these
categories are not as neat as they might seem at first. Failure to execute a judgment against an
insolvent enterprise that “can’t” pay may reflect the inability of the court to make its administrative
superior bear responsibility even where it should do so. This problem is discussed in more detail
below.
125. For more on the complex issue of real or apparent debtor insolvency, see infra text
accompanying notes 227-240.
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Second, the number given for “executed judgments” may include
cases where the plaintiff was persuaded by the court to accept less than it
was entitled to.126 In one case, the court persuaded the plaintiff to forgive
50 percent of the interest due on a debt. The debtor then paid. This case
was described as “smoothly executed” and no doubt went into the statistical
records as such.127
Third, for a number of reasons a judgment may simply not be issued
against a defendant where it would be difficult to execute.128 Courts have
traditionally operated under a policy, formalized in Article 6 of the 1982
Law on Civil Procedure, of stressing mediation over adjudication. (The
formal requirement of preferring mediation was abolished in the 1991 Law
on Civil Procedure.) In practice, this meant that court officials were
expected to dispose of about 80 percent of their caseload through
mediation.129 A policy that pressures courts to find a settlement gives an
advantage to the stubborner party; it could artificially raise the execution
rate because defendants would refuse to agree to a settlement that they were
not prepared to carry out voluntarily.
Moreover, court officials have an incentive not to issue judgments that
they foresee will be difficult to execute. They are assessed in part on the
number of cases they handle. Because a case is not considered completed
until successfully executed, their record looks bad if cases drag on and on.
In addition, they may be subject to continued importuning and harassment
by the dissatisfied judgment creditor until the judgment is executed.130
There is ample evidence that the perception of executability influences
the substantive content of the judgment, and indeed whether the court
accepts the case at all. As early as 1950, one court criticized its own
erroneous past practice:
126.
127.

See the discussions in note 119 supra.
See SHENZHEN JINGJI TEQU SHENPAN SHIJIAN [ADJUDICATION PRACTICE IN THE
SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE] 140 (1990). See also Wuhan Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan
[Wuhan Intermediate Level People's Court], Yunyong Duozhong Biantong Zhixing Fangshi, Jiji Jiejue
Jingji Jiufen Anjian Zhixing Nan Wenti [Actively Solve the Problem of Difficulty in Execution in Cases
of Economic Disputes by Using Many Methods of Alternative Execution], in “ZHIXING NAN” DUICE
TAN, supra note 49, at 19, 19, where cases executed via “alternative execution” (biantong zhixing)
are counted as bringing up the execution rate. “Alternative execution” means execution where the
creditor takes something other than what the judgment says he is owed — for example, goods instead
of cash. In practice it includes simply forgiving some of the indebtedness.
128. See generally Cheng Cheng, Liu Jiaxing & Cheng Yanling, Guanyu Woguo Minshi
Zhixing Zhong De Jige Wenti [On Some Problems in Civil Execution in China], FAXUE YANJIU
[STUDIES IN LAW], No. 1, at 44 (1982); ZHIXING DE LILUN YU SHIJIAN, supra note 81, at 35 (some
courts “won’t accept a case unless the judgment in it can be executed, and won’t hand down a
judgment that can’t be executed.”).
129. See Academic Interview L; Court Interview F.
130. See Lawyer Interview R.

1996]

POWER AND POLITICS IN THE CHINESE COURT SYSTEM

33

[W]e held that the judgment should be based on the actual ability
of the debtor to carry it out. For example, if A owed B 200 yuan,
and in practice was able to repay only 100 yuan, then the
judgment could only require him to repay 100 yuan.131
When I explored with one group of court officials in 1992 the question of
how to enforce an eviction judgment against a tenant with no place to move
to, they said the question would not arise because if the tenant had no place
to go, the judgment would not have been issued in the first place.132 Many
courts are reluctant to accept divorce cases where the parties have not
already solved the housing problem, since the result otherwise will be
unmarried persons of different sexes sharing the same living quarters.133 A
Jiangsu court was praised by the provincial court for its rule whereby no
chamber could send more than seven percent of its cases to the execution
chamber. “This way, the adjudication officers are forced to give thorough
consideration to execution when they are hearing the case.”134 An article
praising a local court for having achieved a 95.5 percent execution rate
explained how they did it: “The Lianhu court first of all . . . considers
execution problems at the time of adjudicating the case, and exercises strict
control over the acceptance of cases (yange bahao li’an guan).”135 In other
words, if the court foresees execution problems, it will not even give the
plaintiff a chance to plead his case, let alone issue a favorable judgment.136

131. Beijing Renmin Fayuan [Beijing People's Court], Minshi Zhixing Gongzuo De Gaijin
[Progress in Civil Execution Work] (1950), in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XING MIN SHI
SUSONG CANKAO ZILIAO [REFERENCE MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 294, 295 (Wuhan Daxue Falü Xi Xing Min Fa Jiaoyanzu [Criminal
and Civil Law Teaching and Research Group of the Wuhan University Department of Law] ed.,
1954).
132. See Court Interview K. This is not the philosophy of all courts. Other sources make it
clear that although few if any courts will take coercive steps to evict a tenant who has no place to go,
the hesitancy comes usually at the execution stage, not the judgment stage. Immunities and exclusions
from execution are discussed further below.
133. In other words, courts can award the residence to one party, but they can’t make the
other party leave. See Lawyer Interview R; Academic Interview L; see generally Pan Xiaojun, Guanyu
Lihun Anjian Zhufang De Chuli [On the Handling of Living Quarters in Divorce Cases], DANGDAI
FAXUE [CONTEMPORARY LEGAL STUDIES], No. 2, at 60 (1990).
134. Jiangsu HLPC, supra note 47, at 237.
135. Lianhu Fayuan Renzhen Jiejue “Zhixing Nan” [Lianhu Court Overcomes "Difficulty
in Execution"], FAZHI ZHOUBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM WEEKLY], Oct. 9, 1990, at 1.
136. Various sources suggest that courts will often strive to think up excuses to avoid
accepting cases brought against army-run enterprises. See, e.g., Academic Interview P; Cheng, Liu
& Cheng, supra note 128, at 44.
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Finally, we simply do not know how much execution would constitute
a good rate. If the marginal cost of execution rises as one approaches 100
percent, at some point it may not be socially worth it any more. Why should
society bear the cost of recovering every ill-considered loan? As one
academic remarked, “Courts are adjudication organs, not collection
agencies.”137
Moreover, it is extremely difficult to find systematic studies of the
enforcement of judgments in courts in the United States, where the
enforcement rate, whatever it is, does not generate anything approaching
the cries of alarm heard in China. There is reason to believe, however, that
it is far from ideal, and indeed may not be very different from the rate of
enforcement in China. A 1993 study commissioned by the New Jersey
Supreme Court found, among other things, that almost all complaints about
judgment collection procedures were from creditors, not debtors, and
recommended that pro se litigants setting out to collect judgments be
provided with a pamphlet outlining “the steps that can to be taken to collect
a judgment so as to keep expectations realistic.”138
The study found that in eleven New Jersey counties surveyed for the
year 1987, only 25 percent of writs of execution in civil cases (this category
excludes small claims and landlord-tenant cases) were returned fully
satisfied. Seven percent were returned partially satisfied, and the remaining
68 percent were returned unsatisfied or simply dropped. The odds were
somewhat better in small claims cases, where 37 percent of writs were
returned satisfied and five percent were partially satisfied.139 Difficult as it
is to know the social reality actually reflected by these figures, and the
degree to which they are comparable with Chinese numbers, it seems
abundantly clear that the American public and legal community routinely
put up with enforcement rates that the Chinese legal community would
consider shockingly low.140
V.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

Despite the uncertainties of the statistics, it seems clear that there is
a problem of some importance. It is therefore useful to understand why it

137. Graduate Seminar on Enforcement of Civil Judgments with Professor Liu Jiaxing,
Faculty of Law, Beijing University, Mar. 6, 1992.
138. See New Jersey Report, supra note 52.
139. Id.
140. I would be very surprised to find that the Chinese legal community, any more than the
American public (or indeed the author before beginning research for this article), had any idea how
low these rates actually are.
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might occur. The following discussion distinguishes problems common to
all cases from problems specific to particular kinds of cases.
A.

General Problems in Execution

General obstacles to execution can be divided roughly into those of
external origin (those that operate to frustrate a court that wants to execute)
and those of internal origin (those that make a court reluctant to take the
steps needed to execute).141 Obviously, if a court does not wish to enforce
its own judgments, no amount of court power will change that fact.
1.

Internal Obstacles
a.

Reluctance to Use Coercive Measures

Primary and secondary sources on execution reveal a striking fact:
courts and other wielders of state power are extraordinarily reluctant to use
coercive measures in civil cases, especially when it appears that the
defendant is not entirely morally wrong. A telling example is a case where
a woman’s jilted suitor, having unsuccessfully demanded the return of over
1,000 yuan worth of gifts, kidnapped the woman’s baby as a debt
hostage.142 After five months of unsuccessful attempts by the go-between,
the village committee, and “judicial departments” to persuade him to return
the child, he was finally arrested.143 If it took five months to get around to
arresting a known kidnapper, one can imagine how long it would take to
impose coercive measures against someone who simply owed some money.
Behind this reluctance is, of course, an idea that this is not really a
criminal kidnapping. It is instead an admittedly deplorable development in
what is essentially a messy domestic dispute. There is a very strong feeling
among court personnel that coercive measures are simply not appropriate
in civil cases — in Maoist terminology, contradictions among the people,
not between the enemy and the people.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the continuing ideological
force in China’s legal system of the Maoist dichotomy between nonantagonistic and antagonistic contradictions. Coercion, like dictatorship, is

141. For a good general account of internal problems, see Xu & He, supra note 59.
142. This was not a custody battle; there is no indication in the report that the man was the
child’s father.
143. See Ci An Gai Ding He Zui? [What Crime Should This Case Be Classified As?], ZHENG
FA LUNCONG [POLITICAL-LEGAL DISCUSSIONS], No. 1, at 17 (1992).
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something that one applies to the enemy; among the people, one uses
persuasion and education.144 Thus, Article 6 of the 1982 Law on Civil
Procedure mandated a preference for mediation. In the words of one writer,
“Economic cases fall within the category of disputes among the people and
should usually be resolved by means of persuasion and education.”145 The
same philosophy was applied to the execution of court judgments —
presumably after the failure of mediation:
Because economic disputes belong to the category of
contradictions among the people (renmin neibu maodun), and
because the refusal of the execution debtor (bei zhixing ren) to
implement a legally effective document is often due to all kinds
of ideological and cognitive reasons, then as long as the court
strengthens its educational work, patiently guiding the execution
debtor, explaining the pros and cons and his legal responsibility,
an execution debtor that is able to repay will generally change
his attitude and voluntarily perform.146
This view is not simply that of academic commentators. The same caution
toward coercive measures is reflected in a prototype civil procedure
regulation issued by the Supreme People’s Court in 1979, three years
before the issuance of the first Law on Civil Procedure:
Execution work must rely on the masses and the relevant
departments. The court should work at educating and persuading
the party involved and pay attention to work style. . . . Sealing
up and selling off should be done with extreme caution and must
be approved by the court’s leadership. Important cases must be
reported to the Party committee at the same level for approval.147

144. See, e.g., Zeng Hanzhou (Vice President, Supreme People’s Court), Zai Di-Er-Ci
Quanguo Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo Huiyi Shang De Baogao [Report at the Second National
Conference on Civil Adjudication] (Dec. 22, 1978), in SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 28,
30 (1978). I discuss this issue at greater length in Clarke, supra note 75, at 286-288.
145. Fei Deping, Jingji Shenpan Zhixing Gongzuo Qianlun [A Brief Discussion of Execution
in Economic Adjudication], FAXUE PINLUN [LEGAL STUDIES REVIEW], No. 1, 1986, at 63, 64. See also
Xu Ping (Supreme People's Court Civil Chamber), Duiyu Minshi Susong Fa (Shi Xing) Ji-Ge Wenti
De Fayan [Speech on Several Problems on Implementing of the Civil Procedure Law (for Trial
Implementation) (no date; perhaps 1983)), in SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 103, 112-113
(“[A] civil case is a manifestation of a contradiction among the people . . . . [It] arises on the basis of
a unity of fundamental interests; it is not an irreconcilable contradiction.”)
146. SHENZHEN JINGJI TEQU SHENPAN SHIJIAN, supra note 127, at 138.
147. 1979 SPC Rules, supra note 15, at 84.
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Given the apparent prevalence of this view among courts, it is not
surprisingly shared by defendants, who are said to make comments such as,
“I didn’t steal or rob and haven’t committed any crime; what can you do to
me?” or “This is a civil case — they wouldn’t dare grab anyone!”148
According to some lawyers interviewed, the reluctance of courts to
use the power they have, not external interference, is the main reason for
execution difficulties.149 Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the
patience of courts may be diminishing. A 1984 Supreme People’s Court
document to lower courts instructed them, in the spirit of the regulations
noted above, first to carry out education and propaganda in the legal
system, and to carry out compulsory execution only where education was
ineffective.150 A superseding document issued six years later omitted the
admonition to educate; if a defendant refused to perform, he should be
required to do so.151 Similarly, a 1963 Supreme People’s Court document,
reprinted in 1981, contained an instruction to courts not to detain persons
who refused to comply with the property portion of a divorce judgment.152
Three different reprints from the 1990s, however, omit this instruction from
the document.153
b.

Lack of Interest in Execution

Execution of judgments has not traditionally been a matter of great
concern for courts. Their main duty has been criminal adjudication and
sentencing.154 The execution of the sentence was in the hands of the other

148. See Li Wensen, Zhang Bingde & Wang Fengzhu, Qiantan Zhixing Qian Dangshi Ren
Duikang Xintai De Chengyin Ji Qi Fangzhi Cuoshi [A Brief Discussion of the Reasons for the
Antagonistic Attitude of a Party Before Execution and Measures for Preventing It], RENMIN SIFA
[PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No. 5, 1990, at 41, 41. Similar language is cited in Yin Jiabao, Renmin
Fayuan De Panjue He Caiding Bixu Zhixing [Judgments and Rulings of People’s Courts Must Be
Enforced], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Jan. 10, 1980, at 5. The view may also be shared by
police, who are reported by some sources to be often uncooperative in locking people up as requested
by a court. See Luo Shaocheng, “Zhixing Nan” Qianxi [A Short Analysis of “Difficulty in
Execution”], in “ZHIXING NAN” DUICE TAN, supra note 49, at 78, 83.
149. See Lawyer Interview A. This view is not universally held. One prominent academic
interviewed held that courts in general wanted to execute, but were stymied by the failure of other
institutions — banks, government agencies, etc. — to cooperate. See Academic Interview L.
150. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Guanche Zhixing
“Minshi Susong Fa (Shi Xing)” Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Opinion on Several Questions in the
Implementation of the Law on Civil Procedure (for Trial Implementation)] (Aug. 30, 1984), in
ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 87, 98 (art. 63).
151. See 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, supra note 70, at 89 (art. 254).
152. See 1963 SPC Reply, supra note 67.
153. See ZHIXING GONGXUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 198; NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS,
supra note 81, at 975; LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATIONS, supra note 97, at 1227.
154. See Xi’an ILPC, supra note 43, at 4-5.
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bodies such as the police and prison administration, so it was never an
issue.155 In addition to stressing criminal over civil cases, courts and
scholars have traditionally stressed substantive law over procedural matters,
which are considered less a matter of law than of work style (zuofeng).156
As a subject of academic research, civil procedure did not even get off the
ground until 1979.157
The very internal organization of courts reflects their priorities: the
president takes charge of criminal adjudication, the vice president takes
charge of civil adjudication, and the vice president’s assistant takes charge
of execution. When the adjudication committee discusses cases, criminal
cases are at the top of the agenda. Problems in executing judgments come
last — if there is any time left.158
A particularly extreme case of reluctance to execute was reported in
1994: after having mediated an agreement between the parties in 1988
(which had the legal effect of a court judgment), the court accepted 3,000
yuan in execution fees from the plaintiff but refused to do anything or even
respond to inquiries for at least six years, despite an eventual direct order
from the Supreme People’s Court.159
c.

Lack of Finality

Following European and Japanese practice, the Chinese system allows
one appeal, with the second hearing a trial de novo. There is no third
appeal, even on issues of law alone.160Although the judgment of the trial in
second instance is supposed to be the final judgment and thus enforceable
(“legally effective”), defendants in fact have numerous opportunities to
relitigate the merits of the case, or at least to pose further procedural
obstacles in the way of execution.
155. See CHANG, supra note 44, at 16.
156. See Academic Interview P.
157. See Academic Interview B.
158. See Xi’an ILPC, supra note 43, at 4-5.
159. See Zhang Wenrui, Zhixing Nan Qi Neng Nan Zai Fayuan [How Can it Be That When
Execution Is Difficult, the Difficulty Lies With the Court?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY],
Apr. 5, 1994, at 2. Contrast this case with the system in New Jersey, where the remuneration of
enforcement officers is dependent upon “how many items of process the officer serves and the
officer’s diligence in searching for assets.” New Jersey Report, supra note 52, at 2.
160. Parties can still contest judgments that have become legally effective through a
procedure known as shensu (petition). A petition is essentially a request to the court that made the
judgment or its superior court to have another look at the case. The procuracy can also be petitioned
to re-open the case. There are as yet no clear standards governing the grounds on which petitions may
be brought or the number of times they may be brought. On petitions generally and their relationship
to appeals, see Margaret Woo, The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People’s Republic of China, 14
YALE J. INT’L L. 118, 133-141 (1989).
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With its heavy emphasis on substance over procedure, Chinese law
has been reluctant to enforce its own rules on finality. A 1964 Supreme
People’s Court document said that “[i]f the party refuses to perform [the
judgment], the court should first investigate to see whether the original
judgment is correct”161 — in effect giving the defendant the opportunity to
force a rehearing of the issue even after formal appeals have been
exhausted.
A more formal way for defendants to reopen a case after their single
appeal (shangsu) is exhausted is through an application for readjudication
(shenqing zaishen) on the grounds of mistake in the original judgment.162
Although such an application is not supposed to stop the process of
execution,163 courts were authorized in 1989 should they deem it necessary
to suspend execution while they are considering the application.164 A later
document appears to have rescinded this authorization to some degree:
while higher courts are investigating the legally effective judgments of
lower courts, they are not supposed to suspend execution until they have
reached a decision that the judgment is definitely erroneous and have issued
an order for rehearing.165
In one perhaps unusual case, the defendant, having lost both at the
BLPC and at the ILPC, applied for readjudication at the HLPC and, when
rejected, pursued his case to the Supreme People’s Court. Although the
judgment of the ILPC was the legally effective and immediately executable

161. 1964 SPC Reply, supra note 67.
162. The relevant procedure is set forth in articles 177-188 of the Law on Civil Procedure.
Probably the only truly final judgment in Chinese civil law is a second-instance judgment of divorce,
which under article 181 of the Law on Civil Procedure is not subject to an application for
readjudication.
163. See Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, art. 178; 1990 SPC Reply, supra note 85,
at 85.
164. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Jingji Jiufen Anjian
Fucha Qijian Zhixing Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Question of Execution During the Period of
Reinvestigation of Cases of Economic Disputes] (Aug. 8, 1989), in LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATIONS,
supra note 97, at 1238.
165. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Shenpan Jiandu
Chengxu Zhong, Shangji Renmin Fayuan Dui Xiaji Renmin Fayuan Yijing Fasheng Falü Xiaoli De
Panjue, Caiding, Heshi Caiding Zhongzhi Zhixing He Zhongzhi Zhixing De Caiding You Shei
Shuming Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Issues of Making a Ruling Suspending Execution During the
Examination by a Superior Court in the Course of the Judicial Supervision Process of a Judgment or
Ruling of an Inferior Court, and of Who Should Sign the Ruling Suspending Execution] (July 9,
1985), SPCG, No. 3, Sept. 20, 1985, reprinted in DATABASE, supra note 85. To the same effect is
article 183 of the 1991 Law on Civil Procedure.
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one, the defendant nevertheless succeeded through his subsequent
applications in postponing execution by 22 months.166
If the decision being enforced by the court was issued by an
administrative agency, the defendant gets another opportunity to contest it
at the time of execution even if he did not appeal either administratively or
to a court within the required time period.167 This is because even where the
defendant does not request a review, the court has the power, and perhaps
the duty, to review the decision for “correctness” on its own.168
Defendants may also have a chance to reopen the case when execution
of the judgment is entrusted to another court. In theory the entrusted court
has no right to review the substance of the judgment,169 and some courts
assert that they follow this rule.170 Other courts, however, assert that
[b]efore executing an [entrusted] judgment, the execution
chamber must strictly and conscientiously investigate the basis
for execution. If it discovers that the judgment or mediation is in
error, it should make a prompt report to the court president, who
will turn it over to the Adjudication Committee.171

166. See Wang Aiying Yu Li Baosheng Zhaiji Jiufen Qiangzhi Zhixing An [The Case of
Compulsory Execution in the Residential Land Dispute Between Wang Aiying and Li Baosheng],
SPCG, No. 2, June 20, 1986, reprinted in DATABASE, supra note 85.
167. See Court Interview F. My conversation with the judges made it clear that it is simply
not part of Chinese legal culture to say to the defendant, “Sorry—if you had an objection to make, you
should have made it before when you had the chance.”
168. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang [Supreme People's Court,
People's Bank of China], Guanyu Fayuan Dui Xingzheng Jiguan Yi Fa Shenqing Qiangzhi Zhixing
Xuyao Yinhang Xiezhu Zhixing De Anjian Ying Ruhe Banli Wenti De Lianhe Tongzhi [Joint Notice
on the Question of How Courts Should Handle Cases Where an Administrative Oragan Applies
According to Law for Compulsory Execution and the Cooperation of a Bank in Execution Is Needed]
(Jan. 11, 1989), in LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATIONS, supra note 97, at 1239; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
[Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Yi Fa Zhixing Xingzheng Jiguan De Xingzheng
Chufa Jueding Ying Yong He-Zhong Falü Wenshu De Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Question of What
Kind of Legal Document Courts Should Use When Executing According to Law the Administrative
Punishment Decisions of Administrative Organs] (Sept. 14, 1985), in NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS,
supra note 81, at 994.
169. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Renmin Fayuan
Xianghu Banli Weituo Shixiang De Guiding [Rules on the Mutual Handling of Entrusted Matters by
People’s Courts] (Sept. 25, 1993), in SPCG, No. 4, Dec. 20, 1993, at 148 [hereinafter 1993 SPC
Rules]; 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, supra note 70, at 89.
170. See, e.g., Changchun Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Changchun Intermediate Level
People's Court], Bingqi Difang Baohu Zhuyi, Jiji Banli Shou Weituo Yu Xiezhu Anjian [Eliminate
Local Protectionism, Actively Handle Cases of Entrustment and Cooperation], in CONFERENCE
MATERIALS, supra note 42 [hereinafter Changchun ILPC, Eliminate Local Protectionism]; Court
Interview K; Court Interview U.
171. Jiangsu HLPC 2, supra note 47, at 237.
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External Obstacles
a.

Local Protectionism

Local protectionism is far and away the most frequently mentioned
obstacle in the literature.172 It manifests itself when officials in region A
prevent the execution of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff from region B
against a defendant from region A. Sometimes the court in region A will
have rendered the unfavorable judgment only to find that it is not supported
by other local government organs. More frequently — because a local court
is less likely than an outside court to render a judgment unwelcome to the
local leadership173 — the judgment will have been rendered by a court in
region B, and it will be attempting to execute it either directly or by
entrusting execution to local court in region A.174
The general term “local protectionism” (difang baohuzhuyi) can
describe a variety of practices. As a rule, they stem from the fact that local
governments rely on local enterprises for revenues and employment, and
so are reluctant to allow them to be financially damaged by having a
judgment against them successfully executed.175 In addition, a local
172. The citations are too numerous to list here. For a good general treatment of local judicial
protectionism, see Chengdu Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Chengdu Intermediate Level People's
Court], Dizhi He Kefu Difang Baohu Zhuyi De Tantao [An Exploration Into Resisting and
Overcoming Local Protectionism], in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42 [hereinafter 1992
Chengdu ILPC]; on local protectionism in economic adjudication in particular, see Zhang Yiping,
Jingji Shenpan Zhong Difang Baohu Zhuyi Wenti De Sikao [Thoughts About the Problem of Local
Protectionism in Economic Adjudication], SHENZHEN FAZHI BAO [SHENZHEN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS],
Nov. 14, 1990, at 3. See also Clarke, supra note 6, at 67-69. One group of court officials I spoke with
agreed that while local protectionism was a problem, it was not the main problem. On the other hand,
the same court later published an article, written at approximately the same time, saying essentially
the opposite.
173. “Some leaders of Party and government organs even require that all economic contract
cases involving the locality where the amount in dispute is relatively large be reported to them for
instructions.” Zhang, supra note 172. Despite the writer’s indignation, however, such leaders are
requiring from courts little more than what the Supreme People’s Court itself has required of them.
See, e.g., 1979 SPC Rules, supra note 15, at 84 (“Important cases must be reported to the Party
committee at the same level for approval.”); Ren Jianxin, Nuli Kaichuang Jingji Shenpan Gongzuo
De Xin Jumian, Wei Shehuizhuyi Xiandaihua Jianshe Fuwu [Work Hard to Open Up a New Situation
in Economic Adjudication, Serve the Construction of the Four Modernizations] (report to the First
National Conference on Economic Adjudication Work) (Mar. 28, 1984), in SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
supra note 15, at 196, 216 (“Important issues and cases encountered in the course of work must all
be reported to the Party committee with a request for instructions, in order to obtain the directions and
support of the Party committee.”).
174. Both procedures are explicitly permitted by 1993 SPC Rules, supra note 169.
175. In 1985, the central government introduced a tax system that had the effect of giving
local governments a much greater interest in local revenues. At the same time, court funding was
made a local responsibility. Several sources attributed local protectionism mainly to the confluence
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enterprise may well be run by a local political leader, who will exert his
influence to protect the enterprise.176
It is not simply some vague notion of respect for local leaders that
makes courts reluctant to go against their wishes. This respect has a very
specific institutional basis: the dependence of local court personnel upon
local government at the same level for their jobs and their finances.177 As
one article noted, “Every aspect of local courts, including personnel,
budgets, benefits, employment of children, housing, and facilities, is
controlled by local Party and government organs, as are promotions and
bonuses.”178 Courts generally may keep a portion of the fees they collect,
and turn over the rest either to a higher court179 or to the local government
treasury.180 These fees are not sufficient for salaries and other expenses,
which must be met with funding from local government.181 One urban
BLPC reported that out of a total annual budget of about 800,000 yuan, half
was received as a regular appropriation from the district (qu) government
and half came from the portion of litigation fees they were allowed to
retain.182
Stories abound of local governments using their power over courts to
exercise influence. A judge in Fujian who executed a judgment against a
local enterprise found his daughter transferred the next day by her
employer, the county, to an isolated post on a small island.183 In another
case, local government officials, upon hearing that the local court was
preparing to accept a case naming an important local enterprise as
defendant, reportedly remonstrated:

of these two factors. See, e.g., 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172, at 8; Court Interview D; Lawyer
Interview R; Court Interview K; Zhang, supra note 172; Shi Youyong, Shenpan Zhong Difang Baohu
Zhuyi De Chengyin Ji Duice [Local Protectionism in Adjudication: Causes and Countermeasures],
FAXUE [LEGAL STUDIES], No. 6, at 15, 16 (1989).
176. A case in point is that of the Pingtan country salt plant discussed infra in note 220.
177. Sources making this diagnosis are too numerous to be cited here. The issue is discussed
in more detail in Clarke, supra note 6, at 61-64. In one county, the local government’s persistent
favoring of the procuracy over the court led eventually to violence when the procuracy built its
county-funded dormitory for dependents right up to the courthouse door, blocking vehicular access.
See 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172.
178. Chen Youxi & Xue Chunbao, Zaocheng Fayuan Zhixing Nan De San Da Jiben Yinsu
[The Three Major Reasons Why Courts Have Difficulty in Execution], ZHEJIANG FAZHI BAO
[ZHEJIANG LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Aug. 16, 1990, at 3.
179. See Court Interview K.
180. See Academic Interview P.
181. See Court Interview K; Court Interview D; Court Interview F.
182. See Court Interview F.
183. See MINSHI SHENPAN RUOGAN LILUN YU SHIJIAN WENTI [SEVERAL THEORETICAL AND
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN CIVIL ADJUDICATION] 391 (Tang Dehua ed., 1991).
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The Trust and Investment Company is an enterprise under
district jurisdiction; a case as big as this will have an effect on
the finances of the whole district. Don’t you want your salaries
paid? As for your application to the district to allocate funds for
a dormitory, don’t be ridiculous! You court people need to think
of some excuse for blocking this case and not accepting it.184
Both direct execution and entrustment present their own problems. The
chief problem with direct execution is that outside courts tend to lack the
local clout needed to get their judgments enforced. Some banks in
Shenzhen, for example, apparently had — and may still have — internal
rules requiring that any freeze on customer accounts by an outside court be
approved by a Shenzhen court,185 although such a requirement is prohibited
in notices issued in 1983 and 1993 by the Supreme People’s Court and the
People’s Bank of China.186 Numerous other banks have rules requiring that
the freezing or seizure of funds be approved by higher bank authorities,187
although such rules have also been declared unlawful by the Supreme
People’s Court.188 On a more general level, some local governments have,

184. ZHANG, supra note 172, at 3.
185. See Dangqian Jingji Anjian Weihe Zhixing Nan? [Why Is Execution Difficult in
Economic Cases at Present?], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Oct 2, 1989,
at 1.
186. See infra texts accompanying notes 250 to 254.
187. See, e.g., Zhegjiang Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan, Zhejiang Sheng Renmin Jianchayuan,
Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Zhejiang Sheng Feiyuan, Zhongguo Nongye YinHang Zhejiang Shen
Fenyuan [Zhejiang Province Higher Level People’s Court, Zhejiang Province People’s Procuratorate,
Zhejiang Provincial Branch of the People’s Bank of China, Zhejiang Provincial Branch of the
Agricultural Bank of China], Guanyu Chaxun, Zhifu He Chuli Susong Dangshiren Chuxu Cunkuan
Wenti De Lianhe Tongzhi [Joint Notice on the Issues of Investigating, Stopping Payments from, and
Handling Bank Deposits of Parties to Litigation] (Aug. 13, 1980), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 748
[hereinafter 1980 Zhejiang Notice] (requiring that freezes must have the approval of the bank director
without indicating the grounds on which the director could legitimately disapprove); Tian Da Gongsi
Zongjingli Bei Zhikong Fanzui [General Manager of Tian Da Company Accused of Crime],
SHENZHEN FAZHI BAO [SHENZHEN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], May 31, 1989, at 1 (noting existence in
several places, including Shanghai, of rule requiring approval at county level of bank for freezing of
deposits).
188. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Keyi
Zhijie Yu Yinhang Xitong De Yingyesuo, Xinyongshe Lianxi, Chaxun, Dongjie Huozhe Kouhua QiShiye Deng Danwei Cunkuan De Pifu [Reply [Saying] That People’s Courts May Directly Contact
Business Establishments and Credit Cooperatives Within the Banking System and Investigate, Freeze
or Levy Upon Funds Held by Enterprises, Institutions and Other Units] (Jan. 17, 1985), in ZHIXING
GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 700 [hereinafter 1985 SPC Reply]. Whether this document can
or should actually bind banks is open to question. Although the document states that it was issued
after “liaison and study” with the People’s Bank of China, the Bank chose not to be a co-issuer. Given
that the Bank is a co-issuer of other similar documents, the absence of its name on this document
could be significant.
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according to court officials both in interviews and in published writings,
issued rules forbidding local banks from obeying court orders to remove
funds from a local defendant’s account if it is destined for an outside
(waidi) plaintiff.189 Such rules, if they exist, are unquestionably unlawful,
but the rule in practice in China tends to be that a specific local regulation
prevails over a general national one.190
Local courts may also attempt to interfere with direct execution within
their jurisdiction by an outside court.
When an outside court goes to another area to execute, the local court
always refuses to cooperate, and may even obstruct execution. Even worse
is when the local court has secret communications with the party, warning
it to shift its funds and property, thus making it impossible for the outside
court to execute.191
When officials of a Beijing court went to nearby Zhangjiakou to
execute a judgment against a local defendant, they first cleared it with the
local court. While they were in the process of removing property from the
defendant’s warehouse, however, the local court changed its mind and
decided to “suspend execution,” a measure beyond its authority because it
was not the executing court. At this, the defendant’s manager called on
workers to block court personnel and a fight ensued.192 When officials of
the Chengdu ILPC went to Guangdong to execute a judgment, the president
of the local court required the plaintiff to waive its claim to over half the
amount of the judgment before he would allow the remainder to be
transferred to the Chengdu court’s account.193
One must have a certain sympathy, however, with a local court faced
with an outside court coming in to enforce a judgment in favor of a plaintiff
from its own jurisdiction. A suspicion that local protectionism might be at
work is surely justified, since both courts face the same type of pressures.194

189. See Court Interview E; 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172, at 1.
190. See Clarke, supra note 6, at 26-28.
191. See 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172, at 4.
192. See Kangju Zhixing Fayuan Panjue, Wang Zhihua Deng Reng Bei Juliu [For Resisting
the Execution of a Court Judgment, Wang Zhihua and Others Are Still Detained], BEIJING FAZHI BAO
[BEIJING LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Feb. 24, 1990, at 1.
193. See 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172, at 5. Under prevailing law at the time, the
Chengdu court had the authority to freeze a defendant’s account, but needed approval of the local
court before funds could be transferred out. See infra text accompanying notes 314-323.
194. The Chengdu ILPC reported a case where a Henan court rendered a judgment in
absentia in favor of a local plaintiff against a Chengdu defendant, and did not allow the defendant to
appeal. When asked to cooperate in execution, the court discovered this “error” in procedure in time
to prevent loss to the defendant. See 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172, at 3-4.
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A court that ignored this reality would be doing an active disservice to
defendants in its area of jurisdiction.195
When the person or property to be executed against is outside a
court’s geographical jurisdiction, it may also entrust (weituo) execution to
the basic level196 court of the relevant region instead of executing
directly.197 When a court is entrusted with execution, it must (bixu) begin
execution proceedings within fifteen days. The mandatory “must” is a
deliberate change from the hortatory (and presumably ineffective) “should”
(yingdang) of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure.198
195. In one case, the plaintiff sued in its home court, a BLPC in Wuhan, because the
defendant had made no payments on a automobiles it had leased with an option to buy. Plaintiff’s
lawyer then went to the defendant’s home town in Sichuan with the Wuhan court’s economic
adjudication chamber and the execution chamber — suggesting that the result was something of a
foregone conclusion. Upon investigation, they found that the defendant was delinquent in its payment
of wages and did not intend to pay the debt owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s lawyer pointed out
that the ownership of the cars did not change hands until all payments were made, and asked the court
to impound the vehicles prior to the hearing. As this enraged the defendant’s workers, the court
quickly held a hearing and announced judgment against the defendant. After the announcement of the
judgment, the plaintiff’s lawyer hired drivers to take the vehicles back to Wuhan as quickly as
possible, stopping for nothing. See YUNYONG FALÜ SHOUDUAN QING ZHAI BAI CE [ONE HUNDRED
TACTICS FOR USING LEGAL METHODS TO CLEAR UP DEBTS] 229 (Li Bida ed., 1991). For other cases
where the plaintiff’s home court went to another jurisdiction to conduct the hearing, see Dandong
Fayuan Bodo Dangshiren Hefa Quanli Ying Chajiu [The Dandong Court's Stripping a Party of His
Lawful Rights Should Be Investigated and Punished], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], June 2,
1988, at 1; Yi-Fen Bei Mieshile Liang-Nian Zhi Jiu De Tiaojie Shu [A Bill of Mediation That Was
Looked on With Contempt for Two Long Years], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM
NEWS], Aug. 15, 1988, at 1.
196. The level of court is stipulated in 1993 SPC Rules, supra note 169, art. 11. Before the
issuance of this document, the proper level of court to entrust had been the subject of debate, with
some arguing that execution should be entrusted to the court at the same level as the court that made
the original judgment. See, e.g., WEI JINFA, YIN SHIFENG & HE QIHUA, RENMIN FAYUAN ZHIXING
DUICE [MEASURES FOR EXECUTION BY PEOPLE'S COURTS] 27-28 (1992).
197. See article 210 of the Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34. The degree to which
courts should entrust execution in such cases has remained an unsettled matter of policy. Article 165
of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure said that courts “may” entrust execution. But a Supreme People’s
Court interpretation of 1984 said that courts “should” entrust execution. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
[Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Zai Jingji Shenpan Gongzuo Zhong Guanzhe Zhixing “Minshi
Susong Fa (Shi Xing)” Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Opinion on Several Issues in the Implementation
of the “Law on Civil Procedure Law (for Trial Implementation)” in Economic Adjudication] (Sept.
17, 1984), in ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 102, 107 (section VII, para. 4). In Chinese
legal drafting, “should” is often close, and sometime equivalent, to “must.” The 1991 Law on Civil
Procedure and subsequent Supreme People’s Court documents both restored the “may” formulation.
See 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, supra note 70, at 89 (art. 259); 1993 SPC Rules, supra note
169 (art. 11). According to one court, however, the Supreme People’s Court has a rule requiring
entrustment. See Shanghai Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Shanghai Intermediate Level People's Court],
Zengqiang Fazhi Guannian, Banhao Weituo Anjian [Strengthen Legal-Mindedness, Handle Entrusted
Cases Well], in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42, at 5 [hereinafter 1992 Shanghai ILPC]. On
entrusted execution in general, see ZHIXING DE LILUN YU SHIJIAN, supra note 81, at 83-96.
198. See 1992 Guiyang ILPC, supra note 99, at 1 (complaining that some courts wait months
or years before executing entrusted cases).
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The main problem with entrusted execution is that the entrusted court
is unlikely to devote a great deal of effort to it. From the earliest years of
the People’s Republic, a steady stream of documents attests to the difficulty
of making courts take this procedure seriously.199 As the Supreme People’s
Court complained in 1988,
Recently, some courts have repeatedly reported some problems that
deserve attention. These are principally as follows.
(1) Some courts ignore entrustments from courts from other areas, or
emphasize difficulties and procrastinate.
(2) Some courts want to examine the records of the case from the
entrusting court, or else they create obstacles, even to the extent of
passing on information and giving suggestions to the party from their
own locality, thus hindering implementation.
(3) Some courts make reciprocity a condition, turning cooperation in
entrustment between people’s courts into an exchange relationship,
and even demanding that the entrusting court pay expenses.
(4) In handling entrusted matters, some courts, when they encounter
any pressure or interference, do not dare to uphold principle or to do
things according to law, and try to push the conflict onto the
entrusting court.200
While courts generally report their own rate of successful execution of
entrusted cases to be high,201 they report a low rate of successful execution
of cases entrusted to other courts. One court reported that in a ten-month

199. See 1951 MOJ Notice, supra note 67; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s
Court], Guanyu Weituo Diaocha He Zhuanchu Huibao Gongzuo Shang Tuo La Zuofeng De Tongbao
[Notice Regarding the Work Style of Procrastinating in Matters of Entrusted Investigation and
Reporting Back on Disposition] (Apr. 19, 1956) in YOUGUAN SHENPAN YEWU WENJIAN HUIBIAN
[COLLECTED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION WORK] 182 (1957); 1957 MOJ Notice, supra
note 67; Sifa Bu [Ministry of Justice], Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Daixun Daicha Liaojie Anqing
Gongzuo De Tongzhi [Notice on Conscientiously Doing Well the Work of Substitute Questioning and
Investigation in Order to Understand the Case] (Apr. 14, 1958), in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 420;
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Weituo Waidi Fayuan Diaocha Anqing
He Chuanxun Dangshiren Ying Zhuyi De Wenti De Han [Letter on Problems to Which Attention
Should Be Paid in Entrusting Courts From Other Regions to Investigate the Circumstances of a Case
and to Summon a Party] (Feb. 20, 1962), in 2 MSCZ, at 421; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme
People’s Court], Guanyu Zai Shenli Jingji Jiufen Anjian Zhong Renzhen Banhao Waidi Fayuan
Weituo Shixiang De Tongzhi [Notice on Conscientiously Carrying Out Tasks Entrusted by Courts
From Other Areas in the Course of Trying Cases of Economic Disputes] (Jan. 20, 1988), in ZHIXING
GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 265 [hereinafter 1988 SPC Notice]; 1993 SPC Rules, supra note
169.
200. 1988 SPC Notice, supra note 199, at 265.
201. See, e.g., 1992 Shanghai ILPC, supra note 197, at 1-2.
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period it made 115 entrustments to courts of twenty different provinces. By
the time of the report, only fourteen (12 percent) had been executed. In
thirty cases, the entrusted court reported back that it could not execute or
requested termination of execution, and in fully seventy-one cases (62
percent) no response had been received at all.202
Local courts may be unwilling to help for the local protectionist
reasons outlined above. In the face of determined stonewalling, the court
wishing to execute may have little remedy.203 Even a friendly court, as the
quoted text suggests, may not dare to go against the wishes of local leaders.
In one case, a sympathetic court president asked the outside court for
understanding on the grounds that he was building a house and would never
get it finished if he offended the county government — which, he said,
“won’t let us touch this case.”204 Finally, a court that is neither hostile nor
afraid of local government may simply deem it too much of a bother to
spend resources on executing the judgments of other courts when it may be
hard pressed to execute its own. In such a case, the entrusted court might
demand that the entrusting court pay the expenses of execution.205
As noted above, the principal cause of local judicial protectionism
appears to be the combination of the local government’s direct interest in
the financial well-being of local enterprises with its power over court
personnel and finances. Consequently, local protectionism could be
expected to be less pronounced where either of these factors is weakened
or absent. Indeed, lawyers and court officials interviewed suggested that
local protectionism was much less of a problem with intermediate level and
higher level courts, where the connection of the corresponding level of
government with local finance was much more tenuous.206

202. See Commentator, “Liba Qiang” A, B, C — Shenpan Gongzuo Zhong De Difang Baohu
Zhuyi Shu Ping [“Fence” A, B, C — An Account of Local Protectionism in Adjudication Work],
RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No. 10, 1990, at 2, 3.
203. In one case, a county court refused to help enforce an outside judgment despite two
specific orders from the Supreme People’s Court to do so. See Chen Shibin, Dawu Sian Fayuan
Jianchi Difang Baohu Zhuyi, Tuoyan San-Nian Ju Bu Xiezhu Zhixing Waidi Panjue [Dawu County
Court Persists in Local Protectionism; After Delaying Three Years, Still Refuses to Assist in Execution
of an Outside Judgment], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], June 4, 1988, at 1.
204. Liu Jian & Mu Xiaoqian, Zhixing Zhong De Wu Da Nan Ti — Guangdong Sheng Jingji
Jiufen Anjian Diaocha Zhi San [The Five Big Dilemmas in Execution — Part Three of an
Investigation Into Economic Disputes in Guangdong], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], April
19, 1988, at 3, 3.
205. See 1988 SPC Notice, supra note 199, at 265.
206. See Lawyer Interview R; Court Interview K. One lawyer I interviewed was involved
in a case against a Hangzhou defendant for 200,000 yuan. The Hangzhou court with jurisdiction, a
Basic Level People’s Court, refused to accept the case for hearing. The lawyer went to the
Intermediate Level People’s Court (directly above the first court) and obtained an order to the lower
court to hear the case, but to no avail. Even after the lawyer procured a direct order from the Higher
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Local judicial protectionism could also be expected to decline if the
dependence of courts on local government could be reduced. On the
financial side, this could be done by funding courts from the center instead
of from various levels of local government.207 At present, with the central
government strapped for funds, there is no indication that such a reform is
in the works.
On the personnel side, the picture is a little different. The general rule
is that court presidents and vice presidents owe their jobs to local people’s
congresses at the same level — in practice the local Party organization.208
Since late 1988, however, a small-scale experiment has been going on in
Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Inner Mongolia whereby superior
courts have more say in appointments to inferior courts.209 The spread of
this reform would mean greater independence for courts from local
government.210
For the time being, the best that courts seem able to do is to enter into
what are essentially treaties of reciprocity with other courts. Under such
agreements, each court party to the agreement promises to execute the
judgments of the other signatories.211 Courts are already, of course,
Level People’s Court, at the provincial level, the Hangzhou court still refused to hear the case. See
Lawyer Interview R. As one source points out, courts are more afraid to offend local government than
they are to offend superior courts. See Wu Qingbao, Di-Er-Ci Quanguo Jingji Shenpan Gongzuo
Hiuyi Zongshu [A General Account of the Second National Conference on Economic Adjudication
Work], JINGJI FAZHI [ECONOMIC LEGAL SYSTEM], No. 6, at 25, 28 (1991). For a discussion of the
prevalence of kuai (the principle of control at the same administrative level) over tiao (the principle
of vertical control) in the court system, see Li Yaxiong, Shi Lun Woguo Minshi Zhi Fa De Youhua [A
Tentative Discussion of the Optimization of Implementation of Law in Civil Matters], ZHONG-WAI
FAXUE [CHINESE AND FOREIGN LEGAL STUDIES], No. 2, at 1, 1 (1992).
207. For proposals to this effect, see Zhang, supra note 172; 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note
172, at 13.
208. The dominant role of the Party in selecting judges is clearly spelled out in Cooperation
Measures, supra note 23, which mentions only once the organs formally empowered to select judges:
“After the above cadres have been approved within the Party, it is necessary to perform the procedures
of appointment and removal in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Law of the People’s
Courts [i.e., appointment must be by the appropriate People’s Congress or its Standing Committee].
. . . Appointments to and removals from office may not be announced before the above legallyprescribed procedures have been followed.” Id., at 611.
209. For details, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Renshi Ting [Supreme People’s Court Personnel
Department], Gaige Ganbu Tizhi, Jiaqiang Guanli Gongzuo, Baozheng Renmin Fayuan Yi Fa Duli
Shenpan [Reform the Cadre System and Strengthen Supervisory Work; Guarantee the People’s
Courts’ Independent Adjudication According to Law], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE’S JUDICATURE], No. 9,
at 16 (1990).
210. A number of writers advocate centralizing the power of appointment of judges. See, e.g.,
Yu Lianrui, Shichang Jingji Huhuan Sifa Tizhi Gaigi [The Market Economy Cries Out for Reform of
the Judicial System], MINZHU YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM], No. 181, at 21
(1994).
211. See Academic Interview J (describing the practice in general); 1992 Chengdu ILPC,
supra note 172, at 10.
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statutorily required to execute the judgments of other Chinese courts, and
the Supreme People’s Court has specifically denounced the practice of
requiring reciprocity.212 Nevertheless, such agreements do exist and are
even trumpeted as positive achievements in the press.213 On the other hand,
they have no real legal force, and will last only as long as the parties deem
it in their interest to continue cooperating.
b.

Other Kinds of Interference by Administrative
Bodies

Local protectionism is merely one manifestation of a larger problem,
that of interference by state administrative organs and local power-holders
who do not want to see a judgment executed for whatever reason. Here the
courts are on the horns of not one but two dilemmas.
The first dilemma is that of conflicting policy signals. On the one
hand, courts are told to administer justice independently according solely
to the requirements of the law. The days of seeking advice from the local
Party committee on specific cases are supposed to be over, as stated by no
less than Jiang Hua, then President of the Supreme People’s Court, in the
People’s Daily as early as 1980.214 In addition, a series of academic articles

212. See 1988 SPC Notice, supra note 199, at 265. See also Guangzhou Shi Zhongji Renmin
Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Execution Chamber of the Guangzhou Intermediate Level People's Court],
Jianchi Yi Fa Ban Shi, Bingqi Difang Baohu Zhuyi [Uphold Doing Things According to Law; Do
Away With Local Protectionism], in ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 47, 48 (criticizing
the principle of reciprocity).
213. See Yang Jisheng, “East-West Dialogue” in China — The Strategy of Unbalanced
Economic Development on the Mainland in Perspective (in Chinese), LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK], No.
9, at 5 (1989), translated in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, DAILY REPORT: CHINA
[FBIS], Apr. 10, 1989, at 37, 39 (describing agreements by Shanghai courts with those of nine other
provinces); Xiang-E Liushisi-Jia Fayuan Lianshou Gongpo Yidi Zhixing Nan Guan Jian Xiao [SixtyFour Courts In Hunan and Hubei Join Hands, Achieve Results in Overcoming the Problem of
Executing Judgments in Other Regions], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], July 24, 1991, at 1
[hereinafter Sixty-Four Courts] (reporting mutual execution agreement among courts of several cities
along the Yangtse); Peng Changlin, Jianli Jingji Shenpan Sifa Xiezhu Zhidu, Xieshou Gongke Anjian
Yidi Zhixing Nanti [Establish a System of Judicial Cooperation in Economic Adjudication, Join Hands
to Attack and Overcome the Problem of Executing in a Different Region], JINGJI FAZHI [ECONOMIC
LEGAL SYSTEM], No. 7, at 30, (1992) (article enthusiastically praising the same agreement). According
to the agreement described in the sources cited here, participating courts agreed inter alia to give
priority to executing each other’s judgments (as opposed to the judgments of non-participating courts).
214. See Baozheng Fayuan Duli Shenpan, Feichu Dangwei Shenpi Anjian Zuofa [Guarantee
the Independent Adjudication of Cases by the Courts in Accordance With the Law; Abolish the
Practice of the Party Committee Examining and Approving [Decisions in] Cases], RENMIN RIBAO
[PEOPLE’S DAILY], Aug. 25, 1980, at 1.
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and news reports over the last several years has noted the persistence of
Party decisionmaking in legal cases only to deplore it.215
On the other hand, however, courts are at the same time receiving
policy documents from both the Party and the Supreme People’s Court that
specifically provide for Party committee decisionmaking in specific cases.
In 1980, for example — the same year as President Jiang’s remarks — a
Central Committee document noted that one of the duties of the Party’s
Political-Legal Committees at various levels was to “dispose of important
and difficult cases.”216 A string of Supreme People’s Court policy directives
to lower courts through the late 1970s and the 1980s reflects the Party’s
position: “Important cases must be reported to the Party committee at the
same level for approval” (1979);217 in important or difficult cases, courts
“must always . . . report . . . to the Party committee with a request for
instructions” (1984);218 it is more necessary than ever “to strengthen the
system of reporting to the Party committee for instructions” (1984).219
The second dilemma is an outgrowth of the first: if the courts try to go
their own way and not to involve the local Party organization in their
decisions, they may find that their judgments, however independently
arrived at, are unenforceable. Party involvement may not be bad; in paying
due respect to the Party organization, courts may simply be doing what is
necessary to ensure political backing for their judgments.220 As one source
215. The sources are too numerous to list here. I discuss the issue, with citations, in Clarke,
supra note 6, at 61-64.
216. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Chengli Zheng-Fa Weiyuanhui De Tongzhi [Notice
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Establishment of Political-Legal
Committees] (Central Committee Doc. No. 5 (1980)), cited in Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu
Jiaqiang Zheng-Fa Gongzuo De Tongzhi [Chinese Communist Party Central Committe Notice on
Strengthening Political-Legal Work] (Jan. 13, 1982), reprinted in ZHONGGONG NIANBAO 1983-84
[YEARBOOK OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 1983-84], at 8-6 (1984).
217. 1979 SPC Rules, supra note 15, at 84.
218. Wang Zhanping, Zhenfen Jingshen, Nuli Kaichuang Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo De Xin
Jumian [Get Spirits Up, Work Hard to Open Up a New Situation in Civil Adjudication] in SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, supra note 15, at 121, 142 (report to 4th National Conference On Civil Adjudication
Work, June 28, 1984).
219. Ren, supra note 173, at 216. Ren was vice president of the Supreme People’s Court at
the time.
220. As one court put it,
When a court experiences difficulty in executing judgments in cases that are doubtful,
complex, widely influential, or subject to a great amount of interference, it should
promptly report to the Party committee and the People’s Congress, asking them to make
an appearance in order to request the relevant departments to assist the court in getting
its judgment executed.
Jiangsu HLPC 2, supra note 47, at 239. For similar sentiments, see Guangzhou ILPC, supra note 53,
at 3; 1922 Beijing ILPC, supra note 42, at 8; Su He (vice president of the Huhehot Intermediate Level
People's Court), Tantan Jiejue 'Zhixing Nan' De Juti Cuoshi [A Discussion of Concrete Measures for
Solving “Difficulty in Execution”], at 5, in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42. Of course, going
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noted, “The practice of execution shows that if court work is supported and
assisted by local Party and government departments, execution work goes
smoothly.”221 If local authorities oppose the court, however, it may find (in
the words of one threatening official) that it has “bitten off more than [it]
can chew” (chibuliao douzhe zou).222 In one reported case, a single
telephone call from the local Party secretary brought execution to a halt.223
In another case, a defendant used what were evidently police connections
to disrupt court activities, including blocking the entrance to the court for
three days with a vehicle loaded with toughs, who refused to let anyone
enter or leave.224
Sometimes the power balance may be so one-sided that courts are
simply not in the picture at all. In a Shaanxi village, a Party secretary
forged a contract and unlawfully appropriated 20,000 yuan rightfully
belonging to a peasant. The county Party and People’s Congress
investigated, found the peasant’s complaint well founded, and ordered the
money returned. The culprit, however, refused to do so, and evidently there
was no way to require him. The most interesting thing about the report of
this affair, however, is that while it uses terms such as “bringing a suit”

to the People’s Congress won’t always work. The court of Tongan county in Fujian wrote six times
to the court of Pingtan county in the same province requesting that it carry out entrusted execution
against the Pingtan county salt plant. Nothing happened because the head of the salt plant was a
member of the local People’s Congress standing committee. See Fuzhou Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan
Zhixing Ting [Fuzhou Intermediate Level People's Court], Renzhen Zuohao Waidi Fayuan Weituo
Huo Xiezhu Zhixing De Gongzuo [Conscientiously Do Well the Work of Execution Entrusted by or
in Cooperation With Courts From Other Regions], at 8, in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42
[hereinafter 1992 Fuzhou ILPC 2].
Kevin O’Brien has observed the same imperatives at work in the attitudes of people’s congress
deputies toward “independence” from the Party — they don’t necessarily want it. See Kevin J.
O’Brien, Chinese People’s Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding Early
Organizational Development, 27 COMP. POL. STUD. 80 (1984).
221. Chen & Xue, supra note 178. In one reported case, it was only after the head of the local
government expressed his firm support for “the independent handling of cases by the court” that the
court was able to get its judgment enforced. See Linfen Xing Shu Zhuanyuan Wang Min Zhichi Fayuan
Yi Fa Ban’an [Linfen Administrative District Chief Wang Min Supports the Court in Handling Cases
According to Law], SHANXI FAZHI BAO [SHANXI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Dec. 14, 1986, at 1.
222. The case is reported in Liu Jian & Mu Xiaoqian, Shei Zai Wei Beigao Dang Houtai?
— Guangdong Sheng Jingji Jiufen Anjian Zhixing Nan Diaocha Zhi Er [Who Is Backing Up the
Defendant? — Part Two of an Investigation Into Difficulty in Executing in Cases of Economic
Disputes in Guangdong], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], April 5, 1988, at 3.
223. See Shi-Wei Shuji Neng Ganshe Fayuan De Zhixing Ma? [Can the Municipal Party
Committee Secretary Interfere With the Court's Execution?], MINZHU YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM], No. 5, at 5 (1983) (letter to the editor).
224. See Xiayi Fasheng Ruma Fayuan Ganbu An [A Case of Humiliating and Cursing Court
Cadres Occurs in Xiayi], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Oct. 12, 1987,
at 7.
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(gaozhuang) and “a case of contract dispute” (hetong jiufen an), it never
mentions the involvement of courts.225
The problem of local government interference appears to remain
substantial. Chinese courts are not, along the Anglo-American model,
powerful arbiters of last resort who can decide important questions
involving powerful state leaders. Instead, they are in practice just one
bureaucracy among many with a limited jurisdiction. When a court is on
the same administrative level as a defendant, it simply lacks the rank to
enforce.226
c.

Insolvency of Defendant

Sometimes execution of a judgment will be impossible because the
defendant either no longer exists or is insolvent.227 Failure to execute a
judgment here might have nothing to do with the adequacy of legal
remedies or the strength of courts.228 The strongest legal system in the
world cannot prevent bad debts. On the other hand, the picture becomes
more complicated when we realize that failure to execute against an
insolvent corporate defendant also means failure to hold anyone else —
investors, for example, or an administrative superior — accountable for the
debt. If someone else should, by some standard, be held accountable, then
the failure to execute is significant.
It is important to examine this question because insolvency or
dissolution of the debtor enterprise appears to account for a very large
proportion of unexecuted judgments — according to one estimate, 30 to 40
percent.229 In many cases, however, it may be that somebody else should be

225. See id., at 1. It should be noted that gaozhuang, before the modern era, meant simply
bringing a grievance to a government official.
226. See Zhei-Ge Zao Yi Shenjie De Anzi Yao Tuo Dao He Ri Zhixing? [How Long Will This
Long-Adjudicated Case Drag on Until Execution?], FAZHI ZHOUBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM WEEKLY], May
17, 1988, at 3 ("We can’t execute against the town government [in a suit that the latter lost]; we’re on
the same administrative level.") (letter to the editor).
227. On this problem, see generally Pan & Luo, supra note 59; Su, supra note 220; Kunming
ILPC, supra note 59, at 3; Fei, supra note 145, at 63.
228. This argument is made in Court Interview F and Changchun ILPC, Eliminate Local
Protectionism, supra note 170.
229. See Xue Chunbao, Dui Dangqian Fayuan Panjue Huo Caiding De Jingji Anjian Zhixing
Wenti De Pouxi [An Analysis of Current Difficulties in Execution of Court Judgments or Rulings in
Economic Cases], ZHENJIANG FAXUE [ZHENJIANG LEGAL STUDIES], No. 2, at 25, 25 (1989). Other
sources very roughly corroborate this figure. Out of 473 debt cases surveyed by the Jiangxi Higher
Level People’s Court, for example, 166 were unexecuted because the defendant had no money. See
Jiangxi HLPC, supra note 124, at 3. In one group of unexecuted judgments before the Shenzhen
Intermediate Level People’s Court, 30 percent were for amounts exceeding one million yuan (there
are about 8.3 yuan to the U.S. dollar). See Jingji Anjian Zhixing Nan De Yuanyin He Duice [Difficulty
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made responsible and is somehow getting off the hook. Suppose, for
example, that the Bureau of Light Industry of City X runs an enterprise that
is deeply in debt. It can try to pre-empt creditors by simply closing it down.
During the “company fever” of the 1980s, this was a popular way of
reducing risk. Government organs would establish undercapitalized
“briefcase” companies; if they made money, well and good. If not, creditors
would be left holding the bag.230
Several regulations have attempted to deal with this problem. A 1985
State Council notice provided that where companies were negligently
approved, the approval organ bore responsibility for debts.231 A joint
Central Committee-State Council notice of the following year made
approval organs responsible where unlawful operations resulted in
unpayable debts.232 A 1987 Supreme People’s Court document provided —
somewhat tautologically — that where a branch enterprise established by
an enterprise closed down, it bore its debts itself if it was a legal person
(because legal persons have limited liability). If it was not, then debts were
to be borne by the superior enterprise. If the debtor in question was a
“company” (gongsi), however, then the 1985 and 1986 regulations noted
above would apply.233 A 1990 State Council notice may or may not have
modified the 1985 notice: it states, inter alia, that debts incurred by a
company after it has become administratively separated from its founding
government agency are not the responsibility of the founder.234 It does not

in Execution in Economic Cases: Causes and Countermeasures], SHENZHEN FAZHI BAO [SHENZHEN
LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Sept. 20, 1989, at 3. See also Kunming ILPC, supra note 59, at 3-4.
230. For an account of one of these “briefcase” companies, see Panjue Ruhe Zhixing? [How
Can the Judgment Be Executed?], SHENZHEN FAZHI BAO [SHENZHEN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Aug.
8, 1990, at 1.
231. See State Council, Guanyu (Yao) Jinyibu Qingli He Zhengdun (Gelei) Gongsi De
Tongzhi [Notice on Further Cleaning Up and Rectifying (All Kinds of) Companies] (words in
parentheses omitted in some versions) (Aug. 20, 1985), in 4 JINGJI SHENPAN SHOUCE [HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC ADJUDICATION] 70 (1988).
232. See Zhong-Gong Zhongyang Guowu Yuan [Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee State Council], Guanyu Jinyibu Zhizhi Dang-Zheng Jiguan He Dang-Zheng Ganbu Jing
Shang, Ban Qiye De Guiding [Rules on Further Putting a Stop to Party and Government Organs and
Party and Government Officials Engaging in Business and Running Enterprises] (Feb. 4, 1986), in 1
JINGJI SHENPAN SHOUCE [HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ADJUDICATION] 209 (1987).
233. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Xingzheng Danwei Huo
Qiye Danwei Kaiban De Qiye Daobi Hou Zhaiwu You Shei Chengdan De Pifu [Reply on the
Question of Who Should Bear the Debts of Enterprises Run by Administrative Units or Enterprise
Units After They Have Become Insolvent] (Aug. 29, 1987), in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
FALÜ QUANSHU [COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] [hereinafter LAW
COMPENDIUM] 1188 (1989).
234. See Guowu Yuan [State Council], Guanyu Zai Qingli Zhengdun Gongsi Zhong Bei
Chebing Gongsi Zhaiquan Zhaiwu Qingli Wenti De Tongzhi [Notice Concerning the Issue of Debts
and of Amounts Owing to Companies Merged or Closed in the Course of Cleaning Up and Rectifying
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address the question of negligent approval. Finally, a 1994 Supreme
People’s Court notice abolished that part of its 1987 notice that said that
debts of “companies” should be dealt with according to the 1985 State
Council notice.235 This would appear to mean that negligent approval is no
longer grounds for imposing liability on a superior agency.
In the face of these regulations, government departments have come
up with a new way of avoiding responsibility for indebted companies:
instead of closing the company down, which would expose them to
liability, they leave the company formally in existence as an empty shell
with no substantial assets. As long as the company exists, the entity that
approved it is not responsible for its debts. The company itself is, but its
liability is limited to the property it has been given to manage — which has
been largely stripped away.236
Courts and legal scholars are not unaware of this subterfuge. Thus,
one court has suggested that at least where it is clear that the shell is
maintained for the purpose of avoiding liability on the part of the
company’s administrative superior (zhuguan bumen), liability should be
imposed.237 Unfortunately, this sensible idea is seriously compromised by
the limitation of the superior’s liability to its extrabudgetary funds
(yusuanwai zijin).238 These are unlikely to be ample. Moreover, at least one
scholar has proposed that creditors’ recovery be further limited to the
Companies] (Dec. 12, 1990), ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWU YUAN GONGBAO [PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA STATE COUNCIL GAZETTE] [SCG], No. 28 [1990 volume], Feb. 5, 1991, at 1043,
1044 [hereinafter Notice on Company Debt].
235. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Qiye Kaiban De Qita
Qiye Bei Chexiao Huozhe Xieye Hou Minshi Zeren Chengdan Wenti De Pifu [Reply on the Question
of the Bearing of Civil Liability After the Cancellation or Closing of Other Enterprises Run by
Enterprises], SPCG, No. 2, June 20, 1994, at 71 [hereinafter Reply on Civil Liability]. The cumulative
effect of all these notices and instructions from different bodies is far from clear. To attempt a strictly
logical analysis may be missing the point, since Chinese judges — often recently demobilized army
officers with little or no legal education — are not necessarily going to conduct the same analysis.
236. See Wuhan Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Execution Chamber of the
Wuhan Intermediate Level People's Court], Guanyu Zhixing Chengxu Zhong Zhuijiu Zhuguan Danwei
Qingchang Zeren De Jige Wenti [Some Problems in Enforcing the Responsibility of the Unit in
Charge to Clear Up Debts in the Course of Execution Proceedings], at 3, in CONFERENCE
MATERIALS, supra note 42 [hereinafter Wuhan ILPC]; Liu & Mu, supra note 204, at 3.
237. See Wuhan ILPC, supra note 236, at 4. In a general discussion of the liability of
superior administrative departments for the debts of subordinate enterprises, the court went on to
propose handling this kind of case according to the general principle that the party receiving the
benefits should bear the responsibility. Given that superior departments take profits and management
fees, they should be expected to bear liability when things go wrong as well in accordance with the
principle of the unity of rights and responsibilities. See id., at 8. This apparently sensible rationale
would, however, mean nothing less than the abolition of limited liability.
238. See Notice on Company Debt, supra note 234; Wuhan ILPC, supra note 236, at 9;
Zhang Baoqin, Qiantan Bei Zhixing Ren De Biangeng [A Brief Discussion of a Change in the Identity
of the Executee], FAXUE PINGLUN [LEGAL STUDIES REVIEW], No. 2, at 78, 79 (1992).
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insolvent company’s registered capital — that is, the original investment
made in it.239 This makes no sense for a number of reasons, the most
obvious of which is that undercapitalization is the whole justification for
going after the administrative superior in the first place. The most recent
pronouncement on the subject, a 1994 Supreme People’s Court document,
rules that where a wound-up debtor as a practical matter met the
requirements for legal personality, the liability of a superior agency cannot
exceed the difference, if any, between registered capital and actual initial
investment. Where the debtor did not as a practical matter meet the
requirements for legal personality, the superior agency is responsible for
the whole amount of the debt.240
d.

Lack of Cooperation by Other Units

In a number of circumstances, the court cannot execute a judgment on
its own, but needs the cooperation of other units that control various
resources. The degree to which other units must cooperate with courts
remains remarkably unclear even after more than a decade of legal reform.
What is clear is that as a practical matter units such as banks can sometimes
ignore court requests or orders with impunity.241 Thus, when a court wishes
to freeze or seize funds in a defendant’s bank account, the banks can often
as a practical matter — lawfully or unlawfully — pose many obstacles if
they wish to. Similarly, a defendant’s work unit may simply refuse to
garnish wages by the amount the court requests, and the court appears to
have little recourse.
The ability of banks and others to resist court orders to assist in
execution stems from the fact that the court is essentially just another
bureaucracy, with no more power to tell banks what to do than the Post
Office. Traditionally, it appears that organizations outside the court
bureaucracy had no more than a kind of moral obligation to cooperate with
a court. In one case from the 1950s, the court ordered that eight yuan per
month be withheld from the defendant’s wages to pay a debt. The
defendant’s work unit thought this was unreasonable and withheld five
yuan instead. The court, it was reported, realized its error and agreed to five
239. Zhang, supra note 238, at 9.
240. See Reply on Civil Liability, supra note 235. This document is especially interesting
because it defines legal personality in terms of substance, not in terms of the fulfillment of formal
requirements such as registration.
241. See Pan & Luo, supra note 227, at 6; Dangqian Jingji Anjian Weihe Zhixing Nan?,
supra note 185, at 1; Huang Shuangquan, Guanyu Minshi Zhixing De Qingkuang Diaocha [An
Investigation Into Execution in Civil Cases], ZHENGZHI YU FALÜ [POLITICS AND LAW], No. 2 at 64,
66 (1984); CHANG, supra note 44, at 5.
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yuan.242 The case is presented positively as one of consultation between
equals, not as a struggle for power between a giver and a receiver of orders.
In a similar case in the 1980s, the court told the defendant’s work unit to
garnish ten yuan per month from his wages for child support after divorce.
This time, however, the work unit simply refused to cooperate outright.243
In Harbin, a district real estate administration bureau, having received a
direct order from the provincial level court to transfer housing to a party,
refused to issue the necessary documents. In fact, it requested guidance
from the bureau at the municipal level regarding what it was supposed to
do about the judgment with which it did not agree.244

242. See Beijing Shi Xuanwu Qu Renmin Fayuan [People's Court of Xuanwu District in
Beijing], Guanyu Minshi Zhixing Anjian Zhong Kouchu Gongzi De Chubu Jingyan [Initial Experience
in Garnishing Wages in Executing Civil Cases], RENMIN SIFA GONGZUO [PEOPLE'S JUDICIAL WORK],
No. 4, at 23, 24 (1957) [hereinafter Xuanwu Court].
243. See Renmin Fayuan Yijing Shengxiao De Panjue Bixu Zhixing [Judgments of the
People's Court That Have Taken Legal Effect Must Be Executed], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY],
Oct. 25, 1982, at 4 (1982) (letter to the editor). In another case from the mid-eighties, a defendant
refused to pay ten yuan in court costs (almost certainly a matter of face, not finances). The court then
issued a notice to the defendant’s work unit asking it to pay over the sum from his wages. According
to art. 171 of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure in effect at the time, such a notice had to be obeyed.
Nevertheless, the order came back with a pencilled message on the envelope saying,
The court comrades handling this case are requested to do more mediation work in
order to avoid the exacerbation of contradictions among the people. The circumstances
are unclear and it is impossible to execute by compulsion.
According to the report, the relevant official at the defendant’s work unit was later shocked when
informed that it was a serious offense not to carry out a court order. See Gongran Tuihui Fayuan
Xiezhu Zhixing Tongzhi Shu [Brazenly Returning the Court's Notice to Cooperate in Execution],
SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], May 20, 1985, at 1.
244. See Zhongshen Panjue Yi Liang-Nian; Zhi Jin Tuotan Bu Zhixing [Final Judgment
Already Two Years Old; Still Delaying Execution to This Day], HAERBIN FAZHI BAO [HARBIN LEGAL
SYSTEM NEWS], Sept. 3, 1989, at 1.
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Although generally applicable law and Party policy245 now make clear
that all units have a duty to obey court orders, the regulations that really
count when it comes to cooperation between bureaucratic “systems”
(xitong) are those to which all the relevant parties have signed on. A prime
example is a 1980 regulation on procuratorial investigation of bank
accounts issued jointly by the People’s Bank of China, the Supreme
People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuracy, the Ministry of Public
Security, and the Ministry of Justice.246 This is far more binding on banks
than, say, a 1985 Supreme People’s Court regulation247 that was issued
apparently after “liaison and study” with the People’s Bank of China, but
nevertheless without its co-signature.
In general, courts (as well as the procuracy and the police) appear to
encounter extraordinary problems in getting access to a defendant’s bank
records or account.248 Banks are jealous guardians of their prerogatives —

245. See Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Guanyu Jianjue Baozheng Xingfa
Xingshi Susong Fa Qieshi Shixing De Zhishi [Directive on Firmly Guaranteeing the Thorough
Implementation of the Criminal and Civil Procedure Laws] (Sept. 9, 1979) (“Relevant units and
individuals must resolutely execute judgments and rulings issued according to law by judicial
organs.”), in 1 SIFA SHOUCE [JUDICIAL HANDBOOK] 67; Renmin Fayuan De Panjue He Caiding,
Youguan Danwei He Geren Bixu Jianjue Zhixing [Relevant Units and Individuals Must Firmly
Implement Judgments and Rulings of People's Courts], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL
SYSTEM NEWS], Apr. 16, 1984, at 3. Despite the existence of this specific mandate to Party members,
as well as the general duty (in fact a heightened duty) of Party members to obey state law, my
interviews made it clear that courts and plaintiffs do not and cannot use the threat of Party disciplinary
sanctions against Party member defendants who do not obey court orders.
This issue, in fact, exposed an interesting clash of legal cultures. To most of my interlocutors,
the idea of using Party discipline seemed absurd. To me, the idea that this was out of the question
seemed strange, since with any other administrative or criminal violation by a Party member, Party
disciplinary sanctions can be used in addition to, and indeed often in place of, the regular
administrative or criminal punishment called for.
In the view of one group of judges, Party sanctions were not appropriate because we were
talking of civil matters — "contradictions among the people" — not criminal matters. In other words,
they did not distinguish between liability on the original claim, which is civil, and liability for refusing
to perform a judgment imposing civil liability, which they had just informed me could be criminal.
See Court Interview F.
246. Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan,
Gongan Bu, Sifa Bu [People’s Bank of China, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuracy,
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Justice], Guanyu Chaxun, Tingzhi Zhifu De Moshou Geren
Zai Yinhang De Cunkuan Yiji Cunkuan Ren Siwang De Cunkuan Guohu Huo Zhifu Shouxu De
Lianhe Tongzhi [Joint Notice Concerning Investigating, Stopping Payments From, and Confiscating
Funds of Individuals Held in Banks as Well as the Procedures for Making Payments From or
Transferring Ownership Over Funds Belonging to Deceased Depositors] (Nov. 22, 1980), in ZHIXING
GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 686 [hereinafter 1980 SPC Joint Notice].
247. See 1985 SPC Reply, supra note 188.
248. Indeed, when one bank cooperated with a court it made headlines. See Ning’an Xian
Er-Shang Yinghang Jiji Xiezhu Fayuan Zuohao Zhixing Gongzuo [Number Two Commercial Bank
in Ning'an County Actively Cooperates With the Court in Doing Execution Work Well],
HEILONGJIANG FAZHI BAO [HEILONGJIANG LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Feb. 24, 1987, at 1.
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a jealousy that has been enhanced by the effect of economic reform on their
need to compete for customers — and the duty of banks to assist law
enforcement agencies has been the subject of repeated rulemaking in the
1980s and 1990s.
The 1980 joint regulation noted above provided that neither the court
nor the procuracy could directly review bank records; they had to specify
to bank officials what they wanted and get the approval of the bank director
at a certain administrative level, who was then supposed to order the
subordinate bank to provide the information requested.249
Subsequent notices and regulations have, with some exceptions,
marked an effort to increase the power of courts and other law enforcement
institutions vis-à-vis the banks. In 1983 the Supreme People’s Court and
the People’s Bank of China jointly issued a key notice (the “1983 Joint
Notice”) that governed court-bank relations for about a decade.250 On the
one hand, this notice noted “some problems” in the implementation of rules
governing the access of courts to bank records, and admonished banks not
to interfere with the seizure of funds belonging to judgment debtors.
Instead of specifying a minimum level in the bank hierarchy at which
approval of the court order had to be obtained, it merely instructed courts
to deliver the appropriate documents to “the bank” or to the “responsible
person.”251
On the other hand, whereas the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure said that
courts “may” (ke) entrust the execution of a judgment against a non-local
defendant to a court in the locality of the defendant, the 1983 Joint Notice
went beyond this to say that when levying from a non-local bank account,
courts “should” (yingdang) entrust the local court to issue a required notice
to the local bank. This is not quite as strong as “must” (bixu), but
considerably stronger than the merely permissive “may”. Indeed, the 1983
Joint Notice’s use of “should” was criticized by Chinese legal scholars as
contrary to law and supportive of local protectionism.252
249. See 1980 SPC Joint Notice, supra note 246. At least one provincial regulation made
equally stringent demands. See 1980 Zhejiang Notice, supra note 187. It would in practice have taken
precedence over the central regulations.
250. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang [Supreme People’s Court, People’s
Bank of China], Guangyu Chaxun, Dongjie He Kouhua Qiye Shiye Danwei, Jiguan, Tuanti De
Yinhang Cunkuan De Lianhe Tonzhi [Joint Notice on Investigating, Freezing, and Levying on Bank
Accounts of Enterprises, Institutions, Organs, and Organizations] (Dec. 28, 1983), in ZHIXING
GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 695 [hereinafter 1983 Joint Notice].
251. A subsequent interpretive document issued only by the Supreme People’s Court
specified that “responsible person” meant the person in charge of the local branch, not an official at
any particular level, thus watering down the 1980 requirement completely. See 1985 SPC Reply,
supra note 188.
252. See Xu & He, supra note 59, at 17.
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Although the 1991 revised Law on Civil Procedure maintained the
formulation of “may” with respect to entrusted enforcement and made no
special exception for the seizure of bank deposits, courts and banks
remained confused.253 After all, the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure had said
the same thing, with no apparent effect on the validity of the 1983 Joint
Notice. The issue may finally have been settled, at least in terms of
concrete regulations if not in terms of practice, by a notice issued in 1993
by several interested agencies: the People’s Bank of China, the Supreme
People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuracy, and the Ministry of
Public Security (the “1993 Joint Notice”).254
This notice apparently supersedes the 1983 Joint Notice, although it
does not say so specifically. It repeats the requirement of earlier notices that
requests for bank cooperation in investigating, freezing, or seizing deposits
must come from a court, procuracy, or police bureau at the county level or
above. It specifies (this time over the seal of the People’s Bank of China,
and thus in a manner that is binding on banks) that the “responsible person”
at the bank whose signature is needed can be the head of the local branch
and need not be someone higher up. Finally, it states clearly that any court,
procuracy, or police bureau may request the cooperation of a bank without
regard to jurisdictional boundaries, thus resolving the issue of whether a
local court had to be entrusted with execution if a bank account was
involved.
e.

Inadequacy of Legal Means of Coercion

An important general obstacle to enforcement is the lack of tools of
coercion available to courts. As noted in the preceding section, courts have
few means of forcing units whose cooperation is needed in execution to go
along. In the 1991 revision of the Law on Civil Procedure — inspired in
part by execution problems — courts actually lost the power to detain bank

253. See generally 1992 Guiyang ILPC, supra note 99, at 8; 1992 Fuzhou ILPC, supra note
44, at 9 (noting need for guidance in the matter).
254. Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Remnin Jianchayuan,
Gongan Bu [People’s Bank of China, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuracy, Ministry
of Public Security], Guanyu Chaxun, Dongjie, Kouhua Qiye Shiye Danwei, Jiguan, Tuanti Yinhang
Cunkuan De Tongzhi [Notice on Investigation, Freezing, and Levying on Bank Accounts of
Enterprises, Institutions, Organs, and Organizations] (Dec. 11, 1993), in DATABASE, supra note 85.
The final section of the notice reveals the ways in which the conflict between courts and banks is
manifested: banks are forbidden to transfer or unfreeze frozen funds or to warn the depositor in
advance of freezing, while courts for their part are told that when there is a difference of opinion with
a bank, the matter should be resolved through consultation between the superiors of both court and
bank instead of by detaining bank personnel.
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personnel for failure to cooperate in freezing or seizing bank deposits.255
Unlike Anglo-American courts, Chinese courts have no general contempt
power. Any exercise of coercion over the person or property of a party
must have a specific statutory basis. This is not, of course, to say that courts
never act without a statutory basis, but the lack of one does make things
more difficult. Generally, a defendant’s resistance to execution must be
quite egregious before courts will resort to coercive measures, and the press
is full of stories of court officials being beaten and humiliated by arrogant
execution debtors.256 It is still a matter of debate in the Chinese legal
community whether the mere failure by a defendant to carry out a
judgment, without more, is sufficient to justify administrative detention or
criminal punishment.257
A number of sources complain about the lack of useful national
legislation on the subject of execution. The 1992 revision of the Law on
Civil Procedure was intended in part to redress this problem. In addition,
there is a long tradition of courts formulating their own execution
procedures that continues to this day.258

255. Compare article 77 of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure (allowing detention or criminal
prosecution of those with an obligation to assist the court in a civil case who fail to do so) with article
103 of the 1991 Law on Civil Procedure (allowing only the fining of bank personnel who refuse to
assist courts). According to one Supreme People’s Court official I interviewed, this weakening of
court powers was the result of strong lobbying during the revision process by the People’s Bank,
which did not want courts to be able to lock up bank officials. See Court Interview D. The brief
detention of a bank manager for refusing to transfer funds from the defendant’s account — he wanted
to use the money to ensure that the bank’s own outstanding loan to the defendant was repaid — is
reported in Heilongjiang Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Yanjiu Shi [Research Office of the
Heilongjiang Higher Level People's Court], Hangzhang Wei Fa Bei Yi Fa Juiliu [Bank Manager
Violates Law, Is Detained According to Law], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No. 4, at 7
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 Heilongjiang HLPC].
256. See, e.g., Lü Huichang & Xiong Fasheng, Ju Bu Zhixing Fayuan Panjue Bing Ouda
Zhifa Renyuan [Refuses to Implement Court Judgment, Even Beats Law Implementation Personnel],
HUBEI FAZHI BAO [HUBEI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], July 14, 1988, at 1; Li Dezhang, Minshi Shenpan
Faguanmen De Kuzhong [The Bitterness of Judges in Civil Adjudication], SICHUAN FAZHI BAO
[SICHUAN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], June 20, 1988, at 1 (listing complaints of judges); Gao Fa, Weigong
Wuru Ouda Ban’an Renyuan De Wenti Yingdang Yinqi Zhongshi [The Problem of Personnel
Handling Cases Being Surrounded and Attacked, Humiliated, and Beaten Should Attract Attention],
FAZHI DAOBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM HERALD], Jan. 20, 1990, at 3 (catalog of abuses suffered by court
officials from beating to imprisonment).
257. I discuss the coercive tools available to courts in detail in the next section below.
258. See Xu & He, supra note 59, at 17. Court rules from the 1950s include 1951 Shenyang
Measures, supra note 63; 1951 Urumchi Measures, supra note 63; and 1955 Beijing Measures, supra
note 64. Recently, court rules have been issued by the Jiangsu Higher Level People’s Court, see
Jiangsu Sheng Fayuan Shouci Zhixing Gongzuo Huiyi [Jiangsu Provincial Court Holds First Meeting
on Execution Work], in RENMIN FAYUAN NIANJIAN 1989 [YEARBOOK OF PEOPLE’S COURTS 1989],
at 759 (1989), and the Heilongjiang Higher Level People’s Court, see Heilongjiang Sheng Fayuan
Zhixing Gongzuo Huiyi [Execution Work Meeeting of the Heilongjiang Provincial Court], in RENMIN
FAYUAN NIANJIAN 1989 [YEARBOOK OF PEOPLE’S COURTS 1989], at 751 (1989).
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Specific Problems in Execution

This section looks at how judgments can vary in their executability
depending on a number of different characteristics they might have.
Specifically, it looks at how the executability of a judgment can be affected
by the nature of the defendant and the plaintiff as well as by the method of
execution.
1.

Who Is the Defendant?

While it is reasonable to think that defendants of different status will
have differing abilities to resist execution, the sources do not always tell an
unequivocal story. According to some sources, execution against large
state-owned enterprises is generally not a problem.259 They are less likely
than small enterprises to be strapped for immediate cash.
On the other hand, when they do not have the money or for some
other reason do not wish to pay, execution can be very difficult.260 It seems
clear from interviews and published sources that in 1992 (and probably
still) courts were to show special solicitude for large and medium-sized
state-owned enterprises when asked to execute a judgment against them.261
In particular, seizing their fixed assets in satisfaction of a debt was, and
probably remains, virtually forbidden.262 As a general rule, courts are not
supposed to stress execution “one-sidedly” to the neglect of other factors:
When adopting coercive legal measures to resolve economic
cases, we must never pay attention only to finishing up the case;

259. See Lawyer Interview H; Academic Interview G.
260. See Court Interview U; Lawyer Interview O; Court Interview F.
261. See Lawyer Interview O; Lawyer Interview H; Guangzhou ILPC, supra note 53, at 4;
Su, supra note 220, at 4; Academic Interview J.
262. See Lawyer Interview A (“Normally, one doesn’t execute against means of production;
one executes against circulating funds.”). The same self-imposed prohibition against touching capital
assets can be found in the report of a meeting to discuss execution problems held by the HLPC of the
province of Jiangsu. See RENMIN FAYUAN NIANJIAN 1990 [YEARBOOK OF PEOPLE’S COURTS 1990],
at 620 (1989). There is no basis in the Law on Civil Procedure or the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law for
distinguishing between the two. Some writers hold that one can seize means of production, even if
needed by the debtor enterprise for production, if they are needed even more by the creditor
enterprise. See Liao Degong & Yu Mingyong, Lun Wanshan Minshi Caichan Baoquan Zhidu He
Minshi Zhixing Zhidu [On Perfecting the System of Property Preservation in Civil Matters and the
System of Execution in Civil Matters], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], No. 4, at 47, 50 (1992). For
a detailed discussion of what types of property can be executed against and in what circumstances,
see CHAI FABANG, JIANG WEI, LIU JIAXING & FAN MINGXIN, MINSHI SUSONG FA TONGLUN [GENERAL
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 454 (1982) [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE TREATISE];
ZHIXING DE LILUN YU SHIJIAN, supra note 81, at 48.
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we must at the same time pay attention to unity and stability in
society, to stabilizing relations of socialist ownership, and to
developing the socialist economy.263
In practice, this means “Don’t execute where it will mean closing the
defendant enterprise and throwing workers onto the street.”264 In the words
of one high-ranking judge, “[t]o promote a unified and stable social
situation is the overriding task above all else.”265 This principle is entirely
the result of Party policy and is not sanctioned by any published document
with the status of law.266
Among state-owned enterprises, those run by the military are
particularly proof against execution. As the Chengdu ILPC complained,
Military funds can’t be investigated; anything to do with assets
or funds they say is all military funds and can’t be executed
against. There is no rule [addressing this issue] in law or policy.
. . . . We have not been able to have compulsory execution in a
single case against a military enterprise.267

263. Wang, supra note 77, at 7 (the author at the time of writing was the President of the
Shenzhen Intermediate-Level People’s Court). For almost identical language, see Guangzhou ILPC,
supra note 53, at 2. Other court officials spoke to me of the need to take into account not only the
legal effects, but also social and economic effects of the judgment. See Court Interview F; see also
Beijing ILPC, supra note 42, at 8 (“We oppose the tendency of not considering social or political
effects, of considering individual cases in isolation [when undertaking execution].”). This is not to
suggest that courts in common law systems never take practical consequences into account when
rendering judgment or undertaking execution. The difference — and it is a significant one — is that
they must never admit to doing so, while Chinese courts are urged to. Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum is not
a maxim of the Chinese legal system. For an interesting history of how the United States Supreme
Court tried to take social reality into account while appearing not to do so in the school desegregation
case, Brown v. Board of Education (believing that an order requiring immediate desegregation, while
just, would have been unenforceable), see Philip Elman, The Solicitor-General’s Office, Justice
Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987)
(describing the use of the formula “with all deliberate speed”).
264. For a case where a court refused to enforce its own judgment against an enterprise on
precisely these grounds (“The township government leaders don’t approve of its being put to death;
we must consider the matter from the standpoint of what’s advantageous to economic development”),
see Zhang, supra note 172.
265. Wang, supra note 77, at 7.
266. See, e.g., Li Peng, The Current Economic Situation and the Issue of Further Improving
State-Owned Large and Medium-Sized Enterprises, in SWB/FE, Oct. 23, 1991, at FE/1210/C1/1
(speech by Li Peng at a CCP Central Committee work conference on September 23, 1991).
267. Chengdu Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Chengdu Intermediate Level People's Court],
Qiantan Jingji Anjian Zhixing Zhong De Youguan Wenti [A Brief Discussion of Problems Related to
Execution in Economic Cases], in “ZHIXING NAN” DUICE TAN, supra note 49, at 60, 67.
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In the words of the Nanning ILPC, judgments against government
departments or the military were generally “impossible to execute.”268 The
best hope, albeit a thin one, for courts in these cases is to go through the
enterprise’s administrative superior.269
Contrary to the view of the Chengdu ILPC, there are — and were at
the time its article was written — rules addressing the issue of execution
against military funds. In 1985, banking authorities and the General
Logistics Department of the PLA jointly issued a document providing that
military units should use a special bank account for certain commercial
activities.270 In 1990, in response to two requests for instructions from
lower courts made three years earlier, the Supreme People’s Court issued
a reply ruling that funds from the special bank account, as well as from
other accounts that were unlawfully used for business, were available for
execution.271 Given that no PLA department was a co-issuer of this
document, however, its binding power is questionable.
Small enterprises and getihu (individual businesses) present their own
problems. Because they may have relatively more at stake, they may be
more stubborn about resisting execution, even if they have less actual
power to do so.272
Finally, enterprises that provide employment for the disabled seem to
enjoy a certain immunity from execution.273
268. 1992 Nanning ILPC, supra note 106, at 13.
269. See Academic Interview G. It should be noted that the difficulty of executing against
military enterprises is not limited to enterprises engaged in military production. It includes any
business in any sector run by the military, such as the Palace Hotel in Beijing. The difficulty is caused
not by a legal bar on execution against military assets, but by the practical difficulty of moving against
such a powerful defendant.
270. See Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang, Zhongguo Gong-Shang Yinhang, Zhongguo Nongye
Yinhang, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefang Jun Zong Houqin Bu [People's Bank of China, IndustrialCommercial Bank of China, General Logistics Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army],
Jundui Danwei Zai Yinhang Kaishe Zhanghu He Cunkuan De Guanli Banfa [Measures for the
Administration of Accounts and Deposits Established in Banks by Military Units], Cai Zi No. 110
(1985). This document appears to be an internal regulation not publicly available, but it is referred to
in Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People’s Court], Guanyu Jundui Danwei Zuowei Jingji Jiufen
Anjian De Dangshiren Ke Fou Dui Qi Yinhang Zhanghu Shang De Cunkuan Caiqu Susong Boaquan
He Jundui Feiyong Neng Fou Qiangxing Huabo Changhuan Zhaiwu Wenti de Pifu [Reply to the
Questions of Whether It Is Permitted to Apply Litigation Protection Measures to the Bank Deposits
of Military Units That Are Parties in Economic Disputes, and Whether Military Funds May be
Coercively Seized for the Repayment of Debt] (Oct. 9, 1990), in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
FALÜ (ZENGBU BEN) 1990-1992 [COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(SUPPLEMENTARY EDITION) 1990-1992], at 364-365 (1993) [hereinafter 1990 SPC Reply 2].
271. See 1990 SPC Reply 2, supra note 270.
272. See Lawyer Interview H; Academic Interview G.
273. See Nanjing Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting Nanjing Intermediate Level
People's Court Execution Chamber], Zhixing Zi Bu Di Zhai Anjian De Jidian Tihui Ji Sikao [Some
Understandings and Thoughts About Executing in Cases of Liabilities Exceedings Assets], in
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Geographical location of the defendant also appears to play a role.
Several sources mentioned that execution was more difficult against
defendants in poorer and inland provinces. Henan in particular was
mentioned by three different sources.274 It is not clear why execution should
be more difficult in poorer provinces. It may be that defendants are more
likely to be insolvent; it may be that local enterprises are especially valued
and thus protected. As more than one source points out, however, such a
strategy can backfire in the long run. People will be reluctant to do business
with enterprises from places where courts and government always protect
their own. Backward regions may simply remain backward for lack of trade
and investment.275
Finally, it is worth saying a word about individuals subject to
execution. Individuals have long had a limited immunity from execution
when money or property is sought. A number of local court rules from the
1950s all provide that courts must leave with the judgment debtor sufficient
funds and property for the livelihood of debtor and his or her dependents.276
The same rule appears in Article 171 of the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure
and in Article 222 of its 1991 revision. It would be a mistake to suppose
that this exemption is always interpreted generously. In 1989, a Shenzhen
defendant was allowed to keep only 150 yuan per month from his income
in order to support himself, his mother, and his daughter — less than two
yuan per day per person at a time of significant inflation.277
It is a different story entirely with individuals subject to judgments for
eviction. Such judgments can be among the most difficult to execute of
all.278 Primary and secondary sources agree that “coercive measures are

“ZHIXING NAN” DUICE TAN, supra note 49, at 38, 39.
274. Lawyer Interview O; Academic Interview J; Lawyer Interview R.
275. See 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172, at 6; Academic Interview J.
276. See, e.g., 1949 Harbin Regulations, supra note 63, at 437 (arts. 21, 25); 1951 Dongbei
Directive, supra note 63, at 714 (art. 6); 1951 Shenyang Measures, supra note 63, art. 7; 1951
Urumchi Measures, supra note 63, art. 10; 1955 Beijing Measures, supra note 64, part IV, art. 5; 1955
Procedure Summary, supra note 65, at 34.
277. Fayuan Yao Baoliu Bei Zhixing Ren De Shenghuo Feiyong Ma? [Should the Court
Leave Enough for the Living Expenses of the Executee?], SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL
SYSTEM NEWS], Dec. 18, 1989, at 7. Compare this stingy immunity with that of the bankruptcy laws
of, say, Florida, which exempt from seizure among other things all wages and the debtor’s personal
residence, regardless of its value. As one bankruptcy judge complained, “[Y]ou could shelter the Taj
Mahal in this state and no one could do anything about it.” Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Finding
Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at 1.
278. See Court Interview U; Court Interview E; 1992 Fuzhou ILPC, supra note 44, at 10;
Luo, supra note 148, at 78. The difficulty has existed for decades. See Tai, supra note 104, at 21. On
housing cases generally, see Fuzhou Shi Gulou Qu Fayuan [Fuzhou City Gulou District Court], Dui
Zhixing Shoufang Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Tantao [An Investigation Into Several Problems of
Execution in Cases Involving the Recovery of Housing], in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42
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undertaken only when the execution debtor genuinely has a place to move
to and still refuses to move.”279 In virtually all cases, a person with no place
to go is immune from execution.280
This policy has a long history in the People’s Republic and can
perhaps be considered a kind of customary law — I have been unable to
find any authoritative documentary basis for it outside of a 1955 set of
internal rules of the court of Xuanwu District in Beijing.281 A 1992 article
refers to “provisions of law” supporting this immunity but provides no
concrete reference.282 It appears to be one of those things that everyone
“just knows.” It has been justified on the grounds that just as a court

[hereinafter Gulou BLPC], whose “solution” merits quotation on the grounds of sheer fatuousness:
Practice proves that with respect to the problem of cases involving the recovery
of housing being difficult to execute, provided we have confidence, address this
problem correctly, approach it with the actual circumstances in mind, adopt effective
measures, and in the course of execution work earnestly to ensure that the execution
activities are well founded, the processes are lawful, work is done carefully, methods
are appropriate, measures are effective, and procedures are complete, then the problem
of cases involving the recovery of housing being difficult to execute can be resolved
in a relatively satisfactory way. Id. at 4.
279. Cheng, Liu & Cheng, supra note 128, at 43. See also Academic Interview C; Court
Interview U.
280. This policy appears to apply only to cases deemed to be “internal contradictions” and
thus can be waived in the case of political dissidents and their families. The wife and daughter of Ren
Wanding, jailed both in the late 1970s and the late 1980s for human rights advocacy, found the door
to their flat nailed shut with all their belongings still inside upon arriving home one afternoon. See
Sheryl WuDunn, Wife of Jailed China Dissident Is Left Homeless by Eviction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1992, at A7.
I did find one case of eviction where the tenant appears to have had no place to go. An
individual business operator (getihu) was forcibly removed from a space rented to her as a workshop
about a year after she began living in it (precisely because she had no other residence). This case may,
however, be the exception that proves the rule: first, unlike the typical tenant, she was living in a space
that was not intended for residential use; second (and probably most important), the space belonged
not to a private landlord but to a local supply and marketing cooperative, and was thus considered
government property. See Zhou Haiqing Zhanyong Gonggang Bei Qiangzhi Tengtui [Zhou Haiqing
Occupies Public Quarters, Is Forced to Move Out], SICHUAN FAZHI BAO [SICHUAN LEGAL SYSTEM
NEWS], July 25, 1988, at 1.
281. “Coerced moving from a residence should be effected under the premise that the
applicant still has a place to live.” 1955 Beijing Measures, supra note 64, part. VII, art. 1. This
principle is repeated in identical language (not surprisingly, given that the author is an official in the
same court) in Tai, supra note 104, at 21. The earliest mention I have found of this policy is in
Shenyang Renmin Fayuan [Shenyang People's Court], Minshi Zhixing Gongzuo Zhong De Ji-Dian
Jingyan Jiaoxun [Some Experience and Lessons From Work in Civil Execution] (1951), in ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO XING MIN SHI SUSONG CANKAO ZILIAO [REFERENCE MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 295, 295-296 (Wuhan
Daxue Falü Xi Xing Min Fa Jiaoyanzu [Criminal and Civil Law Teaching and Research Section of
the Wuhan University Department of Law] ed., 1954). In this source, however, the court considers
the practice to be a shortcoming in its own work.
282. See Gulou BLPC, supra note 278, at 6.
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suspends execution against a debtor who has no money, it should suspend
execution against a tenant who has no place to go.283
In an eviction case, the defendant might be given an initial deadline
of half a year or a year within which to move out, with extensions
available.284 The plaintiff-landlord might be encouraged to find another
place for the defendant and to help him out with the first few rent
payments.285 When both tenant and landlord refuse to look for another place
for the tenant, the result is not eviction but paralysis: the maintenance of the
status quo.286
Even when there is another important policy at stake — for example,
that of returning possession of property wrongfully taken from overseas
Chinese — the burden of that policy falls on the work units of those
wrongfully occupying the property, not on the occupants themselves. Until
their units find alternative housing, the occupants will not be forced to
leave.287 One court went so far as to blame “execution difficulties” on
landlords who obstinately insisted on getting their property back in
accordance with the judgment. In such cases, wrote the court, “we should
resolutely suspend execution in accordance with the provisions of Article
234, Paragraph 5 of the Law on Civil Procedure.”288
In evictions as in other areas, execution policy essentially mirrors
legal policy. As seen already in the discussion of the lack of finality of
judgments,289 courts do not seem to draw a strict distinction between prejudgment and post-judgment procedure. Even after a landlord overcomes

283. See ZHIXING DE LILUN YU SHIJIAN, supra note 81, at 44. On the other hand, debtors
generally have an incentive to find money, whereas tenants under this rule have no incentive to find
another place to live.
284. See Academic Interview J. The deadline is a hollow threat, since if the tenant has not
found a place by the time it expires, he still cannot be forced to move. See id.
285. This was suggested by one court in interviews. See Court Interview E. It is confirmed
in articles by courts from other parts of the country entirely. See, e.g., 1992 Fuzhou ILPC, supra note
44, at 10 (“When the execution debtor has no place to move to, we ask the landlord to help him find
a place and to provide funds for moving.”). Another court reports two cases: in one, the landlord found
the tenant a new place for 60 yuan a month and made a one-time payment to the tenant of 900 yuan;
in the other, the court persuaded the tenant to reduce his demand for “moving expenses” from 20,000
yuan to 1,400 yuan. See Gulou BLPC, supra note 278, at 7-8.
286. See Gulou BLPC, supra note 278, at 1.
287. See Guowu Yuan Qiaowu Bangongshi, Cheng-Xiang Jianshe Huanjing Baohu Bu [State
Council Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, Ministry of Urban and Village Construction and
Environmental Protection], Guanyu Luoshi “Wen Ge” Qijian Bei Jizhan De Huaqiao Sifang Zhengce
De Ruogan Guiding [Several Rules on Carrying Out Policies Regarding Private Residences Belonging
to Overseas Chinese That Were Occupied During the “Cultural Revolution”] (June 8, 1982), in
ZHIXING GONGZUO SHOUCE, supra note 15, at 203, 204.
288. Gulou BLPC, supra note 278, at 11. The relevant paragraph allows a court to suspend
execution when it deems it “necessary” to do so for any reason.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 160 to 171.
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the obstacles in the way of obtaining a favorable judgement, however, the
same policies continue to operate at the stage of execution. A local rule on
execution in Fujian province states that where a tenant has no place to go,
he should be given a period of time (normally not to exceed one year)
within which to find a new place. If by the end of the period the tenant has
still not found a place to go, the execution officer should conduct diligent
ideological work on the landlord and give another extension.290
2.

Who Is the Plaintiff?

Who the plaintiff is can significantly affect the likelihood of a
judgment’s being executed. First, courts tend to work harder on behalf of
a plaintiff who will need support from the state if the judgment is not
executed.
Claims for payment of support for children, spouses, or aged parents
are given high priority in adjudication and in execution.291 At the time the
claim is made but before it has been judged, the court can order an advance
payment (xianxing geifu), a measure similar to a preliminary injunction
imposing an affirmative duty on the defendant.292 After the plaintiff has
won, courts are supposed to put extra effort into execution.
In addition, the policy of supporting large and medium-sized stateowned enterprises has a plaintiff-side effect as well: where the plaintiff is
a favored enterprise that desperately needs the money, courts are supposed
to put extra effort into execution of judgments in their favor.293
Second, there are some cases in which the plaintiff will be less
interested in execution than the average plaintiff and thus may not push the
court as hard as other plaintiffs might. As long as an enterprise manager has
a realistic hope that losses can be made up out of state funds, the bottom
line is less important than an allocation of responsibility for the loss. Even
if an enterprise manager cannot hope to collect on a debt, a judgment in the
enterprise’s favor serves a purpose: it declares unambiguously that there is
an amount of money owing to the enterprise. The manager can then explain
to his superiors any shortfall in revenues, for example, by means of the

290.
291.
292.
293.

See Gulou BLPC, supra note 278, at 3.
See, e.g., Court Interview K; Guangzhou ILPC, supra note 53, at 2.
See Article 97, Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34.
See Court Interview K.
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judgment in the enterprise’s favor. As one lawyer explained, “In the end
it’s all about justifying yourself” (zuihou shi’ge jiaodai wenti).294

3.

Methods of Executing Judgments
a.

Sanctions for Refusal to Carry Out Court Orders

When persons or organizations do not carry out a court’s orders, the
court can try to perform the act itself. If a defendant refuses to pay a sum
of money to the plaintiff, the court can attempt to take money from the
defendant’s bank account. It can also send a bailiff to the defendant’s home
to remove valuable property that can later be auctioned off for the
plaintiff’s benefit. In many cases, however, it is much simpler if the party
simply does as it is told in the first place. What threats can the court bring
to bear?
When the person subject to the order is the defendant (as opposed, for
example, to the defendant’s bank or employer),295 the court can attempt to
impose both administrative and criminal sanctions.
Article 102 of the Law on Civil Procedure allows a court to fine or
detain (juliu) any person (including the responsible person of an
organization) who refuses to carry out a legally effective judgment or ruling
of the court. This detention is considered administrative in nature and is
imposed by the court president without the necessity of any sort of hearing.
Although the period is limited to fifteen days, there is no limit on the
number of times a person may be detained.296 Because of the sensitivity of
such a coercive measure, a 1987 Supreme People’s Court document,
probably unaffected by the 1991 amendments to the Law on Civil
Procedure, stipulates that detention under Article 102 in areas outside of the
detaining court’s geographical jurisdiction should be effected by a personal

294. Lawyer Interview R; a similar point is made in Lawyer Interview X; Academic
Interview M; Academic Interview C.
295. The power of courts to require cooperation in execution from non-parties is discussed
briefly above at text accompanying note 256.
296. See Court Interview F.
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entrustment request to the local court. Not even sending the request through
the mail is sufficient.297
Execution measures directed against the person, as opposed to the
property, of the defendant are politically very sensitive in China. It is an
article of faith among Chinese legal scholars and officials that, unlike in the
pre-Communist era, courts may not execute against the person of the
defendant. In the 1982 Law on Civil Procedure, mere refusal by a
defendant to carry out a judgment, without more (such as threatening or
beating court personnel), was not grounds for detention — although,
curiously, mere refusal by a non-party such as a bank manager to cooperate
in execution was.298 An authoritative 1985 textbook explains:
To detain the debtor, making him suffer in order to force him to
perform his duty to pay off the debt, is a method used by the
exploiting classes to oppress the working people . . . . If a party
does not use violence or similar methods to resist execution, and
merely refuses to perform [his duty], the implementing officer
(zhixing yuan) . . . cannot use force with respect to his person.299
Despite this accepted taboo, debate and controversy are still possible
because there is no agreement on what it actually means to execute against
the person. For example, some scholars hold that one cannot enforce child
custody awards through criminal or administrative sanctions against the
non-custodial parent who takes or hides the child because that would
constitute execution against the person.300 Others hold that it is permissible
on the grounds that the “object” of execution is behavior — the act of

297. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Jueding Caiqu Minshi
Juliu Cuoshi De Fayuan Neng Fou Weituo Bei Juliu Ren Suozaidi Fayuan Dai Wei Zhixing De Pifu
[Reply On the Question of Whether a Court That Has Decided to Impose Civil Detention Measures
May Entrust the Court of the Detainee's Locality to Execute on Its Behalf] (Oct. 15, 1987), in
NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 81, at 48.
298. See 1982 Law on Civil Procedure, supra note 34, arts. 77, 164. This interpretation is
supported by Dui Bei Zhixing Ren De Zhei-Zhong Xingwei Gai Zenme Ban? [What Should Be Done
in the Face of This Kind of Behavior by the Executee?], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No.
4, at 48 (1990) (letter to the editor).
299. MINSHI SUSONG FA SHIXING WENTI TANTAO [AN INVESTIGATION INTO PROBLEMS IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW ON CIVIL PROCEDURE] 231 (Chen Yanling, Yang Rongxin, Liu
Jiaxing, Zhao Huifen, Tang Dehua & Cheng Cheng eds., 1985).
300. See WEI, YIN & HE, supra note 196, at 116-117; Jin Xinnian, Zi-Nü Renshen Anjian
Juyou Zhixingxing Ma? [Are Cases Involving the Persons of Children Executable?], FAXUE [LEGAL
STUDIES], No. 4, at 33 (1987). The views of these writers are prefigured in 1951 Urumchi Measures,
supra note 63, which instructs the courts to use persuasion and education.

70

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW

[10:1

handing over the child to the custodial parent — and not the person of the
defendant or the child.301
Academic sources consistently distinguished detention under the 1982
Law on Civil Procedure from detention under Republican law by holding
that detention under the former was imposed not for the failure to carry out
the judgment, but for some other act. Although Article 102 of the 1991 Law
on Civil Procedure seems to have destroyed the viability of this distinction,
it appears that in general the mere passive refusal to carry out a judgment
will in practice result in nothing more than a fine, even though detention is
technically possible.302 On the other hand, it is possible to go very quickly
beyond the threshold of mere passive resistance. A company manager in
Shenzhen, for example, was detained for three days when he cursed court
cadres who had come to investigate company records and threatened to call
the police.303 This may be the kind of abuse of detention powers that the
Supreme People’s Court had in mind when it issued a notice in 1992
reminding courts that detention in civil cases was a coercive measure to be
used only with the greatest of caution.304
Although passive resistance is at least in theory now grounds for
administrative detention, there is disagreement about whether mere refusal
to perform is by itself enough to justify criminal sanctions. Article 157 of
the Criminal Law allows for the imposition of punishment including
imprisonment upon anyone who “by means of threats or violence obstructs
state personnel from carrying out their functions according to law or refuses
to carry out judgments or orders of people’s court that already have become
legally effective.” Unfortunately, the original Chinese is arguably
ambiguous on the issue of whether “by means of threats or violence”
applies to refusal to carry out judgments as well as obstructing state
personnel. According to some sources, it does not — passive refusal to

301. See Wu Peizhong, Lihun Anjian Keyi Qiangzhi Zhixing? [Can Divorce Cases Be
Coercively Executed?], FAXUE [LEGAL STUDIES], No. 4, at 22, 22-23 (1987); Liu, supra note 3, at 4647.
302. See Lawyer Interview T.
303. Yuan Sanda Zu’ai Sifa Renyuan Zhifa Bei Luliu [Yuan Sanda Obstructs Judicial
Personnel in Carrying Out the Law, Is Detained], SHENZHEN FAZHI BAO [SHENZHEN LEGAL SYSTEM
NEWS], Aug. 22, 1991, at 1.
304. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Zai Zhixing Jingji Jiufen
Anjian Zhong Yanjin Weifa Juliu Ren De Tongzhi [Notice on Strictly Prohibiting the Unlawful
Detention of Persons in the Course of Executing Cases of Economic Disputes] (Aug. 29, 1992), in
DATABASE, supra note 85.
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perform cannot be criminally punished.305 Other sources, including court
officials, disagree: no threats or violence are required.306
In practice, of course, the views of courts count for more than the
views of academics because it is the former that have the power to
sentence. Thus, although proposals during the latest revision (in 1991) of
the Law on Civil Procedure to spell out that mere refusal to perform could
be a crime were defeated,307 some courts seem to have gone their own way
and made it one regardless.308 In one case dating from 1980, just after the
promulgation of the Criminal Law, a Tianjin defendant was prosecuted
under Article 157 for the non-violent refusal to perform a judgment
requiring him to move from a house.309 In another more recent case, a
woman was sentenced to fifteen days’ detention — apparently under
Article 157 — because she “wept and wailed and made a big fuss” when
court personnel came to seize her property in satisfaction of a tort judgment
against her.310
The last word on the subject — for the time being — may have come
from the Supreme People’s Court, which issued an official Opinion in 1992
specifying that the mere failure, without more, to carry out a judgment,
ruling, mediation, or payment order of a court when one had the ability to
do so constituted an offense under Article 102(6) of the Law on Civil

305. See Huang Xianping, Tan Ju Bu Zhixing Renmin Fayuan Panjue (Caiding) Zui [A
Discussion of the Crime of Refusing to Execute Judgments (Rulings) of People's Courts], JIANGXI
FAZHI BAO [JIANGXI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], June 7, 1983, at 64; Li Junjie, Lun Ju Bu Zhixing Panjue
Zui De Fanzui Goucheng [A Discussion of What Constitutes the Crime of Refusing to Execute
Judgments], HEBEI FAXUE [HEBEI LEGAL STUDIES], No. 1, at 1 (1992); Lawyer Interview T; CHANG,
supra note 44, at 27 (who views this limitation as a weakness).
306. See Court Interview F; Court Interview E; Wang Wei, Ju Bu Zhixing Renmin Fayuan
Panjue Caiding Zui Ji Qi Shenli Chengxu De Tantao [An Investigation Into the Crime of Refusing to
Execute Court Judgments and Orders and the Process for Its Adjudication], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S
ADJUCATION], No. 10, at 15, 16 (1990) (viewing violence and threats as aggravating circumstances
instead of necessary elements); Zhu Xianghong, Ju Bu Zhixing Fayuan Panjue, Caiding Zui Liang
Yi [Two Proposals on the Crime of Refusal to Implement Court Judgments and Rulings], XIANDAI
FAXUE [MODERN LEGAL STUDIES], No. 2, at 23, 23 (1992); Xiao Li, Qianghua Dui Zhixing
Dangshiren De Falü Yueshu [Strengthen the Legal Constraints on Parties Being Executed Against],
FAXUE [LEGAL STUDIES], No. 9, at 14, 15 (1992).
307. See Academic Interview P.
308. Space limitations preclude discussion here of the fascinating issue of who is supposed
to prosecute in such cases.
309. See Tianjin Shi Heping Qu Renmin Fayuan Chengli Zhixing Zu, Jiji Kaizhan Minshi
Zhixing Gongzuo [Tianjin City Heping District People's Court Establishes Execution Group, Actively
Launches Execution Work], in 2 MSCZ, supra note 1, at 755.
310. See Wang Zhanshu Bei Juliu Fakuan [Wang Zhanshu Detained and Fined], BEIJING
FAZHI BAO [BEIJING LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], May 23, 1990, at 1.
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Procedure.311 A 1993 case published as a model in the Supreme People’s
Court Gazette then demonstrated that such an act, when the “circumstances
are serious” (qingjie yanzhong), could constitute a crime punishable under
Article 157 of the Criminal Law.312
b.

Freezing and Seizure of Bank Deposits

If the execution debtor refuses to pay an amount owing under a
judgment, the court can try to take funds owned by it but held by others. To
this end, Article 221 of the Law on Civil Procedure allows a court to freeze
funds held in a defendant’s bank account and to have them transferred to
a judgment creditor. This measure is most useful against enterprises and
other organizational defendants subject to rules requiring them to keep their
funds in banks, often in a single account.313 Nevertheless, these rules are
often violated, making it hard for creditors to find all the defendant’s
funds.314 Given the importance of the rules for execution of judgments, it
is curious that the rules have been in existence for over a decade, and yet
have not been codified into an authoritative law. They are nothing more
than notices (tongzhi) from the People’s Bank of China, which arguably has
no authority to tell organizations not administratively under it what to do.
The 1991 revision of the Law on Civil Procedure saw a significant
strengthening of these measures. Whereas under the 1982 law courts could
311. See 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, supra note 70, art. 123(3). Article 102 of the
Law on Civil Procedure reads in relevant part as follows:
If a participant in litigation or other person commits any of the following acts,
the people’s court may, according to the seriousness of the circumstances, fine or detain
the person; where the act constitutes a crime, the person shall be subjected to criminal
liability according to law
[...]
(6) Refusing to perform decisions and rulings of a people’s court that have
already become legally effective.
312. See Chen Jianming Ju Bu Zhixing Renmin Fayuan Panjue An [The Case of Chen
Jianming's Refusal to Implement the Judgment of a People's Court] (Hangzhou City Gongshu District
Basic Level People's Court, Sept. 17, 1993), in DATABASE, supra note 85. In this case, the seriousness
of the circumstances seems to have had to do with the amount owed and the defendant’s reneging on
a mediation agreement.
313. See, e.g., Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang [People's Bank of China], Yinhang Zhanghu
Guanli Banfa [Measures on the Administration of Bank Accounts] (Oct. 28, 1977), in 3 JINGJI
SHENPAN SHOUCE [HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ADJUDICATION] 56, 57 (1988).
314. See Luan Yixin, Peng Yingjie & Shi Heping, Dui Dangqian Shenli Jingji Jiufen Anjian
Youguan Chafeng, Dongjie, Kouhua Kuanxiang De Diaocha Yu Tantao [An Investigation and Inquiry
Into Sealing, Freezing, and Levying Upon Funds in the Adjudication of Economic Dispute Cases]
HEBEI FAXUE [HEBEI LEGAL STUDIES], No. 1, at 25, 26 (1992); Jiangsu Sheng Xuzhou Shi Zhongji
Renmin Fayuan [Intermediate Level People's Court of Jiangsu Province, Suzhou City], Zenyang
Chaxun Bei Zhixing Ren De Zhanghu [How to Investigate the Executee's Bank Accounts], RENMIN
SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No. 8, at 18, 18 (1990).
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only freeze, but not transfer, funds in banks outside of their geographical
jurisdiction,315 the 1991 revision and subsequent interpretation make it clear
that this disability has been abolished in law.316 Nevertheless, it appears to
persist in practice at least in some places, where banks insist on an order
from the local court before consenting to transfer funds.317
Despite its potential for circumventing a defendant’s resistance to
execution, the freezing or seizure of bank deposits faces a number of
obstacles. First, as noted, it is difficult to prevent parties anticipating
litigation from keeping their funds in several bank accounts, some of them
secret.
Second, banks themselves now operate under a much more
competitive regime and are anxious to avoid offending customers. To this
end, they will often drag their heels and in other ways attempt to block the
efforts of courts to take their customers’ money.318 Moreover, in many
cases banks will have outstanding loans to the debtor. Thus they may
attempt to ensure that their own loan is repaid before they freeze any
funds,319 although this practice has been forbidden.320
Third, banks remain sensitive to their status and will not easily take
orders from courts, whom they perceive to be another parallel
bureaucracy.321
Fourth, local governments in some areas have formal or informal rules
forbidding the forcible transfer of funds from local parties to outside

315. See 1983 Joint Notice, supra note 250, at 697; 1992 Fuzhou ILPC 2, supra note 220,
at 9. Despite the existence of a Supreme People’s Court notice recommending entrustment to the local
court of matters pertaining to seizure of funds, a 1989 article in the Legal System Daily found “no
legal basis” for the practice. See Yinhang Xiezhu Fayuan Dongjie Cunkuan De Liang-Ge Wenti [Two
Issues in Banks' Cooperation With Courts in Freezing Deposits], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], Nov. 15, 1989, at 3.
316. See Court Interview F; 1992 SPC Civil Procedure Opinion, supra note 70, at 91 (art.
180).
317. See Court Interview U.
318. See Liu & Mu, supra note 204, at 3; Yinhang “Xiezhu Zhixing Ban’an” Duo Fang
Tuiwei; Lüshi Chuanzhe Jingfu Chumian Hengjia Ganshe [Bank in “Cooperating in the Execution
of a Case” Avoids It in Various Ways; Lawyer Wearing Police Uniform Recklessly Interferes],
SHANGHAI FAZHI BAO [SHANGHAI LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Nov. 26, 1990, at 7.
319. See 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172, at 2; Liu & Mu, supra note 204, at 3.
320. See 1983 Joint Notice, supra note 250; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's
Court], Guanyu Yinhang Shanzi Huabo Fayuan Yi Dongjie De Kuanxiang Ruhe Chuli Wenti De Han
[Letter on How to Deal With the Problem of the Bank's Levying on Its Own Authority on Funds That
Have Already Been Frozen by the Court] (Mar. 26, 1989), in LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATIONS, supra note
97, at 1239. A Heilongjiang bank manager was briefly detained by court order for attempting this
tactic. See 1989 Heilongjiang HLPC, supra note 255.
321. See Lawyer Interview R.
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parties.322 Although such rules are technically unlawful, local banks must
in practice obey them.
c.

Sealing and Seizure of Property

Sealing (chafeng) and seizure (kouya) of property are both measures
authorized by Article 223 of the Law on Civil Procedure to ensure that a
judgment is paid. The defendant is deprived of possession until the
judgment is paid; if it is not paid within a specified period, the court can
sell off the property. In one typical case of sealing, court officials broke the
locks on the defendant’s building, inventoried and removed the property
inside, put a new lock on, and pasted up strips of paper over the door
announcing the sealing.323 Seizure is much simpler: the court simply
removes the property.
The problem with sealing is that it is largely a symbolic measure;
there is little to stop defendants from removing the seals and continuing to
use the property except their fear of court sanctions. If they greatly feared
court sanctions, however, sealing would not be necessary in the first place.
In one case, when a defendant refused to pay a judgment, the court went to
his house to “seal” his television set. Instead of seizing the appliance to
satisfy the judgment, court officials “sealed” it by instructing him not to sell
or otherwise transfer it — which of course he immediately did.324
Courts are also reluctant to take the drastic step of sealing in the case
of assets needed for production by an enterprise because it could lead to
needless waste. Thus, it is recommended that courts instead seize the
ownership certificates of the assets in question in order to prevent their
unlawful transfer, and allow them to continue to be used.325
Auction has increasingly come to be the method of choice in realizing
the value of sealed and seized property. The traditional method of realizing
value was bianmai: “selling off” at a price deemed appropriate by the court
and the buyer. Behind this method is the idea that every asset has an

322. See Court Interview E.
323. See Li Jianyi Baisu Zhan Fang Bu Ban, Nantou Qu Fayuan Qiangzhi Zhixing [Li Jianyi
Loses Lawsuit but Continues to Occupy House Without Moving; Nantou District Court Coercively
Executes], SHENZHEN FAZHI BAO [SHENZHEN LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], Jan. 18, 1989, at 1. The article
is accompanied by a photograph.
324. See Li Wentong Ju Bu Zhixing Fayuan Panjue Bing Yinni Caichan Bei Soucha An [The
Case of Li Wentong, Who Refused to Implement a Court Judgment, Hid Assets, and Was Searched],
SPCG, No. 4, Dec. 20, 1991, at 21.
325. Huang Changqing & Zheng Haishi, Shiyong “Susong Baoquan” He “Zhixing Cuoshi”
De Ji-Dian Changshi [A Few Points of Common Sense About Using “Litigation Preservation” and
“Execution Measures”], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE], No. 5, at 39 (1990).
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objective value independent of the vagaries of supply and demand.
Moreover, some assets such as land might have been deemed unsuited to
market transactions.
The 1991 Law on Civil Procedure explicitly provides for the
auctioning (paimai) of sealed and seized property. It is viewed as superior
because the competition of an auction will produce a better price,
something that benefits both the debtor and the creditor. As more types of
property become subject to market pricing, auctioning will become more
common. In 1991, the Supreme People’s Court Gazette published the
proceedings of an otherwise unremarkable case in which a house was
auctioned to pay a judgment, apparently just to show that even something
as sensitive as housing could be subject to auction.326 On the other hand, the
law still contains large gaps: courts are to turn the seized property over to
“the relevant unit” for auctioning, but there is no law or regulation
indicating who that “relevant unit” might be.327
d.

Labor Service

An intriguing and controversial method of execution that may become
more common is labor service (laowu dizhai; laowu daichang; zhedi laoyi)
whereby the judgment debtor works off the debt. There is little now to stop
a creditor from agreeing to hire a debtor and to pay him at a certain rate for
his labor.328 The issue is whether the court should be involved in coercing
the labor of a debtor.
One proposal suggests that morally blameworthy debtors could be
required to work in labor re-education camps for a period of time in order
to pay off their debts.329 Another proposal suggests that debtors with no

326. See Lin Jinzhang Ju Bu Lüxing Fayuan Panjue, Bei Qiangzhi Bianmai Fangchan
Zhixing An [The Execution Case of Lin Jinzhang, Who Refused to Carry Out the Court's Judgment
and Whose House Was Coercively Auctioned], SPCG, No. 4, Dec. 20, 1991, at 22.
327. See Zhang Jingxue, Zhixing Chengxu Zhong De “Yi Wu Di Zhai” [“Paying Debts in
Kind” in the Execution Process], FAXUE [LEGAL STUDIES], No. 5, at 17 (1994).
328. A 1991 Supreme People’s Court document allows labor service where both parties agree
and the arrangement harms the interests neither of society nor of third parties. See Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Shenli Jiedai Anjian De Ruogan Yijian
[Several Opinions on the Adjudication by People's Courts of Borrowing-Lending Cases] (Aug. 13,
1991), art. 20, in ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN 1992 [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 1992], at 532
[hereinafter 1991 SPC Opinions].
329. See Yang Duoming, Shi Xi Jingji Jiufen Anjian Zhixing Nan De Yuanyin He Duice [A
Tentative Analyis of Causes and Countermeasures for the Difficulty of Executing in Cases of
Economic Disputes], SHEHUI KEXUE JIA [SOCIAL SCIENTIST], No. 4, at 87, 88 (1989).
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money but the ability to labor could be sent to work off their debts in some
kind of factory.330
The legal community in China is extremely cautious about the idea of
labor service. A prominent concern is whether the public will accept what
is essentially the imposition of servitude for civil obligations.331 Another
concern is whether it might, given the “current judicial circumstances”
(muqian zheizhong sifa zhuangkuang), lead to abuses of power.332
Although a proposal to include it in the latest revision of the Law on
Civil Procedure was rejected,333 labor service is still apparently imposed by
some courts on their own.334
e.

Payment in Kind

It frequently happens that a debtor has goods but no cash. In such a
case, the court may encourage the creditor to take the goods in lieu of cash
(yi wu di zhai).335 The obvious problem with this method is that the reason
the debtor has no cash is precisely that nobody wants to buy its products.
The Supreme People’s Court has endorsed this method where the plaintiff
agrees to it.336 This hardly seems necessary, since debtors usually do not
need anyone’s permission to make a sale to creditors. The problem is that
courts sometimes force this method of execution upon plaintiffs against
their will.337

330. See Lawyer Interview W.
331. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Fushun Shi Fayuan Suo
Qingshi De Li Fusheng, Pi Yanxiang Er An Ying Ruhe Chuli De Fuhan [Reply to the Request for
Instructions from the Fushun City Court on How to Handle the Two Cases of Li Fusheng and Pi
Yanxiang] (Jan. 6, 1955), in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN [PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT], YOUGUAN SHENPAN YEWU HUIBIAN [COLLECTED
DOCUMENTS RELATED TO ADJUDICATION] 30 (1958) (barring labor service in one case because of fear
of losing “social sympathy”); MINSHI SUSONG FA DE XIUGAI YU SHIYONG, supra note 75, at 266
(expressing concerns about negative public reactions).
332. See id.
333. See Academic Interview P.
334. See Academic Interview L.
335. See Xining Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Xining Intermediate Level People's Court],
Wo Shi Fayuan Zai Zhixing Zhong Caiyong “Yi Wu Di Zhai” Fangshi De Jidian Zuofa [Some Ways
in Which Our Court Adopted the Method of “Payment of Debt in Kind” in the Course of Execution],
in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42; Chen Xiangli, Jiejue “Zhixing Nan” Wenti De Yi-Zhong
Duice—Dui “Biantong Zhixing” De Ji-Dian Renshi [A Method for Solving the Problem of “Difficulty
in Execution”—Some Ideas About “Alternative Execution”], FAXUE PINGLUN [LEGAL STUDIES
REVIEW], No. 6, at 71, 72 (1990).
336. 1991 SPC Opinions, supra note 328, art. 21.
337. See Liao Mujie, Minshi Zhixing Zhong De Yi Wu Di Zhai Chutan [An Initial
Investigation Into the Payment of Debt in Kind in Civil Execution], RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE'S
JUDICATURE], No. 3, at 25, 25-26 (1992); for general criticisms, see Zhang, supra note 327.
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Payment in kind, when forced on the judgment creditor, runs against
the grain of economic reform because it relies on the notion of innate,
objectively determinable value instead of value determined by supply and
demand. If the creditor does not wish to accept the goods at the value
placed on them by the court, according to one treatise, the goods will be
returned to the execution debtor and execution suspended.338 According to
another treatise, if property cannot be sold at the price originally asked by
the court, the court cannot simply “sell it off cheaply” for whatever it will
bring.339
f.

Other Non-Statutory Methods

Courts have at times shown remarkable ingenuity in fashioning
remedies that will go some way toward solving problems created by postMao reforms while respecting the ideological strictures of an earlier day.
A serious problem can arise, for example, when a state body has large debts
but where it is unlawful to sell or otherwise transfer for value the assets
under its control (which formally belong to the state and of which it is the
steward). An enterprise, for example, might have non-transferable mining
rights; a scientific research institute might have land and buildings that
cannot be auctioned without compromising its state-assigned mission.
Compulsory administration (qiangzhi guanli) meets this problem of market
failure (more accurately, market non-existence) by having the court
“administer” the rights of the execution debtor and turn the revenues over
to the judgment creditor. While not authorized by statute, this procedure
has apparently been used by at least one court, which appointed an
administrator to be paid from the revenues derived from the managed
property.340
Another creative method designed to deal with the same type of
problem is a transfer of ownership plus leaseback where selling the
execution debtor’s property — for example, a factory building — is
deemed undesirable because it would create unemployment. Here, the court
transfers ownership of the fixed assets to the judgment creditor, which then
leases them back to the execution debtor. The rent is set at the bank interest
rate on the value of the assets as assessed by “relevant units.” If the
execution debtor misses rent payments or stops using the property in

338. See CIVIL PROCEDURE TREATISE, supra note 262, at 448.
339. See ZHONGGUO MINSHI SUSONG FA JIAOCHENG, supra note 102, at 352.
340. See Nanchang Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Nanchang Intermediate Level
People's Court Execution Chamber], Qiangzhi Guanli Chutan [An Initial Investigation Into
Compulsory Administration], in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 42.
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question, it can be sold by the creditor in satisfaction of the debt.341
Unfortunately, a number of questions about this method of execution
remain unanswered. For example, is the assessed value of the transferred
assets supposed to equal the amount of the debt? What standards will the
“relevant units” use to assess value?
A similar solution was reached by a court when faced with an
execution debtor that had no property except a number of taxis whose use
it subcontracted out to drivers. The drivers had a right to purchase the cars
after a certain period of time and upon the payment of a sum of money.
Instead of seizing the cars, the court seized the ownership certificates and
instructed the drivers to make future payments to the judgment creditor.342
g.

Self-Help

When plaintiffs feel that courts are unable to give them what they
desire — a favorable ruling that is promptly executed — they may resort
to self-help. Self-help should be discussed in a survey of execution
techniques because not only is the line between pre-judgment and
post-judgment remedies sometimes obscure, but so is the line between
officially-sanctioned and private remedies. Moreover, there is no sharp
distinction between courts and police.
The result is that whether before or after judgment, a well-connected
plaintiff may be able to enlist the aid of public security forces in achieving
its objective. It may also choose to go it alone with the acquiescence of the
police and courts.
In one frequently reported type of self-help case, a plaintiff from city
(or county or town) A will have the police from the same city detain a
defendant from outside city A until the claimed debt is paid.343 The police
cooperate because the plaintiff is an important local enterprise. In reports
of such cases, the detention is typically justified as part of an investigation
into charges of fraud against the defendant, but the extortionate motive is

341. See Sichuan Sheng Zigong Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Sichuan Province Zigong City
Intermediate Level People's Court], Gan Yu Zhi Fa, Shan Yu Zhi Fa, Tupo Zhixing Nan [Dare to
Implement the Law, Be Good at Implementing the Law, Make a Breakthrough in Execution Difficulty],
in SELECTED PROBLEMS, supra note 47, at 249, 258.
342. See Huang & Zheng, supra note 325, at 39.
343. See generally Zhou Shihua, Dui Zhaiquan Zhaiwu Jiufen Yinqi De Feifa Jujin An De
Pouxi [An Analysis of Cases of Unlawful Detention Arising Out of Debt Disputes], ZHONG-WAI
FAXUE [CHINESE AND FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE], No. 6, at 56 (1993); Zhang Ya & Wei Zhi,
Zhongguo “Renzhi Xianxiang” [China’s “Hostage Phenomenon”], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], Jan. 2, 1994, at 5; 1992 Chengdu ILPC, supra note 172. These are only a few of the numerous
articles on the subject that could be cited.
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only thinly disguised. In one case, for example, police from Renxian county
in Hebei traveled to Zhengzhou in Henan, where they arrested and brought
back to Renxian the manager of a department store involved in a dispute
over nails supplied by a Renxian enterprise. Police said they were acting
under instructions from county leaders and would not release the manager
until the nails were paid for.344 In another case report in the book One
Hundred Strategies for Using Law to Clear Up Debts, the writer mentions
as an aside that a plaintiff trying to collect a debt asked the police and the
procuracy to assist. They helpfully detained three people from the
defendant organization for up to eight months, but were unsuccessful in
collecting.345
This strategy appears to have become quite widespread and is
international in scope. While judicial kidnapping of foreign citizens
originally appears, interestingly enough, to have been limited to ethnic
Chinese, it has lately been extended to those from other ethnic groups as
well. In all cases, it was made clear that the victim would be released when
the sum demanded was forthcoming.346
Although the central government has been unwilling or unable to
respond in concrete cases, there is a series of regulations since 1990347 —
all apparently ineffective, given their similar content — that spell out the
details of the problem. The most recent such regulation, from 1993, repeats
the admonition to local procuracies not to arrest people in ordinary
economic disputes.348 In particular, they are instructed not to get involved

344. See Illegal Detention in Hebei Condemned, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 11, 1993, at 3.
345. See YUNYONG FALÜ SHOUDUAN QING ZHAI BAI CE, supra note 195, at 234.
346. See generally Jonathan Manthorpe, Sour Business Deals a Risk for Canadians;
Hostage-Taking, Arrests Become a Major Problem, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 25, 1994, at E8.
347. Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan [Supreme People’s Procuracy], Guanyu Bu De Yi Jiancha
Jiguan De Mingyi Wei Dangdi Zhuikuan Taozhai De Tongzhi [Notice That It Is Not Permitted to Seek
Repayment of Debts in the Name of the Procuracy on Behalf of the Locality] (Apr. 16, 1990), in LAW
COMPENDIUM, supra note 233, at 173; Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan [Supreme People’s Procuracy],
Guanyu Yi-Xie Jiancha Jiguan Yuequan Ban’an Canyu Zhuikuan Taozhai De Qingkuang Tongbao
[Bulletin on the Situation in Which Some Procuratorial Organs Handle Cases Outside the Scope of
Their Authority and Get Involved in Seeking Repayment of Debts] (Jan. 10, 1991), in LAW
COMPENDIUM, supra note 233, at 173; Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan [Supreme People’s Procuracy],
Guanyu Yanjin Jiancha Jiguan Yuequan Ban’an Chashou Jingji Jiufen Weifa Buren De Tongzhi
[Notice Strictly Forbidding Procuratorial Organs From Handling Cases Outside the Scope of Their
Authority, Interfering in Economic Disputes, and Unlawfully Arresting People] (July 20, 1993), in
ZUIGAO RENMIN JIANCHAYUAN GONGBAO [SUPREME PEOPLE’S PROCURACY GAZETTE], No. 1, Apr.
15, 1993, at 28 [hereinafter 1993 Procuratorial Notice].
348. A 1995 Supreme People’s Court Reply spells out that there is no legal basis for
procuracies to lodge protests (kangsu) against decisions to execute the same way they can against
other court decisions. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan [Supreme People's Court], Guanyu Dui Zhixing
Chengxu Zhong De Caiding De Kangsu Bu Yu Shouli De Pifu [Reply That Protests Against Rulings
in the Course of Execution Proceedings Shall Not Be Accepted] (Aug. 10, 1995), in DATABASE, supra
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in contract, debt, and other economic disputes; not to get involved in the
recovery of debts or the taking of debt hostages; not to make arrests outside
their geographical jurisdiction without notifying local authorities; and not
to charge fees for their services or take a portion of the amount
recovered.349
In a case reported in 1993, a local court invalidated the detention of
a man who had been captured from another county by local police solely
on the basis of allegations by a rival. His whereabouts were discovered
shortly after his disappearance when the police cabled his family informing
them that he had been detained for investigation and instructing them to
come and “resolve” the matter.350 The court’s decision was based not on the
unlawful grounds for detention, however, but on the technical ground that
the detention had exceeded the three months allowed by the Ministry of
Public Security’s regulations on administrative detention.351
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article began with the proposition that some but not all court
judgments and decisions are difficult to execute, and that this affects the
practical significance of economic and other rights apparently granted by
law.
The available evidence, while often contradictory, suggests certain
patterns. It will be difficult, for example, to execute against a large and
locally-important but cash-poor state-owned enterprise in a poor province.
All eviction cases against individuals will be difficult, but there is no
special difficulty in evicting organizational tenants.
It is surprisingly difficult, however, given the attention that has been
devoted to the problem of execution difficulties, to come to a firm
note 85.
349. See 1993 Procuratorial Notice, supra note 347.
350. See Wu Peisheng & Zhou Qiang, Danyang Fayuan Chexiao Yi Shou-Shen Jueding
[Danyang Court Cancels a Decision on Custody and Investigation], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM
DAILY], July 12, 1993, at 1.
351. The point of invalidating the detention, from which the plaintiff had already been
released, was simply to clear his name. The particular regulations breached by the local police, those
pertaining to a form of detention called “custody and investigation” (shourong shencha; also
sometimes translated as “shelter and investigation”), have never been publicly issued and remain in
effect a state secret. See generally Donald C. Clarke & James V. Feinerman, Antagonistic
Contradictions: Criminal Law and Human Rights in China, CHINA Q., No. 141, at 135, 143-144 (Mar.
1995); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS 67-71 (1993). A number of regulations building on the original authorizing
regulations, such as the 1985 Notice of the Ministry of Public Security Concerning Strict Control of
the Use of the Method of Custody and Investigation, are translated in the September-October 1994
issue of Chinese Law and Government.
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conclusion about its seriousness, particularly in comparison with other
societies. The reality of what Chinese courts do and don’t do is simply too
messy to provide neat answers to the questions posed at the beginning of
this article. Nevertheless, the evidence canvassed here does throw a
surprising amount of light on a number of other issues of importance.

A.

Legal Culture

It is impossible to read a large number of news reports and articles
dealing with execution without realizing that a certain legal culture beyond
the written rules is at work. In the realm of execution policy and practice,
legal culture means a sense of the arguments and considerations that should
count in deciding whether or not a person shall be required to perform (or
to refrain from performing) a certain act. Some of these ideas may well be
written into the law, but others may not. Indeed, some of the arguments and
considerations that are deemed to count may contradict what the written
law says.
There are numerous examples of the unwritten rules that courts go by
even though there is no statutory support.352 Some of those unwritten rules
have a basis in policy; others have a basis in no more than popular
perceptions of what is right and reasonable.
A recurring example of a legal idea that has actual force (in that courts
and other legal officials feel constrained by it) is the principle of widened
responsibility. I say “widened” not only because Chinese notions of
responsibility are often much wider than those of Anglo-American law, but
also because they are often wider than what Chinese law itself calls for.
Although this principle is apparent in many areas of the legal system,353 it
will be discussed here only insofar as it is relevant to execution: in cases
where although the mandate of the law is clear, Chinese legal officials will
hesitate to act because the defendant can plausibly (but without, strictly

352. See, for example, the rules on eviction and on seizure of capital stock in satisfaction of
debt discussed respectively supra at text accompanying notes 278 to 290 and at text accompanying
note 262.
353. For example, both traditional and modern Chinese criminal law accept the notion that
one can be criminally responsible for driving another to suicide through acts which, by themselves,
are lawful.
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speaking, any legal basis) argue that others are equally if not more
responsible for his situation.
Take, for example, the recurring problem of evictions. It is
commonplace that the landlord is expected to help the tenant find another
place to live and perhaps help out with the rent, at least at first. Since the
tenant has a place to go, she can no longer argue that eviction will mean
putting her out on the street, an argument that is sure to paralyze the court.
After being forcibly evicted and moved to new quarters, however,
apparently some tenants will refuse to pay the rent, telling the new landlord
to look to the court for it, since it is the court’s “fault” that they are where
they are. According to one court writing about this phenomenon, this puts
the court in a difficult position because “it has no way to solve the
problem.”354 Of course, it does have a way: the new landlord can bring an
action to evict for non-payment of rent, and the court can evict. But the
court doesn’t want to evict. Where the defendant has a unit, it can garnish
his wages to pay the rent, but where the defendant has no salary income,
garnishment is impossible.355
The same phenomenon is visible when enterprises refuse to pay a debt
on the grounds that it was incurred by a former manager, not the current
one.356 Obviously, the validity of the debt cannot be made to depend on
whether the debtor agrees that it is owed. Yet courts cite managerial
changeovers as an obstacle to execution different in kind from a general
reluctance on the part of the debtor to pay. By distinguishing the two
circumstances, courts grant a certain validity to the argument and disarm
themselves.
Interestingly, we can see the same phenomenon in reverse when a
creditor attempts to collect from an enterprise whose sole relation to the
debt is that it was formerly under the management of the current debtor’s
manager.357 I would predict that one can find cases of attempts to collect

354. Guiyang Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Ting [Guiyang Intermediate Level
People's Court], Jiji Kaizhan Zhixing Huodong, Weihu Falü De Zunyan [Actively Launch Execution
Activities, Uphold the Dignity of the Law], in “ZHIXING NAN” DUICE TAN, supra note 49, at 118, 124.
355. See id., at 124.
356. See, e.g., id., at 123; Li Honghe & Yang Dianwen, Yao Yan Yu Zhi Fa Bixu Zuohao
Zhixing Gongzuo [To Be Strict in Implementing the Law Means We Must Do Execution Work Well],
HEILONGJIANG FAZHI BAO [HEILONGJIANG LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS], July 19, 1986, at 3, 3; Fei, supra
note 145, at 63.
357. In one case, enterprise A’s truck was essentially hijacked and its driver beaten by
unidentified persons. The enterprise later discovered the they had been sent by a court trying to collect
on behalf of a local plaintiff from enterprise B. The connection was that the manager of enterprise B
was the former manager of enterprise A. See Legal Advisor, Qingyuan Xian Fayuan Zheiyang Zhixing
Panjue Dui Ma? [Is It Correct for the Qingyuan County Court to Execute Its Judgment in This Way?],
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Feb. 22, 1993, at 1.
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from a particular enterprise on the grounds that it is now managed by the
person who managed the debtor enterprise when the debt was incurred.
This study also illuminates other aspects of Chinese legal culture. It
confirms, for example, the generally observed reluctance of the system to
give teeth to rules respecting finality if it were ever to be at the cost of
getting the right substantive result. In short, the system simply does not
assign a high relative cost to delay and uncertainty. Both at the adjudicatory
and the execution stage, defendants are given many more chances to make
their case than a reading of the letter of the law would indicate. This
reluctance to accept finality is part of a broader reluctance to allow any
aspect of procedure to dictate a substantive result, a reluctance that finds
expression throughout the legal system. It is inconceivable, for example,
that a wrongdoer in China could escape punishment on a technicality. A
sharply contrasting view of the importance of procedure relative to
substance can be found in a recent dissent by Justice Antonin Scalia: “What
the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural guarantee assures is an
opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment in state
court; but there is no federal guarantee a damages award actually be
reasonable.”358 This way of thinking is profoundly alien to the legal culture
apparent in this study. It would be the duty of any court at any stage of the
process to remedy unreasonableness or injustice whenever it found it.
The concern for a substantively correct outcome is not, however,
overriding. While substance may trump procedure, it does not trump
everything else. The imperative to keep up appearances can be so strong
that it crowds out all other values. Consider the courts cited earlier that
maintained a high rate of execution by ensuring that problematic judgments
were not issued or problematic cases not even heard. So normal and
acceptable was this practice, even with its clear cost to plaintiffs with a
sound case, that some courts were praised for their success with these
gatekeeping techniques.359
B.

Anomalous Position of Courts in the Chinese Polity

As argued in Part II of this article, the establishment and maintenance
of market institutions in the reforming Chinese economy requires — or at
least is substantially aided by — a particular kind of rule making and rule
application. This rule making and application is characterized by generality

358.
dissenting).
359.

BMW of North America v. Gore, 64 U.S.L.W. 4335, 4347 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
See supra text accompanying notes 134 to 136.
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and should be understood in opposition to the traditional system of ad hoc
bargaining between individual enterprises and their superiors.
The problem with a system of general rules is that there is currently
no system of institutions in China willing and able to enforce them. First,
there is a chicken-and-egg problem. In the absence of complete economic
reform, economic activity does not take place on a level playing field.
Thus, applying general rules without taking individual differences into
account is not only seen as unfair, but actually is so. Moreover, it may be
counterproductive as well, if efficient enterprises that nevertheless lose
money find themselves in trouble, for example, under the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law. However, the development of a market economy is
obstructed to the extent that the principle of particularism reigns.
Second, making general rules stick implicates important questions of
political power. It means drastically weakening the power of some
institutions to grant exemptions and building institutions that can enforce
the rules. Courts have seemed the natural candidate for the task because of
their sweeping formal authority and their ability to keep to a minimum the
amount of noise in policy transmission. They are not, however, capable of
carrying it out as currently structured.
Two principles, tiao and kuai, govern the flow of power in the
Chinese political system. Tiao is the principle of vertical control: superiors
in a given bureaucratic hierarchy dictate to inferiors. Kuai is the principle
of horizontal control: a particular body at a given level of adminstration —
say, the Party committee — has control over certain other bodies at the
same level of administration in a given jurisdiction.360 Individual courts are
subject to both in varying degrees. As noted previously, they are subject to
the principle of kuai in the key field of personnel decisions, but subject to
the principle of tiao when the correctness of their decisions is in question.
But the exercise of power by courts fits comfortably into neither principle,
and this is the key to their continued weakness. Courts are, and are seen by
other bureaucracies as, a separate but equal bureaucratic hierarchy. They
are conceded their own sphere of authority, to be sure, but they do not have
the overarching authority of courts in common law and, to a lesser extent,
continental European legal sytems. The only power that a court can
exercise by virtue of tiao is over a lower court. Courts have real power over
other bodies only by virtue of kuai: provided they are supported by local
government, they can exercise real power over local actors. But this is not
supposed to be the source of court power. Court power is supposed to stem

360. For a much fuller but still concise summary of the workings of tiao and kuai, see
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA 169-70 (1995).
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from their authority to pass judgment on disputes involving anyone in
accordance with rules validly promulgated by a large number of local and
national bodies.
Courts are thus in the position of occupying a doubly anomalous
position in the Chinese polity: exercising a power that is supposed to stem
neither from tiao nor from kuai, and enforcing a set of rules that are
essentially alien to the system: rules that purport to operate horizontally,
across bureaucracies, and to bind all citizens and institutions equally.
C.

Lag of Legal Reform Behind Economic Reform and Other Social
Changes

While China’s courts are hampered in one sense by being too far in
front of the rest of reform, in other important ways they suffer from being
too far behind. While there have been significant legal reforms in the Deng
era, in many crucial areas the legal system remains as before and is thus
unable to perform the task of enforcing the rules of economic reform. First,
there is no evidence to suggest that courts have more real power now than
they did a decade ago. The observance of court judgments for many
institutions remains essentially voluntary. Despite the increasing reliance
of the government upon statutory law as a means of policy implementation
(as opposed, for example, to political campaigns), surprisingly little has
been done to enable courts to enforce these laws effectively.
Moreover, the social and economic milieu in which courts operate has
changed as well. What used to work is no longer so effective as before. For
example, when virtually all urban residents worked within an organization
responsible to the state, a good deal of enforcement could be carried out
within the organization. When the income of most defendants is in the form
of a wage, then support payments can be deducted from the wage. On the
other hand, garnishing wages is completely ineffective as an execution
measure against individual businesspeople (getihu) who have no wages to
garnish.361
Yet another reason for the apparent increase in execution difficulties
is the change in the nature of cases heard by courts. Divorce cases were
361. A 1957 article noted the same phenomenon when economic reform was moving, as it
were, in the opposite direction: after the “socialist transformation” of industry in the 1950s, debt cases
between individual businesspeople (artisans, merchants, etc.) essentially disappeared. The debtors
seen by courts after that were typically salaried employees. This made the garnishing of wages a much
more effective tool of execution that it had been before. See Xuanwu Court, supra note 242, at 23.
A study of judgment collection procedures in New Jersey found that wage execution orders
were notably more effectively than other collection procedures. See New Jersey Report, supra note
52.
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traditionally the mainstay of civil litigation.362 The divorce declaration itself
needs no execution, and the amount of property to be redistributed was
small. What urban residents had that was most valuable was their right to
live and work in the city, something not subject to division as property. The
majority of cases that did feature defendants reluctant to pay were family
cases involving duties of support.363 With the progress of economic reform,
courts have found themselves called on to do what they had almost never
been called on to do before: enforce judgments against state enterprises. At
the same time, however, they remain under the de facto control of the same
power that controls local enterprises.
The persistence of local control over courts demonstrates that
establishing a system where courts would have real power involves
grasping some very thorny political nettles. If anything stands out from a
study of execution difficulties, it is the confirmation at a fine level of
institutional detail of the impression of many observers that the central
government faces serious problems in making its writ run in the provinces.
Interviews and published sources all make clear that a good part of the
execution problem stems from the willingness and ability of local
governments simply to ignore central regulations and directives when it
suits them. Even when the central authorities are directly aware of the
problem, they seem in some cases unable or unwilling to do anything about
it. The plight of courts is in this case a symptom, not a cause, of this larger
problem. Reforms in the staffing of courts, long promised and long delayed,
as well as reforms in the way courts are financed — reforms that have not
been promised — are necessary before courts can be used to overcome the
obstacles to reform caused by local protectionism and particularism,
because they are now part of the very structure causing the problem.364
D.

Proper Role of State in Establishment of Efficient Social
Institutions

From a broader perspective, the prominence of local and regional
centers of political power on the list of obstacles to execution of judgments
in China may shed light on the question of the proper role of the state in the
362. Indeed, even in 1992 divorce cases constituted some 70% of the civil case load at one
court I visited. See Court Interview V.
363. See Jiamusi Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi [Jiamusi Intermediate Level People's
Court], Jingji, Minshi Caipan Zhixing Nan De Yuanyin Ji Duice [Causes and Countermeasures for
Difficulty in Execution in Economic and Civil Adjudication], FAXUE YU SHIJIAN [JURISPRUDENCE AND
PRACTICE], No. 4, at 41, 41 (1988).
364. This point is made by a number of sources. See Academic Interview P; Luo, supra note
148, at 84.
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establishment of economically efficient social institutions. Recent writing
in law and economics has attacked the “legal-centralist” view, attributed to
scholars from Hobbes to Calabresi, that the state is the exclusive creator of
property rights.365 Instead, these writers say, property rights may arise
“anarchically out of social custom” and “from the workings of
non-hierarchical social forces.”366
It may be, of course, that the debate will turn out to be about what the
participants mean by “rights.” Just how compulsory must the corresponding
duty be before we will find that a “right” exists? Ellickson’s study of norms
established spontaneously in the whaling industry hardly disproves the
legal-centralist thesis when the writer concedes that the system broke down
as economic pressures led some whalers simply to defect.367 The assurance
of enforcement, the confidence that others cannot defect at will, is the
whole point of having a right, and the key to the arguments of Douglass C.
North and others that well-defined rights are necessary for sustained
economic development to occur.368
If we adopt a strong definition of “rights,” however, the Chinese case
suggests that the spontaneous-rights thesis, while not necessarily wrong,
has limits in a complex economy. Efficient economic organization doesn’t
just happen: there are powerful political forces opposed to it that can be
overcome only by more powerful political forces. State intervention is just
as necessary to a complex market economy as it is to a planned economy.
Local governmental power made the Commerce Clause necessary in the
United States Constitution; federal governmental power is needed to
enforce it.
E.

Relevance for North Hypothesis

An important issue raised by the weakness of rights-enforcing
institutions in China is the extent to which that observed weakness
challenges the connection made by North and others between economic
development and well-defined and enforceable rights of property and
contract. The intuitive appeal of the hypothesis is undeniable: it seems
beyond dispute that the unavailability or unenforceability of property rights

365. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from
the Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG’N 83 (1989); R. Zerbe, The Development of Institutions
and the Joint Production of Fairness and Efficiency in the California Gold Fields (Right Makes Might)
(May 8, 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
366. See Ellickson, supra note 365, at 83.
367. See id., at 95 n.39.
368. See NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 11.
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is going to deter useful investment that would otherwise occur. Consider
the predicament of the Chinese peasant interviewed below:
When asked, Mr. Yang says that agricultural production and
income could increase even further if the family made some
irrigation improvements, terraced more of their land, and planted
fruit trees. Mr. Yang, though, is unwilling to make such capital
improvements to the land. The profits from such investments
would only be realized after several years, and Mr. Yang
considers his family’s use rights to the land too uncertain.
Although the local leaders told him they could use the land for
at least fifteen years, the [Yang family’s] land use contract has
no such term. And Mr. Yang notes that his neighbors were
required to give up a portion of their land, on which they had
recently planted fruit trees, for a road. The neighbors received no
compensation.369
One might interpret the much-vaunted consumption boom in the Chinese
countryside as evidence of agricultural investments forgone for the reasons
cited by Mr. Yang.
Although it seems clear that investment by Mr. Yang and others
similarly situated is the type of transaction that is going to suffer if courts,
who have been given the task of guaranteeing Mr. Yang’s rights, are unable
to do so, it remains to be seen whether the discouragement of such
transactions is a major problem.
The evidence so far suggests that economic development in China has
not been significantly hampered by the lack in some circumstances of
effective enforcement of rights. Nobody who was in China in, say, 1978
can doubt the reality of the tremendous economic growth and rise in
prosperity that has occurred since that time. How can that undeniable fact
be reconciled with the evidence adduced here that legal institutions remain

369. Tim Hanstad, The Effects of Rural Reforms on a Chinese Family, RURAL DEV. INST.
REV., at 1, 2 (Spring 1993). In another work based on the same set of interviews, the researchers write:
If land is taken, little legal assurance is afforded the farmer in obtaining
compensation — either for the disturbance of his usership or for improvements
he may have made in the land. It appears that only nominal compensation, if
any, is given. . . . [T]he farmer will not keep the continuing benefit of long-term
improvements . . . .
ROY L. PROSTERMAN & TIM HANSTAD, LAND REFORM IN CHINA: A FIELDWORK-BASED APPRAISAL
37 (1993). For a recent summary of the authors’ research and arguments about the relationship
between secure rights and productive investment, see Roy L. Prosterman, Tim Hanstad & Li Ping,
Can China Feed Itself?, SCI. AM., Nov. 1996, at 90.
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essentially unreformed and ill-suited to the institutions of a market
economy, that property and contract rights are not reliably enforced?
Apparently, either the popular connection drawn between economic
development and the effective protection of rights is mistaken, or the
Chinese system does indeed provide such protection where it counts.
It is possible, of course, that the observations are simply wrong:
perhaps, despite surface appearances, legal institutions in China provide far
more predictability and stability than they appear to. The news on
execution of judgments is not all bad. While courts still do not have a great
deal of general power to impose their will, in a number of well-defined
circumstances, they are not the paper tigers that some of the Chinese (and
Western) literature makes them out to be. As one court official pointed out,
“‘Difficult to execute’ does not mean ‘impossible to execute’ (zhixing nan
bu dengyu zhixing bu liao).”370
Another possibility is that both the North hypothesis and the findings
of this paper are right. China’s current growth would then be explained as
taking place in spite of the absence of appropriate legal institutions. The
tremendous advance over the pre-reform period would be explained not as
a function of how hospitable the current institutional structure is to
economic development, but instead as a function of how unimaginably
inhospitable and restrictive the pre-reform system was. The thunderclap of
growth we have witnessed over the past several years is, in this view,
nothing more than the air of entrepreneurship rushing in to fill a vacuum.
It is, essentially, a one-time-only advance that will stall out when further
gains from exchange can be obtained only from a division of labor and
institutional complexity not supported by China’s legal institutional
structure.
A final possibility is that the North hypothesis is simply wrong:
perhaps stable and predictable rights of property and contract, effectively
enforced, are only a small part of the explanation of why economic growth
occurs. It may be that while they matter at the margin, reasonably effective
institutional substitutes are available and other factors are much more
important contributors to economic development. Macauley, for example,
demonstrated the discontinuity between contract law and the contracting
practices of businesses in the United States; what mattered more to the
parties than the law was that they were in a relationship that was beneficial

370.

Court Interview K.
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to both.371 According to this theory, I keep my promise to you not because
of the threat of legal sanctions, but because I want to do business again
either with you or with those who would hear about any promises I broke.
A great deal of business can be done on the basis of trusted go-betweens
and the desire for a long-term relationship. In such circumstances, legally
enforceable rights are simply not very important. Court-enforced rights are
most needed in the case of transactions between strangers who do not
expect to have further dealings with each other and are indifferent to
reputational damage. But how important are such transactions to an
economy? Even what might seem the paradigmatic example of such a
transaction, anonymous buying and selling on the stock market, takes place
within an institutional framework where market authorities can, in order to
attract customers and encourage repeat transactions, impose their own
sanctions such as expulsion on wrongdoers and set up a private insurance
scheme for cheated investors.
This theory, of course, has its limits. If the promise of further business
is the only glue that holds contractual relations together, then an entire class
of necessary and useful contracts — those between parties who have no
need or desire for anything more than a one-shot deal — will be
unenforceable and thus discouraged. There are, however, reasons for
thinking that in China this class of contract is relatively rare, and that
therefore this problem is relatively unimportant, at least for the moment.
First of all, China’s population is not very mobile. Although mobility
has increased tremendously in the economic reform era, changing one’s
residence is still difficult. Therefore, a party who prepays on a contract has
less reason (although not of course no reason) to fear that the other party
will simply disappear with the money.
Second, only a small percentage of economic activity measured by
value is conducted by individual entrepreneurs, with most of the rest
conducted by units of government at various levels.372 These are much
more likely to be known quantities to a prospective business partner.
Altogether, then, it may be that relational contracting can carry economic

371. See Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). On the theory of relational contracting, see Ian Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-Classical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 854 (1978).
372. See Table 1 in Barry Naughton, Distinctive Features of Economic Reform in China and
Vietnam, in REFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISM: THE GROWTH OF MARKET INSTITUTIONS, supra note 9,
at 282. A small percentage of output is attributable to joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises.
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development in China a long way even in the absence of a well functioning
formal system.
A further question raised by the North hypothesis is whether we might
expect to see not economic development as a response to institutional
innovation, but rather institutional innovation as a response to economic
development. Can demand create supply? Under this conjecture, the growth
and increasing complexity of economic activity in China will eventually
tend to generate the institutions needed to keep it going. The difficulty here
is supplying a mechanism whereby demand elicits supply. Many societies
in history would have been much better off with a well developed legal
system, but they didn’t all get one.
The most plausible scenario may be one founded on the increasing
power of regional governments coupled with an increased mobility of
capital. While the central government has not so far shown much capacity
for creating a set of institutions that can effectively enforce property rights,
it may be more possible for the provinces (and perhaps governments at even
lower levels) to do so. Why should they want to? The answer here lies in
competition for resources. The region that provides the most hospitable
environment for economic activity will reap the rewards of increased
employment and tax revenues.373 This may be one of the reasons behind the
judicial cooperation agreements signed by Shanghai with several other
cities in the late 1980s374 and more recently by courts of several cities along
the Yangtse.375 The key to this scenario is that provinces must be
independent enough to be able to offer meaningful differences in economic
environment, but not independent enough to obstruct the free movement of
capital.

373. One should also note that in the absence of strong, enforceable central policies on
environmental protection, such competition is likely to lead to severe pollution that “will make
Eastern Europe look like a nature park.” Ann McIlroy, An Economic Boom Is Fuelled by
Environment-Destroying Material, VANCOUVER SUN, May 1, 1993, at B2 (quoting Western diplomat
in Beijing).
374. See supra note 213 and sources cited therein.
375. See Sixty-Four Courts, supra note 213; Peng, supra note 213.

